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ABSTRACT
Self-esteem, viewed for decades as psychology’s Holy Grail, has proved to be an elusive and
surprisingly barren destination. One of the oldest concepts in psychology, self-esteem likely
ranks among the top three covariates occurring in personality and social psychology research.
Propelled by the self-esteem movement of the 1970s, it was popularly believed that self-esteem
played a significant causal role in determining a wide range of both positive and negative social
behaviors. However, the results of a 2003 large-scale literature review showed that it is actually
not a major predictor of almost anything, with the exception of positive feelings (happiness) and
possibly greater initiative. With over a decade passing since that publication, the current
investigation sought to review, synthesize and critically analyze the more recent literature.
Results confirmed a similar dearth of meaningful relationships connected to self-esteem, the only
exceptions being some modest correlates to happiness, narcissism, and self-perceived
attractiveness and intelligence. However, the literature continues to be plagued with myriad
conceptual and methodological problems. This study utilizes specific critical thinking principles
to advance understanding in this area, to address why the self-esteem obsession still persists, and
to propose a new theoretical model, one that accounts for the construct’s heterogeneous and
multidimensional nature. Self-esteem is defined as the appraisal of one’s own personal value,
including both emotional components (self-worth) and cognitive components (self-efficacy). The
multiple forms of self-esteem are a function of how accurately or closely it matches an
individual’s measureable reality, composed of the objective outcome of one’s behavior (actual
achievements, measurable capabilities) as well as one’s interpersonal interactions (i.e., the level
of congruence between how one thinks he or she is perceived and how he or she is actually
perceived). Self-esteem also varies in terms of its level of stability, or the degree to which it is

xviii
influenced by evaluative events or the need to match external standards across time and situation.
The permutations of these sorting variables yield eight types of self-esteem: Optimal High,
Fragile High, Accurate Low, Fragile Low, Non-compensatory Narcissism, Compensatory
Narcissism, Pessimal, and Disorganized. Specific recommendations for clinicians and
researchers are provided.

1
Chapter 1: Introduction
Overview
For nearly half a century, self-esteem1, Baumeister (2005) stated, has been viewed as the
psychologist’s:
Holy Grail: a psychological trait that would soothe most of individuals’ and societies’
woes. We thought that high self-esteem would impart not only success, health, happiness,
and prosperity to the people who possessed it, but also stronger marriages, higher
employment, and greater educational attainment in the communities that supported it. (p.
34)
In the 1970s, when the self-esteem movement emerged as a powerful social force, and even now,
many Americans believe that we suffer from a low self-esteem epidemic. However, there are
now ample data on the American population showing that is not the case. In fact, if anything, we
tend to overvalue ourselves (Taylor & Brown, 1988), with the average American perceiving
himself as above average2 (Baumeister, 2005). When looking at structured scales designed to
measure global self-esteem, research has shown that the high scores on these measures are
indeed high, but the low scores are, in fact, medium, if taken at face value; relatively few people
score below any self-esteem scale’s conceptual midpoint (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989).
Therefore, the fact that most individuals in the United States score toward the high end of selfesteem measures casts serious doubts on the basic assumption underlying the self-esteem
movement, namely that there is a widespread deficit of self-esteem. How can American society

1

It should be noted that, for purposes of this document, self-esteem will be used to refer to the
term, and self-esteem to refer to the construct.
2
This perception is, of course, statistically impossible. Most people cannot actually be above
2
This perception is, of course, statistically impossible. Most people cannot actually be above
average. This type of self-favoring bias is akin to the research showing that 93% of the U.S.
population consider themselves to be better than average drivers (Svenson, 1981), an example of
what social psychologists have called the above-average effect or illusory superiority (Hoorens,
1995).
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be suffering from a widespread low self-esteem epidemic if the average American person regards
himself as above average? Nonetheless, proponents of the self-esteem movement have embraced
a positive self-view as a panacea for a remarkably wide range of social problems, from
academic, occupational and interpersonal difficulties, to violence and teenage pregnancy
(Dawes, 1994; Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989).
In the 1980s, with this conviction as the driving force, the California State Assembly
established a task force to promote self-esteem and Governor George Deukmejian signed a bill to
fund its work in 1986 (Dawes, 1994). This task force, the California Task Force to Promote SelfEsteem and Personal and Social Responsibility, had high hopes of pioneering the quest to
identify causes and cures of many social ills plaguing society, so much so that they actually
compared their efforts to both unlocking the secrets of the atom in the 1940s and attempting to
plumb the reaches and mysteries of outer space in the 1960s (Mecca et al., 1989). The results of
their findings were published in 1989 in a book titled The Social Importance of Self-Esteem. In
the introduction to the book, one of the editors wrote:
The causal link is clear: low self-esteem is the causally prior factor in individuals seeking
out kinds of behavior that become social problems. Thus, to work on social problems, we
have to work directly on that which deals with the self-esteem of the individuals
involved. Or, as we say in the trade, diminished self-esteem stands as a powerful
independent variable (condition, cause, factor) in the genesis of major social problems.
We all know this to be true, and it is really not necessary to create a special California
task force on the subject to convince us. The real problem we must address—and which
the contributors to this volume address—is how we can determine that it is scientifically
true. (p. 7)
This statement is truly remarkable for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that
the editors are claiming to know something to be true, but they have yet to determine that it is
scientifically true (Dawes, 1994). An even more profound problem faced by the editor and
contributors, however, is that what they knew to be true turned out not to be scientifically true. In
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fact, close examination of all the chapters in their book reveals a task force report that does not at
all support the basic idea that self-esteem plays a major causal role in determining various social
behaviors, let alone that government programs designed to enhance self-esteem will have
beneficial social effects (Dawes, 1994; Mecca et al., 1989). As Dawes (1994) concluded in his
book, House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth, “The California task force
has performed a valuable service, but not the one it intended. Rather, it created a volume of work
demonstrating that the Holy Grail of pop psychology is nothing more than a mirage” (p. 243).
Nevertheless, the body of research on self-esteem has grown, and continues to grow,
since the late 1980s. And, despite the lack of empirical support that self-esteem plays a direct
causal role in areas like academic performance, job performance, interpersonal relationships, or
healthier lifestyles, countless efforts to boost self-esteem are made by teachers, parents, and
therapists alike (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). Over recent years, close
analyses of the accumulated research have shaken many psychologists’ faith in self-esteem. Not
only has the research shown that self-esteem fails to accomplish what proponents of the
movement hoped it would, efforts to raise self-esteem could in some cases backfire and
contribute to some of the very problems it was thought to thwart (Baumeister et al, 2003; Blaine
& Crocker, 1993; Crocker & Park, 2004; Kernis, 2003a; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991).
Research Objective
Despite the inconsistencies in the research and regardless of the numerous studies that
have shown otherwise, the pursuit of self-esteem has historically been so pervasive that many
psychologists have assumed it is a universal and fundamental human need (Allport, 1955;
Branden, 1969, 1994; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961; Rosenberg, 1979; Satir, 1964/1983); some
have even hypothesized that humans evolved as a species to pursue self-esteem (Leary &

4
Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Downs, 1995). With so much existing evidence to challenge these
assumptions and shake the faith that many have in the construct, why is it that interest in the
topic has not waned? How should psychologists view self-esteem and approach the topic with
the populations they serve?
This study seeks to review, synthesize and critically analyze the research on self-esteem,
as well as to propose a new model for conceptualizing the construct and provide a series of
specific recommendations, for both clinical and research settings. This chapter provides
background as an introduction to the topic and presents the research objective. Chapter 2
describes the plan of action and method by which the researcher reviews, synthesizes, and
critiques the literature. Chapter 3 consists of an integration and analysis of the existing literature.
Finally, Chapter 4 includes a summary of research findings and discussions of a critical thinking
approach to self-esteem, a proposed new model, clinical implications and recommendations for
clinicians and researchers.
Background
A brief history of self-esteem. The term self-esteem can be traced back to 1890 and the
work of William James, who is generally seen as the father of modern psychology. Like many of
the early theorists who came after him, James’ conceptualization of self-esteem was brief, albeit
insightful. In a comprehensive review of the theoretical contributions to the body of work on
self-esteem, Bednar and Peterson (1995) noted that the concept self-esteem per se is not
discussed in depth in the writings of the early theorists such as William James, Alfred Adler,
George Herbert Mead, and Gordon Allport. Instead, it must be sifted from related ideas about the
self. Although the focus was broad, a brief discussion of James’ definition is included here as the
first recorded description of the construct. Not only was it the first recorded definition, James’
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definition is supported by a considerable amount of research (Harter, 1999). James had a very
simple definition of self-esteem: successes divided by pretensions3 (James, 1890/1983). In other
words, he described self-esteem as a ratio or relationship between our achievements and our
aspirations. Based on this definition, the more success we have and the lower our expectations,
the higher our self-esteem. Said another way, one can raise self-esteem by either lowering
expectations or increasing achievements. According to James, there are three major constituents
of the self from which one chooses his pretensions: (a) the material self (i.e., objects and
possessions considered to be one’s personal property), (b) the social self (i.e., reputation or
recognition by others), and (c) the spiritual self (i.e., the inner subjective being; Bednar &
Peterson, 1995). James also recognized that self-esteem might have both general and specific
elements. In other words, although fluctuations of self-esteem might occur based on daily
encounters, there is an average tone that develops over time and that one’s self-esteem seems to
return to (Bednar & Peterson, 1995).
Early theoretical efforts, like that of James (1890/1983), were followed by years during
which the concept was neglected as being unscientific and shallow (Bednar & Peterson, 1995).
Martin Seligman, popular American psychologist and long-time proponent of James’ definition,
has written that James’ work on self-esteem was largely ignored for 75 years as a result of both
academic and socioeconomic factors. Economic depression and world wars did not create an
environment characterized by a focus on how people felt about themselves. Moreover, schools of
thought, such as Freudianism and behaviorism, dominated the field of psychology, both of which
essentially shared the common belief that individuals’ lives are largely determined by forces

3

Pretension can be defined in numerous ways. James (1890/1983) used the word to mean
aspirations, as opposed to the common modern-day meaning (i.e., pretentiousness or
ostentatiousness).
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outside of their control, either internal unconscious forces (as per Freudianism) or external forces
(behaviorism). A shift occurred in the 1960s, with the rise of wealth and consumerism. Along
with these social and economic changes came the ability of the individual to see himself or
herself at the center of his or her own destiny (Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, & Gillham, 2007).
Self-esteem across the major theoretical orientations. Psychodynamic4 theory and
behaviorism dominated the field from roughly the late 19th century to the 1950s, at which point
humanistic psychology, sometimes called the third force in psychology, emerged as a reaction to
the aforementioned schools of thoughts. While psychoanalysis focused primarily on
understanding unconscious motivations that drive behavior and behaviorism primarily on
conditioning processes, humanistic thinkers stressed the importance of the role of personal
choice. Thus, this third force represented a shift towards focusing on each individual’s potential
for growth and self-actualization. It is not surprising then that most of the early writings on selfesteem came out of this movement. A brief discussion of self-esteem and relevant topics as they
have been defined by some of the prominent theorists follows.
Psychodynamic theory. Psychoanalysis—Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Psychoanalytic
theory originated with the work of Sigmund Freud. The essence of Freud’s theory is that sexual
and aggressive energies originating in the unconscious mind are modulated by the ego, which is
a set of functions that moderates between the unconscious mind and external reality. With a
focus on the role of unconscious drives as the primary motivators of behavior, Freud did not
specifically focus on self-esteem per se in his writings. He did, however, discuss narcissism and
how it relates to one’s feelings of self-regard. In his pivotal essay, On Narcissism, Freud
(1914/1991) suggests that narcissism is actually a normal part of the human psyche. He referred
4

For the purposes of this document, psychodynamic refers to a wide range of both Freudian and
neo-Freudian theories, including psychoanalysis.
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to this as primary narcissism, or the energy that lies behind each person’s survival instincts.
Freud theorized that, before children are able to invest their libidinal energy in other people, they
go through an adaptive period of primary narcissism in which they are egocentric and cannot
take the perspective of others. Healthy development then, according to Freud (1914/1991)
consists of a departure from primary narcissism, when people invest their libidinal energy into
another person rather than themselves. According to his model, in which a person has a limited
amount of libidinal energy, a person’s own feelings of self-regard are lowered when he or she
progresses from primary narcissism to object love. When viewed through the lens of more recent
theoretical writings, this process may be seen as roughly equivalent to what is now considered a
healthy degree of self-esteem.
Self-Psychology—Heinz Kohut (1913–1981). Of the major psychodynamic schools that
stemmed from Freudianism (viz., self-psychology, ego psychology, object relations) selfpsychology, which was founded by Heinz Kohut in the 1950s, focused the most directly on
conceptualizing the self. Kohut asserted that the self refers to a person’s perception of his or her
experience, including the presence or lack of a sense of self-esteem. The self is perceived in
relation to the establishment of boundaries and differentiations of self from others. For Kohut
(1971), parents function as early self-objects, or persons used by the infant to organize his or her
self-experiencing, by either promoting or impeding their child’s self-formation along the
developmental axes of (a) grandiosity, (b) idealization, and (c) twinship. Thus, Kohutian theory
emphasizes the role of early self-object need gratification in initially organizing one’s selfexperiencing. When basic human emotional needs for affirmation, belongingness, and security
are inadequately satisfied by early caregivers, the person internalizes problematic schemas
unconsciously and experiences difficulties with self-esteem regulation, which subsequently
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obstruct the achievement of mature interdependence in adulthood.
Attachment Theory—John Bowlby (1907–1990). Similarly, John Bowlby’s attachment
theory, which also stems from psychodynamic thought, proposes that variations in relationship
patterns established in the early infant-caregiver relationship give rise to stable interpersonal
orientations that either promote or impair psychosocial development across the individual’s
lifespan (Bowlby, 1988). More specifically, the capacity of parents to satisfy their child’s
security-related needs determines to what degree the parent-child relationship can serve as a safe
haven for containing and reducing the child’s distress, which supports the child’s development of
healthy self-reliance. On the other hand, when parental figures are inconsistently responsive to
the child’s early needs for care and protection, the child becomes dysregulated, resulting in
chronic hyperactivation (i.e., persistent demands for caregiver proximity) or deactivation (i.e.,
strong disinclinations to seek care and support from others) of the attachment system. These
relational patterns are then internalized to form less favorable working models of self and other
(Bowlby, 1988). According to attachment theory, self-esteem is the result of internalized selfother models for regulating one’s experiences of insecurity. As prominent examples of
psychodynamic theory, both self-psychology and attachment theory trace the emergence of adult
emotional and interpersonal difficulties to the problematic early experiences one has with his or
her parental caregiver(s). These theories anchor the development of adult interpersonal
difficulties to unsatisfied early emotional needs, which then adversely impacts self-esteem
regulation.
Behaviorism, Social Cognitive Theory, and Cognitive Behavioral Theory.
Behaviorism—B. F. Skinner (1904–1990). Generally speaking, behaviorism arose in the early
20th century as a reaction against the highly speculative psychodynamic theories discussed
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above. Behaviorists minimized speculation about mentalistic phenomena and focused almost
entirely on observable behavior. B.F. Skinner, perhaps the person most often associated with the
behaviorist position, devised his theories by avoiding all hypothetical constructs (e.g., ego, traits,
drives, needs). Instead, as a determinist, he asserted that human behavior does not stem from an
act of free will, but like any observable phenomenon, is lawfully determined and can be studied
scientifically (Skinner, 1953). Thus, as one would imagine, his theories and those of his fellow
radical behaviorists include very little focus on constructs like self-esteem, which by its very
nature calls for consideration of mentalistic processes such as cognition and/or subjective
emotional states.
Social Cognitive Theory—Albert Bandura (1925-present). Nonetheless, some
behaviorists acknowledge that observable behavior does not have to be limited to external events
and can include private behaviors such as thinking, remembering, and anticipating, all of which
are observable to the person experiencing them (Bandura, 1986). Albert Bandura’s social
cognitive theory stemmed from behaviorism but incorporates a cognitive component. Social
cognitive theory takes an agentic view of personality, meaning that humans have the capacity to
exercise control over their own lives (Feist & Feist, 2006). Moreover, Bandura’s theory
emphasized the human capability to learn through both direct experience and vicarious
experience (Bandura, 1986). Rather than focusing on self-esteem per se, Bandura focused on
self-efficacy, which he defined as “people’s beliefs in their capability to exercise some measure
of control over their own functioning and over environmental events” (Bandura, 2001, p. 10).
Self-efficacy is not a global or generalized concept, such as self-esteem or self-confidence. It
varies from situation to situation depending on one’s competencies, the presence or absence of
others, the perceived competencies of those other people, and accompanying physiological states
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(Feist & Feist, 2006).
Cognitive Behavioral Theory—Aaron Beck (1921-present). Aaron Beck, who is
considered to be the father of cognitive therapy, deemed self-concept to consist of a number of
characteristics that people ascribe to themselves and to be operationally defined by descriptors
such as attractive, critical, kind, and efficient. The descriptors, in turn, are weighed by an
individual with respect to how much they are valued by that person. Thus, Beck, Steer, Epstein,
and Brown (1990) stated the overall self-concept reflects the,
…summation of an individual’s self-evaluations of the set of descriptors and represents
how good the person feels about himself or herself. The self-concept is the product of
input of self-relevant data and relatively stable structures (self-schemata) that serve as
information processors. The stronger a self-schema, the greater its influence on the input
of self-relevant information (i.e., data supporting the self-concept will be processed,
whereas data not supporting the self-concept will be ignored). (p. 191)
From this cognitive perspective, self-esteem can be operationalized as beliefs about oneself and
beliefs about how other people regard oneself (Bhar, Ghahramanlou-Holloway, Brown, & Beck,
2008).
Humanistic Theory. Humanistic psychology5 emerged at the second half of the 20th
century. Unlike psychodynamic theory and behaviorism, humanistic theory emphasized
conscious human experience as opposed to unconscious processes or conditioned responses. As
the focus shifted to concepts like self-determination, the power of free will, and human potential,
self-esteem naturally arose as an important and popular idea. While a discussion of all the most
influential humanists’ work is beyond the scope of this investigation, a brief discussion of three
5

It should be noted that existential psychology became prominent at approximately the same
time as humanistic psychology, and the two schools of thought are often considered to be one in
the same. For the purposes of this investigation, the works of the major existential theorists (e.g.,
Rollo May, Irvin Yalom, R.D. Laing) were explored; however, writings devoted specifically to
defining self-esteem were not found. Thus, the researcher will focus on the works of prominent
humanists as a representation of what is often called the third force movement (aka the
humanistic/existential movement).
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of the most prominent theorists follows.
Person-Centered Theory—Carl Rogers (1902–1987). Carl Rogers, perhaps the most
prominent figure associated with humanistic psychology, first expressed his theory of
personality, person-centered theory, in an APA presidential address in 1947 (Feist & Feist,
2006). According to Rogers (1959), the self-concept includes all those aspects of one’s being and
one’s experiences that are perceived in awareness, although not always accurately, by the
individual. Rogers believed that the self-concept is comprised of three different components: (a)
self-image (the view one has about himself or herself), (b) the ideal self (what one wishes to be
like), and (c) self-esteem or self-worth (how much value one places on himself or herself). The
closer our self-image and ideal self are to each other, the more consistent or congruent we are
and the higher our sense of self-worth or self-esteem. Another one of Rogers’ key theoretical
assumptions was that self-esteem depends on knowledge that one is genuinely understood and
unconditionally accepted and loved by an important person in one’s life (Feist & Feist, 2006).
Generally speaking, humanistic psychologists have traced high self-esteem to a congruency
between a person’s real and ideal selves, suggesting that self-esteem serves as an indication to
people as to when they are behaving in autonomous, self-determined ways (Leary, 1999).
Self-actualization—Abraham Maslow (1908–1970). Abraham Maslow, whose theories
first received much attention in the 1960s and 70s, assumed that human motivation is usually
complex; people are continually motivated by one need or another; people are motivated by the
same basic needs; and, needs can be arranged on a hierarchy (Feist & Feist, 2006; Maslow,
1970). The highest level of that hierarchy, self-actualization, is characterized by self-fulfillment,
the realization of all one’s potential, and a desire to become creative in the full sense of the word
(Maslow, 1970). Based upon Maslow’s theory, lower level needs must be satisfied or at least
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relatively satisfied, however, before higher level needs become motivators.
The human need for self-esteem plays an important role in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
Esteem needs, which immediately precede self-actualization needs in Maslow’s hierarchy,
include self-respect, confidence, competence, and the knowledge that others hold them in high
esteem. Maslow (1970) identified two levels of esteem needs: reputation and self-esteem. He
defined reputation as the perception of the prestige or recognition a person has achieved in the
eyes of others. Self-esteem, on the other hand, was defined as a person’s own feelings of worth
and confidence, a “desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and
competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom” (p. 45).
Maslow suggested that people need both internal self-respect and esteem from others in order to
achieve self-actualization.
Humanistic Family Therapy—Virginia Satir (1916–1988). Not only is Virginia Satir
widely regarded as the mother of family therapy, she was also called “the most widely known
and the most high-spirited” (Mecca et al., 1989, p. xviii) of all the members of the California
Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility (see above) in the
1980s. In fact, shortly before her death in September of 1988, the task force unanimously voted
that its final report be dedicated to her.
Satir was a pioneer in the newly emerging field of family therapy, and she based her
approach on a combination of both humanistic psychology and communications theory. The
foundation of her theory was that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between self-esteem
and communication. Specifically, high self-esteem and healthy communication (and conversely
low self-esteem and dysfunctional communication) are both causes and effects of each other.
Within the parameters of her interactional approach to family therapy, difficulty communicating
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is closely linked to an individual’s self-concept, including his or her self-esteem (which Satir
viewed as equivalent to feelings of self-worth) and the individual’s self-image (Satir,
1964/1983).
According to Satir’s model of family therapy, low self-esteem comes from a person’s
early experiences and results in a great sense of anxiety and uncertainty about oneself. For a
child to build healthy self-esteem, the parents must first recognize that their parenting is
influenced by the dysfunctions in their own marital relationship and, second, must validate the
child as a masterful person (a person who is able to do for himself or herself) and as a sexual
person. For Satir, self-esteem, independence and individual uniqueness “go together in every
way” (Satir, 1964/1983, p. 67).
Conceptual Issues Relevant to Defining Self-Esteem
One of the oldest concepts in psychology, self-esteem likely ranks among the top three
covariates occurring in personality and social psychology research. In 2003, it was the subject of
over 18,000 published studies (Rhodewalt & Tragakis, 2003). As of 2015, it is the subject of
over 22,000 publications. Given the long history of the term, it is not surprising that many
individuals, representing a wide range of theoretical perspectives, have attempted to define it.
Further, each definition naturally gives rise to a different body of research findings, theories, and
conclusions about the construct. With multiple active definitions of self-esteem and very little
consensus, it can be difficult to keep in mind which definition is linked with which body of
work, creating confusion in the field. While addressing all of the ways self-esteem has been
defined would be beyond the scope of this investigation, four of the central conceptual issues and
debates that are relevant to the defining of self-esteem will be explored here: (a) affective versus
cognitive versus behavioral focus, (b) stable versus fluid, (c) unidimensional versus
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multidimensional, and (d) self-esteem versus self-concept.
Affective versus cognitive versus behavioral focus. According to Mruk (2006), social
scientists define self-esteem in at least three very different ways, each of which has been
legitimately used in the field of psychology for over a century. Generally speaking, these three
different ways include: (a) self-esteem as feelings of worthiness, (b) self-esteem as a relationship
between achievements and aspirations, and (c) self-esteem as a relationship between a sense of
personal efficacy and a sense of personal worth.
Feelings of worthiness. Mruk (2006) claims that the first way of defining self-esteem, as
a feeling of worthiness, has numerous advantages when it comes to designing research. In
particular, a one-dimensional (or single-factor) approach makes researching self-esteem
relatively easy to do. For this reason, defining self-esteem in terms of worthiness, or a favorable
global evaluation of oneself, seems to be the most commonly used definition by far (Baumeister,
Smart, & Boden, 1996). However, conceptualizing self-esteem in terms of worthiness alone
could lead to some serious problems. For example, oversimplification of the idea of self-esteem
in this manner can lead to programs and interventions designed merely to make people feel good
about themselves. Inherently, there does not seem to be anything wrong with making people feel
good about themselves, but what if that self-perception is not warranted? As much research has
shown, feeling good about oneself without earning it can lead to myriad problems, such as
facilitating the development of narcissism, risking an increase in the likelihood of violence, or
tolerating undesirable academic performance (Baumeister et al., 1996; Damon, 1995; Dawes,
1994).
Achievements/aspirations ratio. Mruk (2006) also addresses the potential pitfalls of the
second way researchers have defined self-esteem, as a ratio or relationship between our
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achievements and our aspirations. This definition is the one that can be traced back to the
original coining of the term by William James in 1890. According to James (1890/1983):
Our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. It
is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities: a fraction of
which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator our success: thus,

Such a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator as by
increasing the numerator. (p. 296)
Mruk (2006) points out that this approach to self-esteem stresses a certain type of behavior rather
than just affect, attitude, or belief. To define the term in this fashion has numerous advantages
when it comes to research. For one, competence is tied to behavior, which is observable, unlike
feelings, beliefs, or attitudes. Moreover, it is part of numerous developmental processes that have
been clearly defined (e.g., mastering age-appropriate skills). However, as Mruk (2006) cautions,
there are plenty of behaviors that one could become very good at, but that are undesirable. For
example, one could become highly skilled at violating the rights of others, but it would be
antithetical to the kinds of competencies we would associate with high (i.e., healthy) self-esteem.
Moreover, there are many people who are quite competent in a number of areas (e.g., career,
academia, athletics), but who have low self-esteem. In other words, they don’t feel worthy
enough to enjoy their success.
Efficacy and worth. Finally, Mruk (2006) defines the third way, according to his
conceptualization, that self-esteem is defined, which is self-esteem as a relationship between “a
sense of personal efficacy and a sense of personal worth. It is the integrated sum of selfconfidence and self-respect. It is the conviction that one is competent to live and worthy of
living” (Branden, 1969, p. 110). In other words, self-esteem defined in this way is the
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relationship between perceived competence (cognitive) and feelings of worthiness (affective).
This definition has been the one most widely used and supported by Nethaniel Branden, one of
the most prominent leaders of the self-esteem movement (Branden, 1969).
Stable versus fluid. In their essay on the nature of self-esteem and the ways it is defined,
Brown and Marshall (2006) discuss the widespread disagreements and divisions amongst
psychologists with respect to self-esteem’s function and benefits. While some argue that high
self-esteem is essential to human functioning (Pyszczynski & Cox, 2004; Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004), others argue that it is of little value and could
even be a liability (Baumeister et al., 2003; Baumeister et al., 1996). According to Brown and
Marshall (2006), at least part of the confusion in the field is a result of a lack of agreement and
consistency with regard to the definition of the construct itself. These authors propose that selfesteem is used in at least three different ways: (a) global self-esteem (aka trait self-esteem), (b)
feelings of self-worth (aka state self-esteem), and (c) self-evaluations (aka domain-specific selfesteem). Overall, by outlining these three ways self-esteem can be defined, Brown and Marshall
assert that, regardless of the definition one chooses to use, they should not be used
interchangeably.
Global self-esteem. Global self-esteem, or trait self-esteem, can be described as a
personality variable that represents the general way people feel about themselves (Brown &
Marshall, 2006). Whether defined through a cognitive lens (i.e., thoughts people have about their
self-worth as a person) or an emotional lens (i.e., feelings of affection people have for
themselves that are not derived from rational processes), global self-esteem is seen as being
stable through adulthood, with a possible genetic component (Neiss, Sedikides, & Stevenson,
2002).
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State self-esteem. State self-esteem, on the other hand, is typically defined as selfevaluative reactions to events or feelings of self-worth, which is more in line with William
James’ original definition of the term in 1890. Put plainly, trait self-esteem persists while state
self-esteem can be seen as more temporary.
Domain-specific self-esteem. When self-esteem is defined in terms of self-evaluations, it
refers to the way people evaluate their abilities, physical attributes, and personality
characteristics within different specific domains (e.g., academically, physically, artistically).
Thus, one can have different levels of self-esteem in different areas (Brown & Marshall, 2006).
Unidimensional versus multidimensional. Another way that different definitions of
self-esteem can be compared is by looking at whether the definition is unidimensional or
multidimensional. A unidimensional definition of self-esteem would involve a single, global
domain of self-concept, whereas a multidimensional approach would focus on multiple, distinct
components of self-concept. For example, a unidimensional definition might focus essentially on
feelings of worthiness, whereas a multidimensional definition could include feelings of
worthiness, cognitive appraisal of efficacy, and behavioral measures of success. According to an
essay on the nature of self-esteem by Marsh, Craven, and Martin (2006), appropriately selected
specific domains of self-concept are far more useful than a unidimensional view of self-esteem in
research settings. In fact, such debates go beyond discussions of self-esteem and reverberate
across different psychological disciplines. For example, researchers are increasingly recognizing
the value of a multidimensional perspective when it comes to multiple intelligences versus global
measures of IQ when characterizing intellectual abilities.
Self-esteem versus self-concept. Although the two terms are oftentimes used
interchangeably, it is important to distinguish self-esteem from the more general term self-
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concept. Self-concept can be defined as “the totality of cognitive beliefs that people have about
themselves; it is everything that is known about the self, and includes things such as name, race,
likes, dislikes, beliefs, values, and appearance descriptions, such as height and weight”
(Heatherton & Wyland, 2003, p. 220). Self-esteem, on the other hand, regardless of how the
construct is defined, involves some level of emotional response that a person experiences as he
or she contemplates and evaluates things about himself or herself. Although the two terms are
related, it is possible to believe objectively positive things about oneself (e.g., academic skills,
athletic skills), but not necessarily like oneself. Conversely, it is possible to like oneself without
objective indicators to support the positive self-views (Heatherton & Wyland, 2003).
Assessment of Self-Esteem
Not surprisingly, there are many available measures of self-esteem from which to choose,
reflecting a variety of theoretical perspectives. Most self-esteem research utilizes self-report
measures (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). In their review of measures of self-esteem, Blascovich
and Tomaka (1991) identified the most frequently cited measures in the literature and then
reviewed what they considered to be the 11 most common, five of which are general measures
for use with adolescents and adults, two designed for use with younger children, and the
remaining four cover specific aspects of self-esteem. The five most frequently cited self-report
measure for adolescents and adults are: Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, Coopersmith’s
(1967) Self-Esteem Inventory, the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Roid & Fitts, 1988), Janis &
Field’s (1959) Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, and the Texas Social Behavior Inventory
(Helmreich & Stapp, 1974). The two most common measures designed for use with young
children are the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale (Piers, 1969) and the Harter SelfPerception Profile for Children (Harter, 1985/2012). The last four cited by Blascovich and
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Tomaka are measures of specific aspects of self-esteem (e.g., body image), which include: The
Body Esteem Scale (Mendelson, Mendelson, & White, 2001), the Ziller Social Self-Esteem
Scale (Ziller, Hagey, Smith, & Long, 1969), the Shrauger Personal Evaluation Inventory
(Shrauger, & Schohn, 1995), and the Marsh Self-Descriptions Questionnaire (Marsh, Martin, &
Jackson, 2010). Of all the scales they reviewed, Blascovich and Tomaka found them of unequal
quality and gave high marks to only a few, specifically Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale
and a revision of Janis & Field’s (1959) Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, which was revised by
Fleming and Courtney (1984).
Although the vast majority of self-esteem researchers utilize self-report measures,
nonreactive measures of implicit self-esteem have increased in popularity during recent years
(Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). When completing nonreactive measures, respondents do
not answer direct questions about their self-esteem. Instead, they ostensibly reveal their selfevaluations via reaction time tasks that utilize priming techniques, or projective tests in which
they respond to ambiguous stimuli. The meaning behind the measure is often masked, either by
subliminal presentation of stimuli or by working under time pressure or cognitive load (Bosson,
2006). Common measures of implicit self-esteem include: the Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), cognitive priming tasks (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham,
1999; Spalding & Hardin, 1999), word completion tasks (Hetts et al., 1999), and people’s
preferences for their birthday numbers and name letters (Nuttin, 1985). Issues of validity and
reliability, as well as strengths and weaknesses of different types of measures are discussed in
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2: Plan of Action
Overview
This chapter outlines the method by which the published literature on self-esteem has
been obtained for review and analysis. The discussion includes the following: (a) the process of
identifying relevant literature; and, (b) how the literature has been synthesized and organized.
Identification of Relevant Literature
A literature search was conducted through a review of abstracts in EBSCO Host Research
Database, PsycINFO. By going to the subject category in PsycINFO and searching self-esteem, a
total of 21,554 articles were found. The list of articles was narrowed down using a series of
criteria. First, those works that have not been published or whose sole source was Dissertation
Abstracts International were not retained. Second, the researcher generally eliminated secondary
sources in order to obtain original data. Secondary sources were only included if they presented
meta-analyses or other authoritative literature reviews. In addition to the articles obtained
through PsycINFO, the researcher consulted the reference pages of existing research articles and
books relevant to the purposes of this endeavor. The researcher acknowledges that eliminating
dissertations and works that have not been published biases the results in favor of positive effects
of self-esteem, due to the fact that null results are difficult to publish. Thus, including sources
cited in the articles obtained from PsycINFO was helpful for finding null effects. Worldcat was
also used to locate and acquire books on the topic of self-esteem.
The search for relevant literature included, but was not limited to, the following terms
independently or in combination: self-esteem, assessment/measures, definition/defining, global,
trait, state, stable fluid, implicit, explicit, costs/benefits, construct validity, predictive validity,
convergent validity, divergent validity, conscious, nonconscious, optimal, intervention, self-
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concept, self-efficacy, happiness, depression, and initiative. Although the most current resources
available were prioritized, relevant literature that dates back was considered for inclusion,
particularly on the topics of defining self-esteem and assessment of self-esteem.
Organization and Synthesis of the Literature
Literature has been included or excluded based on its relevance to the study. Several
factors were employed to determine inclusion and exclusion criteria. From a practical standpoint,
literature has been included in this work based on its availability through electronic databases, at
Pepperdine University, or through interlibrary loan. Moreover, only literature published in
English was included.
The researcher sought to collect all relevant scholarly information related to self-esteem
via extensive database searches for research articles and books and by perusing the references of
relevant articles and texts to gather additional, influential research sources. As a result of this
extensive search, the current researcher was able to identify the last major, widespread literature
review conducted that sought to examine the empirical findings on the relationship between selfesteem and numerous variables of broad social relevance (e.g., health, sexual behavior,
interpersonal relations, financial status, grades, intelligence, job performance and satisfaction)
(Baumeister et al., 2003). On the whole, Baumeister et al. (2003) found that self-esteem is not a
major predictor of almost anything. However, they did identify a couple of potential exceptions,
although the findings remain somewhat speculative and are contingent on further work
supporting the conclusions. According to their findings, the possible benefits of high self-esteem
can be tentatively summarized in terms of two main themes: (a) high self-esteem being linked to
positive feelings (i.e., happiness), and (b) high self-esteem being linked to greater initiative.
Based on the findings of this seminal study, the current researcher narrowed her search criteria
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and set out to extensively review the literature on self-esteem as it relates to happiness and
initiative, including several additional closely related variables. The researcher then critiqued and
evaluated the literature, resulting in an in-depth discussion of approaching the topic of selfesteem from a critical thinking perspective, the proposal of a new conceptual model of selfesteem, and a series of specific recommendations, for both clinical and research settings.
Limitations
There are a number of considerations that must be accounted for when conducting a
critical analysis (Mertens, 1998). For example, publication bias is a potential concern, as there is
a tendency for research that yields statistically significant results to be published. Moreover,
research that does not yield significant results is typically discarded and not always available for
review, either because authors choose not to publish or because the material gets rejected by
journals (Mertens, 1998). Inclusion-exclusion decisions on the part of researchers are another
concern. The current researcher has been cognizant of her inclusion and exclusion criteria during
the selection process, and did not base decisions on other factors such as the researcher’s interest
or subjective judgment (Mertens, 1998). Additionally, because so many measurement scales are
available for self-esteem, comparing results from different investigations that have used different
scales is problematic, especially when the results are inconsistent.
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Chapter 3: Critical Review of the Literature: Integration and Analysis
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in their analysis of the benefits of self-esteem, Baumeister et
al. (2003) aimed to thoroughly review the empirical findings on the relationship between selfesteem and numerous variables of broad social relevance (e.g., health, sexual behavior,
interpersonal relations, financial status, grades, intelligence, job performance and satisfaction).
On the whole, the researchers found that self-esteem is not a major predictor of almost anything.
However, they did identify a couple of potential exceptions. According to their findings, the
possible benefits of high self-esteem can be tentatively summarized in terms of two main themes:
(a) high self-esteem being linked to positive feelings (i.e., happiness), and (b) high self-esteem
being linked to greater initiative. Baumeister’s et al. (2003) findings are summarized below and
are followed by a discussion of the more recent literature under these two broad categories.
Happiness
Baumeister et al. (2003): Summary of findings. Baumeister et al. (2003) cited five
studies showing that high self-esteem is linked to happiness. Before presenting their findings,
however, the authors acknowledged the fact that studies of happiness and related variables (e.g.,
depression) almost invariably rely on self-reports. Further, researchers obtained stronger
evidence of the correlates of self-esteem when the studies relied on self-reported outcomes. For
example, studies on the relationship between self-esteem and self-rated attractiveness have
generally shown very strong, positive relationships between the two variables (Harter, 1993);
however, once more objective measures of physical appearance (e.g., full-length pictures rated
by judges) are obtained and compared to the self-report data, people with high self-esteem do not
emerge as any more attractive than people with low self-esteem (Diener, Wolsic, & Fujita, 1995;
Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994). Similarly, people with high self-esteem rate themselves as more
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intelligent than they actually are (Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994) and more socially skilled than
others rate them to be (Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reiss, 1988).6
When it comes to happiness, however, how can researchers conclude that people are less
(or more) happy than they think they are with the lack of objective measures of happiness? As a
result, any research investigating the link between self-esteem and happiness will necessarily
have to rely on self-reports for both measures, despite the pitfalls and drawbacks associated with
establishing not just the causal effects of self-esteem, but even the correlational relationships.
Nonetheless, Baumeister et al. (2003) determined the strongest correlate of high self-esteem to
be happiness, which also happens to be (coincidentally or not) the most subjective outcome they
examined. Across a number of studies cited, self-esteem was shown to be one of, if not the, most
dominant predictor of happiness when compared to other predictor variables (e.g., personality
traits, recalled parental rearing styles, satisfaction in specific domains such as finances and social
support; De Neve & Cooper, 1998; Diener & Diener, 1995; Furnham & Cheng, 2000).
Baumeister et al. (2003) also discussed evidence showing that people with high selfesteem are less likely to be depressed, either in general or specifically in response to stressful,
traumatic events (Murrell, Meeks, & Walker, 1991; Robinson, Garber, & Hilsman, 1995;
Whisman & Kwon, 1993). Thus, a review of the more recent literature on the relationship
between self-esteem and happiness, as well as between self-esteem and depression, was
conducted, and a summary of those findings follows.
6

These findings can be related to the work of Shelley E. Taylor on what she calls positive
illusions. Taylor has explored the biological and psychological benefits of various
socioemotional resources, including self-esteem, optimism, mastery, and social support.
According to Taylor, under some circumstances, socioemotional resources can assume the form
of positive illusions, or overly positive self-perceptions, exaggerated perceptions of control or
mastery, and unrealistic optimism, which have been found to be largely beneficial and associated
with criteria indicative of mental and physical health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). The research on
positive illusions and its relationship to self-esteem will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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More recent findings: 2003–2014. The current review was conducted in the following
manner: from January 2014 through May 2014, the researcher searched the PsycINFO database
and obtained a list of all articles containing self-esteem and happiness in the title. After applying
the aforementioned inclusion and exclusion criteria, 9 articles published in scholarly (peer
reviewed) journals, written in English, and published between 2003 and 2014 were found. The
abstracts of all 9 articles were reviewed and the following studies were determined to be most
directly applicable to the relationship between happiness and self-esteem. The same type of
search was conducted for articles containing self-esteem and depression in the title, which
yielded a list of 121 articles. The abstracts of those 121 articles were also reviewed, the same
inclusion and exclusion criteria applied, and only those determined to be the most directly
applicable to the relationship between the two variables are described in detail below.
Happiness. Since the 2003 Baumeister et al. review article, further research has
consistently reported the link between self-esteem and happiness. In a sample of 88 young,
mostly (68%) female, British, first-year undergraduate students, Cheng and Furnham (2003a)
measured to what extent self-esteem predicted positive affect and self-reported happiness. Selfesteem was shown to be a significant predictor of happiness. Specifically, self-esteem, as
measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), was significantly correlated (p
< .001) both with a single-item happiness measure7 (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1960; r = 0.38), the
Bradburn Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965; r = 0.52), and with the Oxford
Happiness Inventory (OHI; Argyle, Martin, & Crossland, 1989; r = 0.72).
In another study conducted by the same authors, Cheng and Furnham (2004), a sample of
365 normal, nonclinical young people in their late teens and early 20s were administered four
7

This single-item scale measures respondents’ general level of happiness with three choices:
Very Happy; Pretty Happy; and Not too Happy.
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questionnaires: the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the Self-Criticism
Questionnaire (Brewin, Firth-Cozens, Furnham, & McManus, 1992), the Oxford Happiness
Inventory (OHI; Argyle et al., 1989), and the Parental Bonding Instrument (Parker, Tupling, &
Brown, 1979). The researchers measured to what extent three recalled parental rearing styles
(care, discouragement of behavioral freedom, denial of psychological autonomy), self-esteem,
and self-criticism predicted self-rated happiness. The multiple regression analysis showed that
self-esteem, or the aspect of self-esteem they called positive self-evaluation (measured by the
positive five items of the Rosenberg Scale), was the most dominant and powerful correlate of
happiness.
Lyubominsky, Tkach, and DiMatteo (2006) administered self-report questionnaires of
both self-esteem and happiness (Rosenberg, 1965; Lyubominsky & Lepper, 1999) to 621 retired
employees (ages 51-95) of a large Southern California utility company. The sample was 96%
Caucasian, 80% male, and approximately 56% of the subjects had attended at least some college.
The results of the study showed that self-esteem and happiness are highly correlated (r = 0.58).
Denny and Steiner (2009) examined whether happiness and satisfaction were influenced
more by external or internal factors among elite collegiate athletes. Various self-report measures
designed to measure internal factors (viz., locus of control, mindfulness, self-restraint, selfesteem) and external factors (viz., playtime, scholarship) were administered to 140 Stanford
University athletes. The sample was 75% Caucasian and the mean socioeconomic status was
upper-middle class. With regard to the factors of happiness and self-esteem specifically, various
subscales of the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory (Weinberger & Schwartz, 1990), a socialemotional adjustment measure, were used to measure both variables. As predicted by Denny and
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Steiner (2009), internal factors were more powerful correlates of happiness, with self-esteem
being strongly associated with happiness (r = 0.57).
Depression. In another study by the same pair of researchers discussed above, Cheng and
Furnham (2003b) sought to examine the correlations among happiness, depression, and selfesteem among adolescents. Among a sample of 234 British youth (ages 15–35), the researchers
measured self-esteem using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and measured
affect, depression, and happiness with the Bradburn Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn &
Caplovitz, 1965), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, &
Erbaugh, 1961), the Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI; Argyle, Martin, & Crossland, 1989), and
the Gurin Scale, a single item happiness scale (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1960). They found that
self-esteem was positively correlated with happiness, as measured by the OHI (r = 0.67) and the
Gurin single-item happiness scale (r = 0.44). Self-esteem was inversely correlated with
depression as measured by the BDI (r = -0.59). They reported self-esteem to be positively
correlated with positive affect (r = 0.33) and balanced affect (r = 0.38) and negatively correlated
with negative affect (r = -0.23). Based on a multiple regression analysis, the researchers also
reported that self-esteem had a direct predictive effect on happiness and the opposite relationship
with depression.
In a 2003 study by Schmitz, Kugler, and Rollnik, the researchers drew upon data from the
National Comorbidity Study (NCS), which was a nationally representative household survey of
persons, age 15 to 54, in the noninstitutionalized civilian population of the United States. The
NCS was administered between September 1990 and February 1992 in face-to-face, in-home
interviews. A total of 8,098 interviews were completed and the researchers used a modified
version of the World Health Organization Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI;
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Wittchen, 1994) to gather data about psychiatric symptoms (i.e., depression). They assessed selfesteem using an empirically abbreviated form of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965)8 and found a significant inverse relationship between self-esteem and depression.
Specifically, the researchers reported that those subjects determined to have very low self-esteem
scores had a depression prevalence rate of 71.7%.
In an effort to account for some of the self-presentational biases inherent to using selfreport measures, Steinberg, Karpinski, and Alloy (2007) incorporated implicit self-esteem
techniques9 along with the traditional self-report measures in their study of self-esteem and
depression. A sample of 181 undergraduates enrolled in introduction to psychology were
administered the self-other Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the Beck Depression Inventory, Second
Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and an initial-preference task (IPT; Nuttin, 1985).
During the first session, participants were administered the self-other IAT, the IPT, and the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and a baseline measure of depressive symptoms (BDI-II). In the
second session, approximately four months later, they completed a follow-up BDI-II and a
questionnaire about life events. Implicit measures did not correlate with each other and none of
the implicit measures of self-esteem correlated with depression, providing little evidence for a
direct link between implicit self-esteem and depression. However, there was a significant
relationship between low self-esteem and depression shown during both the initial and follow-up
sessions (Time 1 r = -0.41; Time 2 r = -0.24).

8

This short form (5-item versus 10-item) of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was selected based
on data analyses from previous studies designed to select the best subset of items to
operationalize an entire scale (Mickelson, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997).
9
Implicit measures of self-esteem are designed to assess aspects of self-esteem that operate
outside of conscious awareness and control (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
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Franck and De Raedt (2007) used samples of currently depressed inpatients (N=24),
formerly depressed individuals (N=27), and never-depressed controls (N=31) to investigate the
relationship between depression and unstable self-esteem, which has been defined as relatively
high fluctuations and reactivity in self-esteem over time in reaction to daily stressors and boosts
(Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Rosenberg, 1986). Franck and De Raedt (2007)
measured depression with the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer,
& Brown, 1996) and the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960). They
measured level of self-esteem with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and, in
order to measure self-esteem instability, the researchers used repeated assessments of self-esteem
in natural contexts using an adapted version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale10 every evening
for 7 consecutive days, and then again 6 months later. Their results showed that, regarding selfesteem instability, never-depressed controls reported significantly more stable self-esteem as
compared to formerly depressed individuals and the currently depressed individuals. Further, as
the researchers expected, they observed significant negative correlations between self-esteem
instability and level of self-esteem (r = -0.32), indicating that lower levels of self-esteem were
associated with more unstable self-esteem. Self-esteem level was inversely correlated with
average depressed mood (r = - 0.69) and self-esteem instability was moderately correlated with
depressed mood (r = 0.25).

10

This adapted version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale includes anchor points separated by
10 dots (from totally agree to totally disagree). Participants were asked to circle the dot that best
represented how they felt about themselves at the moment they completed the form. The selfesteem instability index, which represents the actual degree of short-term fluctuation in selfesteem over time (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Roberts, Kassel, & Gotlib,
1995), was computed for each participant by the standard deviation of his/her repeated
assessment scores.
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Michalak, Teismann, Heidenreich, Strohle, and Vocks (2011) also found a significant
inverse relationship between self-esteem and depression, as measured by the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1984).
More specifically, their primary aim was to address the question of whether a non-judgmental
accepting stance towards experience, as measured by the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness
Skills—accept without judgment subscale (KIMS-A; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004)11, moderates
the relationship between self-esteem and depression. Results showed that non-judgmental
acceptance moderates the relationship between self-esteem and depression. Among the sample of
216 German undergraduate students (age M = 24.78, SD = 7.56), high self-esteem was
significantly correlated with a non-judgmental acceptance (r = 0.61) and inversely correlated
with depression (r = -0.71). The sample was also divided into two groups: high mindful
acceptance and low mindful acceptance individuals. In both groups, self-esteem was inversely
related to depression, however, they differed quite markedly in the regression slopes obtained.
Thus, the researchers suggest that an accepting, allowing, and non-judgmental stance towards
experience might buffer the detrimental effects of low self-esteem on depression.
Takagishi, Sakata, and Kitamura (2011) conducted a longitudinal study with the aim of
clarifying the relationships among multiple variables, including self-esteem, depression, and
interpersonal dependency. Self-report measures, including the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965) to measure self-esteem and a subscale of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist
(Derogatis, 1974) to measure depression, were administered to a sample of 466 employees
11

The nine-item ‘accepting without judgment’ subscale of the KIMS was used by Michalak et al.
(2011) to assess the degree to which participants have an accepting, allowing, non-judgmental or
non-evaluative stance towards present-moment experience. According to Baer et al. (2004), to
accept without judgment is to refrain from applying evaluative labels such as right/wrong or
worthwhile/worthless and to allow present-moment experiences to be as they are without
attempts to avoid, escape, or change them.
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recruited in two workplaces in Japan (age M = 41.5). Questionnaires were administered on one
occasion, and then again 10 weeks later. On both occasions, the data revealed a significant
inverse correlation between self-esteem and depression (Time 1 r = -0.51; Time 2 r = -0.47).
Findings also showed significant negative correlations between self-esteem and interpersonal
dependency on both occasions (Time 1 r = -0.47; Time 2 r = -0.36), with interpersonal
dependency being measured by the Interpersonal Dependency Scale (IDI; Hirschfeld, 1976)12.
In a recent meta-analysis of the available longitudinal data, covering 77 studies of selfesteem and depression, with the mean age of the samples ranging from childhood to old age,
Sowislo and Orth (2013) sought to explore whether data supports what the authors call the
vulnerability model, which hypothesizes that low self-esteem contributes to depression, versus
the scar model, which hypothesizes that depression erodes self-esteem. The researchers used a
random-effects model and examined prospective effects between variables, controlling for prior
levels of the predicted variables. They reported that the effect of self-esteem on depression was
significantly stronger than the effect of depression on self-esteem. In other words, the relative
predictive weight of self-esteem on depression was greater than the predictive weight of
depression on self-esteem.
Lee, Joo, and Choi (2013) investigated the impact of perceived stress and self-esteem on
work-related stress and depression. Using a sample of 284 female nurses (ages 24-38) recruited
from the University Hospital in Daejeon, Korea, the researchers measured self-esteem using the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). They found that perceived stress was inversely related to selfesteem (r = -0.46) and positively associated with work-related stress (r = 0.42) and depression (r
12

This scale includes 23 items designed to quantify three aspects of dependency: emotional
reliance on others, lack of social self-confidence, and difficulties asserting autonomy.
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= 0.28). Self-esteem was inversely associated with work-related stress (r = -0.28) and with
depression (r = -0.55).
Steiger, Allemand, Robins, & Fend (2014) conducted a 23-year longitudinal study of
German subjects (N = 1,527) on self-esteem and depression in which they assessed self-esteem
annually from age 12 to 16, and depression at age 16 and again at 35. They measured depression
with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) during adolescence and the BDI-V
(Schmitt & Maes, 2000) during adulthood. They measured self-esteem using eight items of the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Results demonstrated that level of self-esteem
was inversely related to depression both during adolescence and also when measured almost two
decades later (Time 1 r = -0.41; Time 2 r = -0.35).
Critique of the literature: Self-esteem, happiness, and depression. The current review of
the literature on the relationship between self-esteem and happiness, and self-esteem and
depression, reveals that the research in these areas continues to be plagued not just with the
limitations addressed by Baumeister et al. (2003), but also with additional weaknesses.
Specifically, although studies show that both happiness and depression appear to be strongly
linked to self-esteem, the following problems and challenges present in the literature must be
addressed and rectified before valid conclusions can be reached:
1.

correlation versus causation;

2.

directionality of causation;

3.

magnitude of correlation;

4.

influence of third variables;

5.

methodological problems with self-report measures;

6.

sample composition and generalizability;
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7.

instrumentation variance;

8.

issues with construct validity (including discriminant and divergent factors) and
overlap between measures.

Each of these issues is discussed sequentially below.
1. While the links between high self-esteem and happiness, and low self-esteem and
depression, appear strong, the methodological shortcomings of the work that has been done thus
far must be addressed prior to determining the exact nature of the relationships between these
variables. It is important to remember the scientific tenet that the correlation between two
variables is just that—a correlation, not necessarily causation. If two variables or phenomena are
correlated, then the presence of one provides us with information about the other; however, cause
and effect cannot be proven simply by virtue of a correlation (Levy, 2010). Nevertheless, several
of the studies discussed above inappropriately imply a causal relationship between low selfesteem and depression, or high self-esteem and happiness, simply by virtue of the statistically
significant relationship shown between two variables (e.g., Cheng & Furnham, 2003b; Michalak
et al., 2011; Sowislo & Orth, 2013). These presumptuous inferences are reflected through
unsubstantiated conclusions and wording choices such as: “…the detrimental effects of low selfesteem on depression” (Michalak et al., 2011, p. 751); “…the effect of self-esteem on depression
was significantly stronger than the effect of depression on self-esteem” (Sowislo & Orth, 2013,
p. 213); and, self-esteem “had a direct predictive power on happiness and the opposite
relationship with depression…” (Cheng & Furnham, 2003b, p. 921).
2. One of these studies (Sowislo & Orth, 2013) not only implied a causal connection
between low self-esteem and depression, but also attempted to establish the directionality of
causation (i.e., vulnerability model, which states that low self-esteem contributes to depression,
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versus the scar model, which states that depression erodes self-esteem). The researchers reported
that the effect of self-esteem on depression was significantly stronger than the effect of
depression on self-esteem. While this information is useful, it is important to note that simply
demonstrating that one variable statistically predicts another (via multiple regression or other
statistical analyses) is not equivalent to proving cause-and-effect.
3. A relationship that is statistically significant is not necessarily meaningful, substantive,
or useful, and these concepts should not be confused. Thus, in interpreting the research, the
actual numerical magnitude of the correlations (i.e., effect size) being reported must be
considered, above and beyond whether it crosses the threshold of statistical significance.
Throughout the literature discussed above, correlations range from r = -0.23 to r = 0.72. Even in
the case of the strongest correlation (r = 0.72) reported by Cheng and Furnham (2003a), this
finding still only accounts for approximately 52% of the variance between the two variables, thus
leaving nearly half (48%) unexplained. All other reported correlations account for even less of
the variance (some as low as 5%), even though they are, technically speaking, statistically
significant.
4. Most of the research described above has not identified, controlled for, or ruled out
potential third variable causes (i.e., covariates). While some studies imply effects of self-esteem
on variables such as happiness and depression, the effects of self-esteem could be confounded
with the effects of other unidentified or unknown variables; consequently, some of these
apparent effects of self-esteem might diminish or even vanish when other covariates (e.g., family
upbringing, peer relationships, actual successes or failures, cultural influences, physical
attractiveness) are controlled for.
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5. Like the studies cited by Baumeister et al. (2003), the four recent studies on selfesteem and happiness discussed here relied solely on self-report measures (Cheng & Furnham,
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Denny & Steiner, 2009; Lyubominsky et al., 2006). The same is true for
seven of the nine recent studies discussed on self-esteem and depression. The two exceptions are:
(a) the study that incorporated implicit measures of self-esteem, which found no correlation
between implicit measures of self-esteem and depression (Steinberg, Karpinski, & Alloy, 2007),
and (b) the study that used the World Health Organization Composite International Diagnostic
Interview (CIDI; Wittchen, 1994) to gather data about psychiatric symptoms (i.e., depression).
However, even a diagnostic interview relies on subjects’ self-report responses. Although selfreport measures are common, inexpensive, and easy to administer, research looking at the
correspondence between reports of what people say they do and what they actually do calls into
question the validity of these measures (Bellack & Hersen, 1977; Shiffman, 2000). Further, selfreport is subject to a whole host of biasing factors (Stone et al., 2000), which are the product of
both normal cognitive processing and psychologically motivated distortions, including:
reactivity, social desirability, demand characteristics, inaccurate recollection or understanding,
halo effect, response set, bias of acquiescence, bias of extreme responding, bias to the middle,
random responding, faking good, and faking bad/malingering13. It is best, therefore, whenever
possible, for researchers to consider alternatives to sole reliance on self-report measures.
6. The research appears to be plagued by a composition of samples (e.g., Stanford
athletes, retired employees from one Southern California utility company, British adolescents,
Korean female nurses, undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology courses) that
are not inherently generalizable to other populations. In other words, the samples used in nearly

13

See Appendix A for brief definitions of these constructs.
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all of these studies are not representative of a diverse population with regard to a number of
important socio-cultural factors (e.g., age, level of education, ethnicity, geographic location,
socioeconomic status, religion, nationality, etc.).
7. Upon close inspection of the methods used amongst several of the studies discussed
above (e.g., Cheng & Furnham, 2004; Franck & De Raedt, 2007; Schmitz et al., 2003; Steiger et
al., 2014), some researchers have elected to use altered or short form versions of the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale and other measures. For example, Steiger et al. (2014) not only used a
shortened version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (i.e., 8 items instead of 10), they also used
two different versions of the Beck Depression Inventory during the first and second sessions of
their longitudinal study, without explaining the rationale for these selections. Also, in their study
on self-esteem and happiness, Cheng and Furnham (2004) decided to divide self-esteem into two
different variables, which they labeled, positive self-evaluation and sense of self-worth.
According to the researchers, studies have shown that there are two orthogonal factors
underlying the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, one based on the combined positive items and one
on the combined negative items. However, they only cited one outdated study (Kaplan &
Pokorny, 1969) in support of this claim. A review of the literature conducted by the current
researcher showed that support of this two-dimensional approach to the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale is mixed at best and virtually nonexistent at worst (Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Dunbar,
Ford, Hunt, & Der, 2000; Greenberger, Chen, Dmitrieva, & Faruggia, 2003). Generally
speaking, although the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is designed to be a single-factor scale, some
have suggested it should adopt a two-factor structure (with positive and negative items loading
on different factors), but most argue that the two-factor structure is simply an artifact of the item
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wording. Thus, with different studies electing to use altered versions of these self-report
measures, such comparisons call into question the validity of their conclusions.
8. Finally, there are unanswered questions regarding self-esteem, happiness, and
depression. For example, the current research does not seem to consider to what degree the
specific items on these self-report measures (e.g., The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, The Oxford
Happiness Inventory) could be measuring the same construct. Similarly, to what degree is low
self-esteem just one of the various symptoms of depression, which could account for the overlap
between items on self-report measures of both constructs (e.g., The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
and the Beck Depression Inventory)? The construct validity of existing measures of self-esteem
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
Initiative 14
Baumeister et al. (2003): Summary of findings. In addition to the research on
happiness and depression, Baumeister et al. (2003) suggested that high self-esteem also appears
to be linked to greater initiative. Specifically, the researchers suggested that people with high
self-esteem are more prone to initiating both antisocial and prosocial actions, compared to people
with low self-esteem. For example, individuals with high self-esteem have been shown to be
overrepresented among both the perpetrators of bullying and the people who stand up to bullies
and defend victims (Salmivalli, Kaukiainen, Kaistaniemi, & Lagerspetz, 1999). Similarly, people
with high self-esteem have been shown to make up both the highest academic cheating groups
14

The term initiative here refers to the broad, far-reaching use of the word that was applied by
Baumeister et al. (2003). In their analysis, initiative was used to refer to an extensive and
heterogeneous list of situations and circumstances (e.g., initiating both antisocial and prosocial
actions, initiating relationships, speaking up in groups, experimenting with sex, trying harder in
response to failure). For the purpose of continuity and in an effort to build upon their findings
and explore the more recent literature within this wide-ranging category, the same use of the
term is being applied here.
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and the lowest academic cheating groups (Lobel & Levanon, 1988). Baumeister et al. (2003) also
reported that people with high self-esteem initiate interactions and relationships more than
people with low self-esteem (Buhrmester et al., 1988), take more initiative in extricating
themselves from unhappy relationships (Rusbult, Morrow, & Johnson, 1987) and are more likely
to speak up in work groups (LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). People with high self-esteem appear to
try harder in response to failure, but are willing to switch to a new line of endeavor if the present
one seems unpromising. More specifically, high self-esteem has been shown to be associated
with persistence in the face of failure (McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984; Cruz Perez,
1973; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977).
Taking these findings into consideration, a review of the more recent literature on the
relationship between self-esteem and initiative (as defined by the situations and circumstances
addressed by Baumeister et al., 2003) was conducted, and a summary of those findings follows.
With regard to the findings on self-esteem and persistence (McFarlin et al., 1984; Cruz Perez,
1973; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977), the recent literature related to this subject will be reviewed
and addressed below. However, despite the fact that Baumeister et al. (2003) combined some of
these terms (i.e., initiative and persistence) into one category, the current researcher will
differentiate between the two: initiative, which involves initiating an action, is not seen as
equivalent to persistence or tenacity.
More recent findings: 2003–2014. The current review was conducted in the following
manner: from January 2014 through May 2014, the researcher searched the PsycINFO database
for studies containing self-esteem and initiative in the title. However, that search yielded no
results. The researcher therefore used more specific search terms, using the various areas
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mentioned by Baumeister et al. (2013) as a guide (e.g., initiative and antisocial behavior,
bullying, initiative and prosocial behavior, social/interpersonal initiative).
The researcher searched the PsycINFO database and obtained a list of all articles
containing self-esteem and antisocial in the title, and, after applying the aforementioned
inclusion and exclusion criteria, three articles published in scholarly (peer reviewed) journals,
written in English, and published between 2003 and 2014 were found. The abstracts of all three
articles were reviewed and all three studies were determined to be relevant. The same type of
search was conducted for articles containing self-esteem and cheating or academic cheating in
the title, which yielded no results. The search for studies containing self-esteem and bullying in
the title yielded a list of 11 articles. The abstracts of these articles were reviewed, the same
inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied, and only those determined to be the most directly
applicable to the relationship between these two variables are described in detail below.
Similarly, the researcher searched for articles containing self-esteem and prosocial in the title,
which yielded one article, discussed below. In order to explore the recent literature on selfesteem and initiative in terms of group behavior, the researcher searched the PsycINFO database
for studies with self-esteem and group in the title, which resulted in a list of 89 articles. The
abstracts of all 89 studies were reviewed, but none of the studies were relevant to the relationship
between self-esteem and taking initiative to speak up in groups. Finally, the researcher sought to
explore the recent literature pertaining to self-esteem and social or interpersonal initiative. Due to
the complex nature of social interaction, various search terms (viz., social initiative, social
interaction, interpersonal, interpersonal initiative, social behavior, relationship initiation, starting
relationships, relationship termination) were used in conjunction with self-esteem. After applying
the aforementioned inclusion and exclusion criteria, numerous articles published in scholarly
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(peer reviewed) journals, written in English, and published between 2003 and 2014 were found.
However, after reviewing all of the abstracts, very few were found to be relevant. Only those
studies determined to be the most directly applicable to the relationship between self-esteem and
initiation of interpersonal relations are described in detail below.
Finally, as noted above, Baumeister et al. (2003) combined the terms initiative and
persistence into one category. Since the current researcher differentiates between the two topics,
a review of the more recent literature on self-esteem and persistence was conducted. The
researcher searched the PsycINFO database for all articles containing self-esteem and persistence
in the title, and, after applying the aforementioned inclusion and exclusion criteria, one article
published in a scholarly (peer reviewed) journal, written in English, and published between 2003
and 2014 was found. However, the abstract was reviewed and the study was determined to be
irrelevant to the direct relationship between the two constructs.
Antisocial behavior. Arbona and Power (2003) sought to explore the relationships
between self-esteem, parental attachment, and antisocial behaviors among a diverse group of
adolescents. Participants in this study were 1,583 high school students (age M = 15.8) from six
high schools in a large metropolitan school district in the South. The sample was 42% European
American, 31% African American, and 27% Mexican American. Self-esteem was measured
using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Antisocial behaviors were measured
by a 10-item questionnaire designed to cover five content areas (viz., aggression, stealing, lying,
vandalism, and drugs), which was adapted from a 12-item self-report instrument developed by
Jessor and Jessor (1977). Attachment was measured using a 38-item questionnaire regarding
mother and father attachment, with items derived from three different sources: the Inventory of
Parent and Peer Attachments (Armsden & Greenberg, 1987), the Emotional Autonomy Scale
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(Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986), and the Children’s Report of Parental Behavior Inventory
(Schaefer, 1965). The researchers found a significant inverse relationship between self-esteem
and antisocial behavior among the European American and African American adolescents (r = 0.26), as well as among Mexican American adolescents (r = -0.22). Overall, the researchers
concluded that securely attached adolescents from the three ethnic groups had a more positive
sense of self-esteem and reported less involvement in antisocial behaviors than their less securely
attached peers.
Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, and Caspi (2005) sought to explore the link
between global self-esteem and externalizing problems such as aggression, antisocial behavior,
and delinquency through three different studies. In the first study, self-esteem was measured with
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the 6-item Global subscale of the Harter
(1985) Self-Perception Profile for Children (SPPC). Delinquency was measured using a 12-item
delinquent behaviors scale adapted by Elliot, Huizinga, and Ageton (1985). The sample
consisted of 292 11 and 14 year olds (age M = 12.66; 55% female, 45% male; 56.5% European
American, 20.5% Hispanic American, 9.2% African American, 9.0% other or not reported, and
4.8% Asian American or Pacific Islander) from two schools in Northern California. Self-esteem
was consistently inversely correlated with delinquency, regardless of whether self-esteem was
assessed by the Rosenberg scale (r = -0.35), the self-report version of the Harter SPCC (r = 0.39), or the teacher version of the Harter SPPC (r = -0.29).
In the second study conducted by Donnellan et al. (2005), self-esteem was measured
among a group of youth at age 11 (N = 812; 48% female, 52% male) and age 13 (N = 736; 48%
female, 52% male) using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Externalizing
problems were assessed using the Rutter Child Scale (RCS; Rutter, Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970)
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and the Revised Behavior Problem Checklist (RBPC; Quay & Peterson, 1987). Consistent with
the first study, self-esteem was inversely correlated with parent reports of externalizing problems
(r = -0.18 at age 11 and r = -0.28 at age 13) and with teacher reports of externalizing problems (r
= -0.16 at age 11 and r = -0.18 at age 13).
In the third study conducted by Donnellan et al. (2005), the researchers sought to explore
relationships between self-esteem, narcissism, and aggression. A sample of 3,143 undergraduate
students (68.3% female, 31.7% male; age M = 19.6) from a large research university in northern
California was administered the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988), and the Buss-Perry Aggression
Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992). Self-esteem was inversely correlated with aggression
(r = -0.30). Self-esteem and narcissism were also moderately related (r = 0.32).15
Menon et al. (2007) sought to explore two hypotheses regarding self-esteem and
antisocial conduct. The first hypothesis that high self-esteem leads children to act on antisocial
cognitions (disposition-activating hypothesis) and the second hypothesis that high self-esteem
leads children to rationalize antisocial conduct (disposition-rationalizing hypothesis) were
investigated in two short-term longitudinal studies. In Study 1, antisocial behavior was defined
by level of aggression, as measured by a 3-item peer nomination scale and a 40-item
questionnaire assessing five aggression-encouraging cognitions (viz., expectation of reward,
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Donnellan et al. (2005) also found that narcissism was positively correlated with aggression (r
= 0.18). The researchers conducted multiple regression analyses to test whether narcissism and
self-esteem had independent effects on aggression. The effects of self-esteem on aggression were
significantly stronger when narcissism was included in the equation than when it was not
included. Similarly, the effects of narcissism were significantly stronger when self-esteem was
included in the equations. Thus, low self-esteem and narcissism appear to contribute
independently to aggressive thoughts feelings, and behaviors, and in fact serve as mutual
suppressors. In other words, each variable, when controlled, had the effect of strengthening the
relationship between the other variables.
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expectation of victim suffering, value of reward, value of victim suffering, and self-efficacy for
aggression). Harter’s (1985) 6-item global self-worth scale was used to measure self-esteem. The
sample consisted of 189, predominately White, third- through seventh-grade boys and girls (age
M = 11.1 years) and the children were tested in the fall and again in the spring of a school year.
No direct, meaningful correlation was found between self-esteem and aggression (Time 1 r =
0.12; Time 2 r = 0.00). More specifically, to evaluate the first hypothesis, the researchers sought
to determine whether high self-esteem would transform aggressive cognitions into aggressive
action through conducting a hierarchical regression analysis. This study failed to yield any
support for the disposition-activating hypothesis. Regarding the second hypothesis, the
researchers evaluated whether high self-esteem would encourage aggressive children to
rationalize their aggressive conduct. As a result of a multiple regression analysis, the researchers
found that high self-esteem exacerbated the contribution of aggression to the aggressive
cognition. In other words, high self-esteem children were shown to rationalize their antisocial
conduct.
In Study 2 by Menon et al. (2007), antisocial behavior was defined by avoidance of the
mother. Presumably, avoidant children experience the mother as aversive and are trying to exit
the relationship. The disposition-rationalizing hypothesis is that “high self-esteem leads avoidant
children to justify their avoidance of their mother by strengthening their perceptions of her as an
inept, hostile, uncaring, blameworthy parent who deserves the avoidant treatment she is
receiving” (Menon et al., 2007, p. 1632). In this study, self-esteem was assessed as it was in
Study 1 and avoidant attachment was assessed using a 10-item scale adapted by Yunger, Corby,
and Perry (2005) from Finnegan, Hodges, and Perry’s (1996) original scale. Measures were
administered once in the fourth grade and again a year later, in the fifth grade. Among the
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sample of 407 children (52% girls, 48% boys; age M = 10.8; 52% White, 28% Black, 20%
Hispanic) from five relatively small elementary schools serving middle- and lower middle-class
neighborhoods in southeast Florida, self-esteem was found to be inversely, but only modestly,
associated with caregiver avoidance (Time 1 r = -0.26; Time 2 r = -0.09). The results of a
multiple regression analysis did not show significant support for the first hypothesis, that selfesteem motivates avoidance by children who view their mother negatively (the dispositionactivating hypothesis). Regarding the disposition-rationalizing hypothesis, multiple regression
analysis showed that high self-esteem magnified the contribution of avoidant attachment to a
negative view of the mother, leading avoidant children to view their mother more negatively.
Thus, according to the researchers, aggressive children with high self-esteem increasingly valued
the rewards that aggression offers and belittled their victims, and avoidant children with high
self-esteem increasingly viewed their mother as harassing and uninvolved. The researchers
concluded that, for antisocial children, high self-esteem carries costs.
Bullying. Seals and Young (2003) explored the relationship of bullying and victimization
to gender, grade level, ethnicity, self-esteem, and depression. The sample consisted of 454
students (59% female, 41% male) from Mississippi, who were between the ages of 12 to 17
years. The sample was 79% African American and 18% Caucasian. Bullying and victimization
were measured using the Peer Relations Questionnaire (Rigby & Slee, 1995) and self-esteem was
measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Three groups (bullies,
victims, and nonbullies-nonvictims) were compared in terms of self-esteem. Although bullies
and nonbullies-nonvictims scored higher in self-esteem than victims, the differences were
minimal and a one-way analysis of variance was not significant (p < .50).
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Fox and Farrow (2009) collected self-report data from a sample of British 11- to 14-yearolds (N = 376) about their weight status, their experiences of three different types of bullying
(verbal, physical and social), their global self-worth, self-esteem for physical appearance, and
body dissatisfaction. Global self-worth and self-esteem for physical appearance were measured
using the Harter’s Self-Perception Profile for Children/Adolescents (Harter, 1985) and 16 items
were written by the researchers to reflect “a complete range of current bullying experiences”
(i.e., verbal, physical, and social; Fox & Farrow, 2009, p. 1290). Global self-worth and selfesteem for physical appearance were highly correlated (r = 0.63). Global self-esteem was also
moderately inversely correlated with body dissatisfaction (r = -0.32), verbal bullying (r = -0.32),
physical bullying (r = -0.23), and social bullying (r = -0.37).
Gendron, Williams, and Guerra (2011) examined the relations between self-esteem,
approving normative beliefs about bullying, school climate, and bullying perpetration using a
large, longitudinal sample of children from elementary, middle, and high school. Self-esteem
was measured with a four-item scale adapted from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965) and bullying was measured with an eight-item scale adapted from Espelage, Holt, and
Henkel (2003). Data were collected as part of a 3-year bullying prevention initiative in Colorado
and a total of 7,299 fifth-, eighth-, and 11th-grade students participated in the study. Self-esteem
was inversely correlated with bullying (Time 1 r = -0.22; Time 2 r = -0.14). The results of a
multiple regression analysis suggested that self-esteem is positively associated with bullying
when school climate is perceived as non-supportive but negatively associated with bullying when
it is perceived as supportive.
Prosocial behavior. Lindsey, Colwell, Frabutt, Campbell, and MacKinnon-Lewis (2008)
aimed to examine mother-child synchrony, characterized by a mutually responsive and
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interconnected interaction style, and its link to early adolescents’ self-esteem and prosocial
behavior. Data were collected from 268 early adolescents (49% girls, 51% boys) and their
mothers, from both European American (56%) and African American (44%) families. All
children in the study were transitioning into middle school and ranged from 11 to 13 years old
(age M = 12.34). Self-esteem was measured by the global self-worth scale from Harter’s (1982)
Perceived Competence Scale for Children (PCSC) and prosocial behavior was measured by the
Ratings of Children’s Social Behavior Scale (CSBS; Crick, 1996), which includes such items as
says supportive things to peers and tries to cheer up peers when sad or upset. The researchers
found a positive correlation between self-esteem and prosocial behavior (r = 0.30).
Social-interpersonal initiative. Ethier et al. (2006) attempted to clarify the relationship
between psychological factors (e.g., self-esteem, emotional distress) and sexual behavior (e.g.,
sexual history, future risky sexual behavior). On a sample of 155 sexually active adolescent
females (46% African American, 37% Latina, 17% other), aged 14-19 years (age M = 17.2), the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was used to measure self-esteem. Among the
various variables they measured, the researchers reported a statistically significant, but small,
relationship between level of self-esteem and age at first intercourse (r = 0.18), which led the
researchers to conclude that adolescent females who initiate sex earlier have lower self-esteem.
Additionally, self-esteem was inversely correlated with having a history of a risky partner (r = 0.22) and inversely, but weakly, correlated with number of partners per year (r = -0.05) and
sexually transmitted disease (STD) history (r = -0.02).
Eryilmaz and Atak (2011) sought to investigate the level at which self-esteem and gender
roles predict the ability to start romantic intimacy in emerging adulthood. Using a sample of 256
university students (ages 19–25 years), the researchers measured self-esteem using the
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). They measured perceptions of starting
romantic intimacy with the Markers of Starting Romantic Intimacy Scale (Eryilmaz & Atak,
2009) and gender role tendencies with the Bem Gender Roles Inventory (Bem, 1974). The results
of a multiple regression analysis showed that level of self-esteem was a significant predictor
variable when it came to starting of romantic intimacy among emerging adults. More
specifically, self-esteem, gender, and also gender roles were the most important factors for
starting romantic intimacy.
Cameron, Stinson, and Wood (2013) aimed to explore the interactions between selfesteem, gender, and relationship initiation with two studies. In Study 1, a sample of 48
introductory psychology students (56% female, 44% male; age M = 18.7 years) were
administered the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and a questionnaire regarding recent
romantic relationship interactions (e.g., most recent romantic attraction, relationship initiation
attempts, romantic involvement) and perceived social risk (e.g., importance of becoming
romantically involved with the target, the importance and significance of this event in their life,
how much it bothered them if they did not become involved with the target). The results of a
multiple regression analysis indicated that, when perceived social risk was present, lower selfesteem individuals were less likely to use direct initiation behaviors than higher self-esteem
individuals. However, if perceived social risk was not present, these self-esteem differences in
behavior were no longer significant.
In Study 2 by Cameron et al. (2013), a sample of 60 introductory psychology students
(52% female, 48% male; age M = 19.2 years) were administered the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (1965). Subjects were placed in a situation where they believed that there was a second,
opposite-sex participant in the lab room next to their own, and that they would be
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communicating with their interaction partner via video camera. Some subjects were then
assigned to a risk condition (i.e., believing that there was a possibility they could meet the other
participant, if and only if the other participant wanted to meet them) and some to a no risk
condition (i.e., believing that they were unable to meet their interaction partner face-to-face, even
if they wanted to, due to ethical regulations). A behavioral coding method was used to assess
actual initiation behavior. The results of a hierarchical regression analysis indicated that gender
moderated the links between self-esteem, risk, and initiation behavior in a manner consistent
with traditional gender roles. In other words, the researchers sought to examine the two-way and
three-way interactions between self-esteem, gender, and risk condition in predicting directness of
cues conveying liking. Women tended to display more direct cues conveying liking in the risky
condition and less in the no risk condition, but there was no interaction between self-esteem and
risk condition for women. For men, an interaction between self-esteem and condition emerged.
In the high-risk condition, men with high self-esteem displayed greater liking cues than those
with low self-esteem. Self-esteem was unrelated to the directness of cues conveying liking in the
no-risk condition. Thus, self-esteem predicted men’s, but not women’s, use of direct initiation
strategies as a function of risk.
Critique of the literature: Self-esteem and initiative. Similar to the studies on the
relationship between self-esteem, happiness, and depression, the recent literature on the
relationship between self-esteem and initiative reveals that the research in this area continues to
display not just the limitations addressed by Baumeister et al. (2003), but also additional
weaknesses. Moreover, although Baumeister et al. did conclude that the potential benefits of high
self-esteem could be tentatively summarized in terms of two main themes (i.e., happiness and
greater initiative), they also clearly stated that, with the exception of the link to happiness, most

49
other effects were weak to modest. Thus, even the findings they cited on initiative in 2003 were
not considered particularly strong. Further, the current review of the initiative literature did not
yield any more robust support for the tentative conclusions of Baumeister et al. (2003) than they
themselves found over a decade ago. Specifically, the following problems and challenges present
in the research, many of which plagued the literature on happiness and depression as well, must
be addressed and rectified before valid conclusions can be reached:
1. correlation versus causation;
2. magnitude of correlation;
3. influence of third variables;
4. methodological problems with self-report measures;
5. sample composition and generalizability;
6. instrumentation variance;
7. issues with construct validity (including discriminant and divergent factors).
Each of these issues is discussed sequentially below.
1. While the links between self-esteem and initiative appear notable in some cases, the
methodological shortcomings of the work that has been done must be addressed prior to
determining the exact nature of the relationships between these variables. As mentioned above in
the critique of the literature on self-esteem, happiness, and depression, a correlation between two
variables does not prove causation. Nevertheless, several of the studies discussed above (e.g.,
Donnellan et al., 2005; Eryilmaz & Atak, 2011; Gendron et al., 2011) inappropriately imply a
causal relationship between self-esteem and initiative across a number of situations, simply by
virtue of the statistically significant relationship shown between two variables. These inferences
are reflected through unsupported conclusions and misleading wording choices such as: “…the
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effect of self-esteem on aggression was independent of narcissism” (Donnellan et al., 2005, p.
328); “…the effect of self-esteem on bullying perpetration was moderated by perceptions of
school climate” (Gendron et al., 2011, p. 150); and, “…self-esteem has a positive effect on
starting romantic intimacy” (Eryilmaz & Atak, 2011, p. 599).
2. A relationship that is statistically significant is not necessarily meaningful, substantive,
or useful, and the actual numerical magnitude of the correlations (i.e., effect size) being reported
must be considered, above and beyond whether it crosses the threshold of statistical significance.
Throughout the literature discussed above, correlations range from r = -0.09 to r = 0.63. Even in
the case of the strongest correlation (r = 0.63) reported by Fox and Farrow (2009), this finding
still only accounts for approximately 40% of the variance between the two variables (viz., selfesteem and physical appearance), thus leaving over half (60%) unexplained. Moreover, this
correlation, albeit the highest reported, is not even directly related to initiative. The next highest
correlation reported here was between self-esteem (measured by the Harter SPCC) and
delinquent behavior (r = -0.39), which accounts for approximately 15% of the variance, leaving
85% unexplained (Donnellan et al., 2005). All other reported correlations account for even less
of the variance (some as low as < 1%), even though they are, technically speaking, statistically
significant.
3. Most of the research described above has not identified, controlled for, or ruled out
potential third variable causes (i.e., covariates). While some studies imply effects of self-esteem
on variables such as bullying or prosocial behavior, the effects of self-esteem could be
confounded with the effects of other unidentified or unknown variables; consequently, some of
these apparent effects of self-esteem might diminish or even vanish when other covariates (e.g.,
family upbringing, peer relationships, cultural influences) are controlled for.
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4. Like the studies cited by Baumeister et al. (2003), the three recent studies on selfesteem and antisocial behavior discussed here (Arbona & Power, 2003; Donnellan et al., 2005;
Menon et al., 2007) relied solely on self-report measures, as did the three recent studies on selfesteem and bullying (Seals & Young, 2003; Fox & Farrow, 2009; Gendron et al., 2011), the
study on self-esteem and prosocial behavior (Lindsey et al., 2008), and two of the studies on selfesteem and social initiative (Ethier et al., 2006; Eryilmaz & Atak, 2011). Only one study
discussed here on self-esteem and social initiative (Cameron et al., 2013) used both self-report
measures and observational data gathered while the researchers attempted to experimentally
manipulate certain conditions. As discussed above, self-report measures are common,
inexpensive, and easy to administer; however, they are subject to a whole host of validity issues
(Bellack & Hersen, 1977; Shiffman, 2000) and biasing factors (Stone et al., 2000)16.
5. Compared to the literature discussed above regarding the relationships between selfesteem, happiness, and depression, much of the research on self-esteem and initiative includes
more ethnically diverse samples. Nonetheless, it is important to note that many of the studies
discussed here used samples that are not inherently generalizable to other populations for a
variety of other reasons. Most notably, almost every study described above involved samples of
children and adolescents (Arbona & Power, 2003; Donnellan et al., 2005; Menon et al., 2007;
Seals & Young, 2003; Fox & Farrow, 2009; Gendron et al., 2011; Lindsey et al., 2008; Ethier et
al., 2006), limiting the generalizability of these findings to other age groups. Additionally, many
of the samples are quite limited with regard to being truly representative of a diverse population
because of a number of other important socio-cultural factors (e.g., gender, level of education,
geographic location, socioeconomic status, religion, nationality, ethnicity, etc.).
16

See Appendix A for a list and brief descriptions of biasing factors associated with self-report
measures.
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6. Upon close inspection of the methods used amongst a couple of the studies discussed
above (e.g., Arbona & Power, 2003; Gendron et al., 2011), some researchers have elected to use
shortened versions (e.g., seven of ten items; four of ten items) of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and other measures. Thus, with different studies electing to use altered
versions of these self-report measures, such comparisons call into question the validity of their
conclusions. Moreover, several of the studies discussed above relied upon Harter’s (1982)
Perceived Competence Scale for Children as the sole measure for self-esteem (Fox & Farrow,
2009; Lindsey et al., 2008; Menon et al., 2007), versus the Rosenberg (1965) scale that is used
across all the other studies. While there is no inherent, notable problem with using Harter’s
(1982) scale as a measure of self-esteem, caution must be taken when making comparisons and
drawing conclusions with various studies electing to use different self-report measures of selfesteem.
7. Finally, before legitimate conclusions can be made, the construct validity of the
measures used within this research must be considered. For example, in Study 2 by Menon et al.
(2007), the researchers operationalized antisocial behavior by the degree to which the youth
engaged in avoidance behavior with their mothers. Avoidance behavior was assessed by a scale
designed to measure avoidant attachment, a 10-item scale adapted by Yunger et al. (2005) from
Finnegan et al.’s (1996) original scale. The researchers concluded that self-esteem was found to
be inversely associated with caregiver avoidance (Time 1 r = -0.26; Time 2 r = -0.09); however,
not only were the correlations weak to modest at best, how can we be sure that an avoidant
attachment style predicts antisocial behavior? If we cannot even be sure that a test measures what
it claims, or purports, to be measuring, how can we make valid conclusions about that construct
and its relation to self-esteem?
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More broadly, this entire portion of the current investigation (i.e., self-esteem and
initiative) was guided by the tentative conclusions of Baumesiter et al. (2003) and their particular
operationalization of the term initiative. According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
initiative can be defined as “the power or opportunity to do something before others do”
(Initiative, 2014, para. 3) “the energy and desire that is needed to do something” (para. 3), “an
introductory step” (para. 4), or “energy or aptitude displayed in initiation of action” (para. 4).
Baumeister et al. (2003) defined initiative so broadly, applying it to such a wide-ranging list of
situations and circumstances (e.g., performing both antisocial and prosocial actions, initiating
relationships, speaking up in groups, experimenting with sex, trying harder in response to failure,
etc.), it is difficult to say with certainty that even the findings discussed here can contribute to
conclusions about initiative as it is defined colloquially or by the dictionary.
Last, as mentioned in the critique of the literature on self-esteem, happiness, and
depression (above), the construct validity of existing measures of self-esteem will be discussed in
more detail below.
Measures of Self-Esteem
As discussed in Chapter 1, the vast majority of self-esteem research utilizes self-report
measures. In their review of measures of self-esteem, Blascovich and Tomaka (1991) identified
the most frequently cited measures in the literature and then reviewed what they considered to be
the 11 most common, five of which are general measures for use with adolescents and adults,
two of which are designed for use with younger children, and the remaining four which cover
specific aspects of self-esteem. Of all the scales they reviewed, Blascovich and Tomaka found
them of vastly unequal quality and gave high marks to only a few, specifically Rosenberg’s
(1965) Self-Esteem Scale (SES) and a revision of Janis and Field’s (1959) Feelings of
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Inadequacy Scale, which was revised by Fleming and Courtney (1984). In the current review of
the literature, over 80% of the research studies cited utilized the Rosenberg (1965) SES to
measure self-esteem. Harter’s (1985) Self-Perception Profile for Children (SPPC), which was
included on Blascovich and Tomaka’s list as one of the most common measures for children,
was used in the vast majority of the remaining research reviewed. Therefore, the following
sections include summaries and reviews of these two measures (viz., SES and SPPC), which
were essentially the only two self-esteem instruments cited by the research in the current study17.
Immediately below is a discussion of the key psychometric properties used to summarize and
critically analyze these two measures, followed by a review of each instrument.
Psychometrics. For interpretations of data to be useful, the measuring instruments used
to collect those data must be both reliable and valid. The following section provides a brief
overview of both reliability and validity.
Reliability. Reliability is the degree to which a test is a consistent measure. Thus, the
more reliable a measuring instrument is, the more likely it is that items within the test are
internally consistent, or that the scores obtained from the test will be the same if the test is readministered at another time by the same or by a different examiner (Gay, Mills, & Airasian,
2009). Although a valid test is always reliable, a reliable test is not always valid. Reliability
provides information about the consistency of scores produced by an instrument whereas validity
provides information about the appropriateness or usefulness of an instrument (Gay et al., 2009).
Reliability is expressed numerically, usually as a reliability coefficient, which is obtained
by using correlation ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values reflecting greater reliability (Gay et
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For a complete list of measures used in the literature reviewed, see Appendix B. This list
includes measures of self-esteem, happiness, depression, and other variables associated with
initiative.
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al., 2009). For example, Cronbach’s α is an index of internal consistency, which tells us how
closely related a set of items are as a group (Cronbach, 1951). In other words, it estimates
internal consistency by determining how all items on a test relate to all other test items and to the
total test. Other types of reliability include stability (or test-retest reliability), which refers to the
degree to which scores on the same test are consistent over time. Inter-rater reliability and intrarater reliability refer, respectively, to the consistency of two or more independent scorers or to
the consistency of one individual’s scoring over time (Gay et al., 2009).
Validity. Validity refers to the degree to which a test measures what it is supposed to
measure, which allows for appropriate interpretation of scores. Like reliability, validity is
typically expressed numerically, usually as a validity coefficient, which is also obtained by using
correlation. However, in the case of a validity coefficient, the value can range from -1 to +1. A
coefficient of 0 indicates that the variables are orthogonal (i.e., statistically independent or
uncorrelated). Generally speaking, there are three main types of test validity: content validity,
criterion-related validity, and construct validity (Gay et al., 2009). Content validity refers to the
extent to which a test represents the general domain or content area of interest. Criterion-related
validity refers to the extent to which a test correlates with another test designed to measure the
same content area of interest. Criterion-related validity has two forms: concurrent validity (i.e.,
the degree to which scores on one test are related to scores on a similar test administered in the
same time frame) and predictive validity (i.e., the degree to which a test can predict how well an
individual will perform in a future situation). Construct validity refers to what extent a test
reflects the construct it is intended to measure (Gay et al., 2009). Convergent and discriminant
validity can be considered subcategories of construct validity and both must be demonstrated in
order to establish construct validity. In other words, one must show a correspondence or
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convergence between similar constructs (i.e., constructs that theoretically should be related to
each other are observed, in fact, to be related) and one must be able to discriminate between
dissimilar constructs (i.e., constructs that theoretically should not be related are observed, in fact,
not to be related to each other; see Campbell & Fiske, 1959, for a comprehensive discussion of
the multitrait-multimethod matrix). For instance, one might expect self-esteem to be correlated
with mood (e.g., high self-esteem with happiness and low self-esteem with depression), whereas
one would expect no correlation or meaningful relationship at all between self-esteem and
psychosis, IQ, or birthdate.
Separate but related types of validity that are important to the evaluation of research
methods include: internal validity, external validity, and incremental validity. Internal validity
refers to the degree to which changes observed in a dependent variable are due to the effect of
the independent variable, and not other extraneous variables. External validity refers to the extent
to which the results of a research study can be generalized to other situations or to other
populations. Incremental validity refers to whether a new psychometric assessment will increase
predictive ability beyond what would be provided or obtained with an already existing method
(Mertens, 2010).
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale. 18 The Self-Esteem Scale (SES; Rosenberg, 1965) is a
10-item self-report questionnaire that was originally designed to measure adolescents’ global
feelings of self-worth or self-acceptance. The original sample was a group of 5,024 high school
juniors and seniors from 10 randomly selected New York State high schools. The Self-Esteem
Scale consists of five positively worded (e.g., I feel that I have a number of good qualities) and
five negatively worded (e.g., All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure) items, which
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Refer to Appendix C for the Self-Esteem Scale test items, along with scoring instructions.
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require the respondent to report feelings about the self directly. It is typically scored using a fourpoint response format (i.e., strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree), resulting in a scale
range of 0-30 with higher scores representing higher self-esteem.
The Self-Esteem Scale is considered to be a unidimensional measure of self-esteem.
Rosenberg (1979) focused on global self-esteem as the target of measurement. Although he did
not dispute the fact that people evaluate themselves differently in different domains of their lives,
he took the stance that these discriminations are difficult to accurately assess. Rather, an overall
assessment of one’s feeling of self-worth as a person, the form of global judgment of selfesteem, was seen as sufficient as a predictor of other important life outcomes.
According to a review by Blascovich and Tomaka (1991), the scale’s brevity, ease of
administration, and simple scoring are some of the reasons it has been used so prevalently. As
mentioned above, using the publications reviewed in the current study as a benchmark, over 80%
utilized the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The SES is often viewed as the standard against which
new measures are evaluated. Overall, the scale is considered to be a straightforward estimate of
positive or negative feelings about the self; however, some items may be susceptible to socially
desirable responding (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
The Rosenberg SES is both internally consistent and temporally stable. Dobson, Goudy,
Keith, & Powers (1979) obtained a Cronbach’s α of 0.77 for their sample and Fleming and
Courtney (1984) reported a Cronbach’s α of 0.88 (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). Silber and
Tippett (1965) reported a test-retest correlation of 0.85 for 28 subjects after a 2-week interval.
Fleming and Courtney (1984) reported a test-retest correlation of 0.82 for 259 subjects with a 1week interval (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
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Convergent and discriminant validity of the Rosenberg SES have been demonstrated
across a number of studies. The measure has been shown to be associated with many selfesteem-related constructs. For example, correlations have been shown between Rosenberg SES
scores and confidence (r = 0.65; Lorr & Wunderlich, 1986), popularity (r = 0.39; Lorr &
Wunderlich, 1986), overall academic self-concept (r = 0.38; Reynolds, 1988), and social
confidence (0.51). Fleming and Courtney (1984) also demonstrated the Rosenberg SES to be
correlated with school abilities (r = 0.35) and physical appearance (r = 0.42). Two studies have
shown the relationship between SES scores and peer ratings of self-esteem (r = 0.27; SavinWilliams & Jaquish, 1981; r = 0.32; Demo, 1985). Correlations with social desirability range
from 0.10 (Reynolds, 1988) to 0.33 (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). Regarding other measures of
self-esteem, Rosenberg SES scores are correlated with Lerner Self-Esteem Scale scores (r =
0.72; Savin-Williams & Jaquish, 1981), the Janis and Field Scale scores (r = 0.66; Fleming &
Courtney, 1984), and the Coopersmith SEI (r = 0.55; Demo, 1985). Inverse relationships have
been demonstrated between the Rosenberg SES and concepts associated with low self-regard.
For example, SES scores are negatively correlated with anxiety (r = -0.64), anomie (r = -0.43),
and depression (r = -0.5419; Fleming & Courtney, 1984).
Significant discriminant validity has also been demonstrated for the Rosenberg SES.
Reynolds (1988) found no significant correlations between Rosenberg SES scores and grade
point averages (r = 0.10), locus of control (r = -0.04), Scholastic Aptitude Test verbal scores (r =
-0.06) or quantitative scores (r = 0.10). Fleming and Courtney (1984) found no significant
correlations between SES scores and gender (r = 0.10), age (r = 0.13), work experience (r = -
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For a detailed review of the relationship between self-esteem and depression, see the review of
the literature earlier in this chapter.
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0.07), marital status (r = 0.17), birth order (r = 0.02), grade point average (r = 0.01), or
vocabulary (r = -0.04).
Harter’s self-perception profile for children. 20 The Self-Perception Profile for
Children (SPPC) is a 36-item self-report scale that measures several aspects of a child’s general
sense of self-worth and self-concept that are related primarily to competence and acceptance
(Harter, 1985/2012). The original standardization sample was composed of 1553 third through
eighth grade boys and girls (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). This tool taps five specific domains
of self-concept (viz., scholastic competence, social competence, athletic competence, physical
appearance, and behavioral conduct), as well as global self-worth. Although the original scale
was designed just for children, Harter has since developed six different versions of her SelfPerception Profile to correspond with different developmental stages: the original SelfPerception Profile for Children, ages 8-13 (Harter, 1985/2012), the Self-Perception Profile for
Adolescents, ages 14-19 (Harter, 1988/2012), Profile for Learning Disabled Students, ages 8-18
(Renick & Harter, 1988/2012), the Self-Perception Profile for College Students (Neemann &
Harter, 1986/2012), the Self-Perception Profile for Adults, ages 20-60 (Messer & Harter,
1986/2012), and the Self-Perception Profile for Older Adults, ages 60+ (Harter & Kreinik, 2012).
According to Harter (1999), self-perceptions, beginning in childhood, are more complex
than what can be captured by measures that take a unidimensional, single score approach (e.g.,
the global self-esteem score of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale). Thus, Harter (1985/2012)
sought to develop assessment tools that would tap into the differentiation between an
individual’s self-evaluations across multiple domains. Based on Harter’s approach, however,
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Refer to Appendix D for the Self-Perception Profile for Children test items, along with scoring
instructions.
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these domain-specific evaluations do not preclude an individual from having an overall sense of
self-worth as a person, which she labels global self-worth (analogous to overall self-esteem), and
these two categories of self-evaluations can coexist (Harter, 1985/2012). Therefore, the SPPC
contains subscales tapping domain-specific concepts and a separate subscale titled Global SelfWorth, namely how much one likes oneself as a person, overall. This scale is not the sum of the
domain-specific scores, but is rated by its own set of items and scored separately (Harter,
1985/2012).
Regarding the contents of the Global Self-Worth scale, Harter (1985/2012) identifies
these items as tapping directly into how much one likes oneself as a person, is happy with the
way one is leading one’s life, is generally happy with the way one is, as a human being. Within
the items designed to measure global self-worth, there are no references to specific skills or
competencies. According to Harter (1985/2012), this subscale is similar to Rosenberg’s (1965)
notion of self-esteem; however, the wording is more appropriate for children and the question
format differs. Harter advises that the global self-worth scores of children under 8 years of age
be interpreted with caution, since younger children are less able to make abstract judgments
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
Briefly, with regard to the other domains, the Scholastic Competence items refer
specifically to the child’s perceived cognitive competence, as applied to schoolwork. The Social
Competence items refer to knowing how to make friends, having the skills to get others to like
oneself, knowing what to do to have others like or accept you, and understanding what it takes to
become popular. The items included on the Athletic Competence subscale refer to one’s ability
to do well at sports, including outdoor games, and items included on the Physical Appearance
subscale tap into the extent to which one feels one is good looking (e.g., happy with one’s looks,
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face, hair, etc.). Finally, the Behavioral Conduct subscale taps the degree to which one likes the
way one behaves, avoids getting in trouble, and acts the way he or she is supposed to act.
Regarding question format, Harter (1985/2012) designed the format with the aim of
offsetting the tendency to give socially desirable response and to provide participants with a
range of response choices. Specifically, the child is first asked to decide which kind of kids he or
she is most like (i.e., those described on the left side of the test form or those described on the
right side) in each statement. After having made this decision, the child then decides whether the
description on the side he/she chose is Really True for Me or Sort of True for Me. Each of the six
subscales is based on six items and items are scored from one to four, with the most positive
answers receiving a four (positive picture, really true) and negative responses receiving a one
(negative picture, really true). Domain scores can range from 6 to 24 and total scores range from
36 to 144, with higher scores indicating a more positive self-concept (Blascovich & Tomaka,
1991).
The Global Self-Worth Scale of the SPPC is internally consistent, with Cronbach’s α
values ranging from 0.71 to 0.85 across four samples (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). With regard
to temporal stability, the test author does not recommend test-retest statistics as an index of
reliability, namely due to self-perceptions changing over time interventions designed to impact
change, natural events in a child’s life, school transitions, various stressors, changing family
constellations, age-related developmental factors, etc. (Harter, 1999). Further, no test-retest
correlations were found from outside sources (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
Regarding test validity, some convergent evidence comes from unpublished data reported
by Harter (1985/2012) in which 96% of first and second grade children were readily able to give
specific reasons why they felt competent or not and why they felt accepted or not. Also, a
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correlation of 0.42 was reportedly obtained between perceived competence and preferred level of
difficulty in puzzle tasks (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). Regarding other measures, scores on the
Global Self-Worth subscale of the Harter SPPC (1985/2012) have been shown to correlate with
scores on the General Self-Concept Subscale of the Marsh Self-Description Questionnaire
(Marsh, 1991; r = 0.56; Harter, 1985/2012). No discriminant validity data were found
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
Critique of measures: The Rosenberg SES and the Harter SPPC. Both
methodological and conceptual problems combine to make valid, useful measurement of selfesteem difficult. Conceptual confusion is exacerbated by the fact that self-esteem, like many
important constructs in the field of psychology, is used both colloquially as well as within the
realms of academic and clinical psychology. Thus, although research would benefit from a
strong, standardized measure of self-esteem, common-language notions of self-esteem are
sometimes substituted for more explicit, scientific definitions, which creates an illusion of a
universally accepted, well-defined entity (Wells & Marwell, 1976). Moreover, given the
ultimately subjective nature of self-esteem, it has been measured almost exclusively by selfreport21. As discussed in Chapter 1, considering all the different theoretical approaches to
defining self-esteem and the enormous number of research studies that have sought to measure
the construct, it is no surprise that different measuring instruments have evolved over time.
Nonetheless, the use of simple self-report measures in research appears to be the method that has
prevailed and been deemed to be the most pragmatic (Blaskovich & Tomaka, 1991). The
pragmatic approach, however, is not without its methodological shortcomings. For example, the
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For a discussion of problems associated with self-report measures, see critiques of the
literature on self-esteem, happiness, and depression, as well as the critique of the literature on
self-esteem and initiative (above). Also, see Appendix A for a list of biasing factors associated
with self-report measures.
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social desirability of high self-esteem in North American culture generally leads subjects to
respond to face-valid (i.e., subjectively transparent or viewed as explicitly covering the concept it
purports to measure) items accordingly, thereby inflating self-esteem scores on self-report
measures (Blaskovich & Tomaka, 1991). Taking these conceptual and methodological issues
into consideration, as well as the psychometric properties discussed above, below are critiques of
some of the specific problems with the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and the Harter
(1985) Self-Perception Profile for Children.
Rosenberg SES: A critique. As mentioned previously, the Rosenberg SES has enjoyed
widespread use as a unidimensional measure of self-esteem and is often the standard against
which new measures are evaluated. However, it is not without methodological problems. For
example, according to Blascovich and Tomaka (1991), the test items are susceptible to socially
desirable responding. Regarding test reliability, although studies have shown the measure to be
both internally consistent and temporally stable, the test-retest reliability coefficients reported
were measured over such short periods of time (i.e., 1 week and 2 weeks), it is unclear whether
the measure is actually reliable over longer periods of time. Similarly, with regard to validity, the
data do not suggest the predictive validity of the measure. In other words, with such limited data
on temporal stability, how can one be sure that the test predicts level of self-esteem in future
situations? Studies have shown both convergent validity (i.e., positive correlations between the
SES and confidence, popularity, overall academic self-concept, social confidence, school
abilities, physical appearance, and peer ratings of self-esteem, as well as inverse relationships
between SES scores and anxiety, depression and anomie) and discriminant validity (i.e., no
significant correlations between SES scores and grade point averages, locus of control,
Scholastic Aptitude Test verbal or quantitative scores, gender, age, work experience, marital
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status, birth order, grade point average, or vocabulary). Concurrent validity has been shown
through correlations between the SES and Lerner Self-Esteem Scale scores, the Janis and Field
Scale scores, and the Coopersmith SEI. However, the external validity of the Rosenberg SES is
questionable. For example, with the original standardization sample being composed of
adolescents from 10 New York State high schools, how can one be certain that the norms
generated from that sample are generalizable to other populations (e.g., anyone who is not an
adolescent in a New York state public school)?
Finally, from a conceptual standpoint, although Rosenberg did not dispute that people
evaluate themselves differently in different domains, he took the stance that this heterogeneity is
difficult to accurately assess and an overall assessment of one’s feeling of self-worth as a person
(i.e., global self-esteem), was seen as sufficient as a predictor of other important life outcomes.
The question still stands as to whether or not this conceptualization of self-esteem is truly valid
or useful. Not only can self-evaluations vary in different domains of functioning, high selfesteem has repeatedly been shown to be a heterogeneous construct (Baumeister et al., 2003).
Thus, a unidimensional measure of global self-esteem, like the Rosenberg SES, might not
capture the distinction between being conceited, narcissistic, or defensive, on one hand, as
opposed to accepting oneself with accurate appreciation of one’s strengths and worth, on the
other.
Harter’s SPPC: A critique. In their 1991 review article, Blaskovich and Tomaka noted
that, while most work using the SPPC has been performed by Harter and her colleagues, the
scale is promising as a useful and stable instrument for assessing children’s self-concept.
However, the authors also stated that additional work is necessary to establish the validity of the
instrument. Over 20 years later, it appears as though the use of the Harter SPPC is more
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widespread, but the lack of research showing the reliability and validity of the instrument is still
a significant problem.
For example, while the measure has been shown to be internally consistent, there are
virtually no data available pointing to the temporal stability of the test. As mentioned above, the
test author does not recommend test-retest statistics as an index of reliability, namely due to selfperceptions changing over time and no test-retest correlations were found from outside sources.
Is self-esteem so fragile and context-specific that scores on this measure would not remain
consistent even over short periods of time? If so, then should researchers actually be using the
SPPC as a measure of global self-esteem? Moreover, research showing the validity of the
instrument (e.g., construct, convergent, discriminant, concurrent, or predictive validity) is
essentially nonexistent. As noted above, the only evidence of convergent validity is in the form
of unpublished data, which happens to be reported by the test author herself, rather than from a
more objective, independent source. Regarding concurrent and construct validity, the current
researcher personally contacted and corresponded with Harter via email and she responded to
inquiries about the direct correlation between the SPPC and the Rosenberg SES by stating that
she has come across some work correlating her Global Self-Worth scale with Rosenberg’s
instrument, but she does “not recall who did this work or where it was published” (S. Harter,
personal communication, July 15, 2014). The current researcher found no such work. Given that
Rosenberg’s SES is the most commonly used—and accepted—self-report measure of selfesteem, the lack of research validating the SPPC against even the SES is a strong indication of
the remarkable absence of established validity of this instrument.
Further, the external validity (i.e., generalizability) of the SPPC is questionable. Although
the original standardization sample was large (n = 1,553 third- through eighth-grade boys and
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girls), the diversity of the sample, with regard to a number of important socio-cultural factors
(e.g., geographic location, socioeconomic status, religion, nationality, ethnicity, etc.), is
unknown. Thus, it is unclear whether results drawn from that sample are truly generalizable to
other populations.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
The primary goal of the current study was to survey the recent research literature in order
to assess whether self-esteem, as it has been conceptualized historically, has important
implications, both from clinical and social perspectives. Additionally, the current researcher set
out to examine and evaluate the manner in which self-esteem has been defined and measured in
the recent literature. These objectives were complicated by several factors: (a) the vast multitude
of studies that discussed self-esteem; (b) imprecise and varied definitions and operationalizations
of self-esteem; (c) widespread reliance on unreliable and poorly validated self-report measures;
and (d) a variety of other methodological shortcomings identified within the literature.
Of particular interest to the current researcher were the following questions:
1. Despite the fact that the construct has been in existence for over 120 years, why does
there continue to be a lack of consensus when it comes to defining and understanding
self-esteem?
2. What have been some of the most salient problems with the existing research?
3. In light of the striking lack of empirical support for self-esteem being psychology’s
Holy Grail, why does our obsession with self-esteem persist?
4. Assuming that the construct of self-esteem is heterogeneous, where do the
distinctions lie?
5. What are the clinical implications if we continue to misunderstand and misuse selfesteem?
The discussion begins with a summary of findings from the critical review of the literature and is
followed by a detailed exploration of the aforementioned questions, applying a critical thinking
perspective to the subject of self-esteem.
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Summary of Findings and Critical Analysis
•

Since the emergence of the self-esteem movement as a powerful social force in the
1970s, many Americans have come to believe that we suffer from a widespread low
self-esteem epidemic.

•

However, research clearly shows that we do not suffer from a low self-esteem
epidemic. If anything we tend to overvalue ourselves, with the average American
perceiving himself or herself as above average.

•

The California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social
Responsibility did not find the support they sought for their assumption that selfesteem plays a major causal role in determining a wide range of both positive and
negative social behaviors. They also failed to conclude that programs designed to
enhance self-esteem would have beneficial social effects.

•

Despite the lack of empirical support that self-esteem plays a direct causal role in
areas like academic and job performance, interpersonal relationships, or healthier
lifestyles, countless efforts to boost self-esteem continue to be made by teachers,
parents, and therapists alike.

•

Moreover, some researchers have suggested that these efforts to raise self-esteem
could potentially backfire and contribute to some of the very problems they were
thought to thwart.

•

One of the oldest concepts in psychology and ranking among the top three covariates
occurring in personality and social psychology research, self-esteem has been
conceptualized and defined in numerous ways (e.g., affective vs. cognitive vs.
behavioral; stable vs. fluid; unidimensional vs. multidimensional) and by numerous
individuals, representing a wide range of theoretical orientations.

•

With multiple active definitions of self-esteem and very little consensus, it can be
difficult to link definitions, theories, and research, creating confusion in the field.

•

There are many available measures of self-esteem, the vast majority of which are selfreport inventories, reflecting a variety of theoretical perspectives.

•

Both methodological and conceptual problems combine to make valid, useful
measurement of self-esteem difficult.

•

Even the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, which is by far the most commonly
used and highly regarded instrument, has a number of flaws, including: susceptibility
to socially desirable responding; overly simplifying the heterogeneity of self-esteem;
and questionable long-term reliability, predictive validity, and external validity.
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•

In their seminal review, Baumeister et al. (2003) concluded that self-esteem is not a
major predictor of most anything, with the exception of two main themes: (1) high
self-esteem is linked to positive feelings (i.e., happiness), and (2) high self-esteem is
linked to greater initiative.

•

The current review of the literature since 2003 revealed similar findings on selfesteem and happiness, self-esteem and depression, and self-esteem and initiative:
o Self-esteem and happiness are significantly, positively correlated. More
specifically, self-esteem has been shown to be a significant predictor of
happiness when compared to other predictor variables.
o Self-esteem and depression are significantly, inversely correlated. Further, the
relative predictive weight of self-esteem on depression has been shown to be
greater than the predictive weight of depression on self-esteem.
o With the exception of the relationship between high self-esteem and initiation
of social interactions (e.g., romantic intimacy), the findings on the link
between self-esteem and initiative were mixed at best, and virtually
nonexistent at worst.

•

The current review also yielded the following results:
o Self-esteem has been linked to self-rated physical attractiveness; however,
when more objective measures of physical appearance are compared to selfreport data, people with high self-esteem do not emerge as any more attractive
than people with low self-esteem. There is an inverse relationship between
global self-esteem and body dissatisfaction.
o People with high self-esteem rate themselves as more intelligent than they
actually are and more socially skilled than others rate them to be.
o Some research has shown a positive correlation between self-esteem and
narcissism. The same researchers also found that narcissism was positively
correlated with aggression.

•

The research repeatedly attests to the heterogeneity of high self-esteem, and many
researchers have invoked some distinction between being conceited, narcissistic, and
defensive on the one hand, versus accepting oneself with an accurate appreciation of
one’s strengths and worth on the other.

•

Overall, the research on self-esteem is plagued with a variety of conceptual and
methodological problems. Some of these include: imprecise definitions and
operationalizations, lack of external validity, reliance on unreliable and poorly
validated self-report measures, haphazard instrumentation variance, failure to rule out
the influence of third variables, concluding causal relationships based on research that
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is primarily correlational, and claiming significant findings based on correlations that
are not necessarily meaningful, substantive, or useful.
Applying a Critical Thinking Approach to Self-Esteem
Our judgment and decision making, although reasonably accurate much of the time, are
frequently clouded by a vast array of cognitive biases and heuristics22. Further, there is
widespread consensus that these biases and heuristics reflect the workings of basically adaptive
processes that are misapplied in specific circumstances (Gigerenzer & Todd, 2002; Lilienfeld,
Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009; Lilienfeld, Ritschel, Lynn, Cautin, & Latzman, 2014; Shepperd &
Koch, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Despite the considerable amount of psychological
research that exists concerning the impact of these biases and heuristics on human judgment,
psychologists have made far more progress cataloguing these biases than they have in finding
ways to correct or prevent them (Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Moreover, although the field seems to
be teeming with pleas to teach and disseminate critical thinking, which some researchers define
as thinking intended to identify and overcome cognitive biases, relatively little research
demonstrates that learned critical thinking skills generalize beyond the tasks or domains within
which they are taught (Halpern, 2014; Lilienfeld et al., 2009). In fact, even among
extraordinarily intelligent scholars, the capacity to think critically is surprisingly nongeneralizable across disciples (see Feynman, 1985; Lykken, 1991). Could it be that the
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It should be noted that, although biases and heuristics are closely related terms that are often
confused with one another, they are distinct and separate concepts. A bias is a “prejudicial
inclination or predisposition that inhibits, deters, or prevents impartial judgment” (e.g., cognitive
bias, motivational bias; Levy, 2010, p. 264). A heuristic is a “mental shortcut or rule-of-thumb
strategy for problem solving that reduces complex information and time-consuming tasks to
more simple, rapid, and efficient judgmental operations, particularly in reaching decisions under
timed conditions of uncertainty” (e.g., availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic; Levy,
2010, p. 270).

71
widespread epidemic from which we suffer is not of low self-esteem, but rather of insufficient
critical thinking?
When reviewing the Summary of Findings and Critical Analysis above, one thing is
certain: the body of existing work on self-esteem is undeniably characterized by its
overwhelming deficiency in critical thinking. In his book, Tools of Critical Thinking:
Metathoughts for Psychology, Levy (2010) defines and applies cognitive tools, which he calls
metathoughts (literally, thoughts about thought), in order to provide readers with specific
strategies for inquiry and problem solving.
The findings of the current investigation, as well as the findings of past scholars who
have uncovered the problems and contradictions within the research, lead to a plethora of
unanswered questions about self-esteem. In an effort to address and answer some of these
fundamental questions, Levy’s (2010) tools of critical thinking (metathoughts) are applied in a
detailed discussion below.
1. Despite the fact that the construct has been in existence for over 120 years, why
does there continue to be a lack of consensus when it comes to defining and understanding
self-esteem? As discussed in Chapter 1, the term self-esteem can be traced back to 1890 and the
work of William James (1983/1890). Following his early theoretical efforts, while the term was
largely ignored for 75 years as a result of both academic and socioeconomic factors, a shift
occurred in the 1960s, with the rise of wealth and consumerism. Along with these social and
economic changes came the ability of the individual to see himself or herself at the center of his
or her own destiny (Seligman et al., 2007), and thus what some call the self-esteem movement
was born.
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Not only did self-esteem grow to be one of the most prominent individual concerns in
Western civilization, it has become a household word and even a widespread societal concern.
North American culture in particular has come to embrace the idea that high self-esteem is not
only desirable in and of itself, but also one of the central psychological sources from which all
positive behaviors spring, and that low self-esteem, conversely, lies at the root of countless
individual and societal problems (Baumeister et al., 2003). For nearly half a century, self-esteem
has been viewed as the psychologist’s Holy Grail (Baumeister, 2005).
Given the long history of the term, it is not surprising that many individuals have
attempted to define it, creating confusion in the field. But if this term has been viewed as not
only the psychologists’ Holy Grail, but as a prominent concern of American individuals,
educators, mental health professionals, and Westernized civilizations at large, why is it still so
misunderstood? Why is there still a lack of consensus in the field about the very definition and
nature of self-esteem? We have named it and we have certainly decided as a society that it is
very important, but do we actually understand it? These questions will be addressed and
discussed below from a critical thinking perspective.
The nominal fallacy and tautologous reasoning. In a world where descriptive labels are
a fundamental and indispensable part of science and everyday life, it is important to remember
that to name something does not necessarily mean to explain it. This error in thinking, called the
nominal fallacy, typically involves circular or tautological reasoning. A tautology is a needless
repetition of an idea or statement, using different words that essentially say the same thing twice
(Levy, 2010). For example, People who like themselves have self-esteem; therefore, people who
have self-esteem like themselves. When it comes to self-esteem and the field of psychology,
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examples of the nominal fallacy and tautological reasoning are rampant in the daily
conversations of clinicians, educators, and researchers alike. For example:
Why does that man not think well of himself?
Because he has low self-esteem.
How do you know he has low self-esteem?
Can’t you see that he doesn’t think well of himself?
For another example:
Why is that woman happy with who she is?
Because she has high self-esteem.
How do you know she has high self-esteem?
Look at how happy she is with herself!
It is important to remember, however, that these kinds of circular explanations are not
explanations at all. To label someone as having high self-esteem or low self-esteem does not
explain why they are happy or sad, why their interpersonal relationships are functional or
dysfunctional, why they engage in healthy or unhealthy behaviors, or why they are successful or
unsuccessful.
Consider the opposite. As mentioned previously, self-esteem has been conceptualized
and defined in numerous ways (e.g., affective vs. cognitive vs. behavioral; stable vs. fluid;
unidimensional vs. multidimensional) and by numerous individuals, representing a wide range of
theoretical orientations. However, in order to truly define or understand any given phenomenon,
its theoretical opposite should be addressed and explored (Levy, 2010). How can we understand
what it means to have self-esteem if we don’t know what the absence of self-esteem is? If we
have not come to a consensus on the definition of self-esteem, how can we consider its
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theoretical opposite? As these questions illustrate, Levy (2010) stated:
To contrast a phenomenon with its polar opposite is to give definition to both terms. Just
as thesis and antithesis can’t be understood in isolation from each other, all the polar
opposites are dependent upon one another for their very conceptual existence. (p. 31)
Conceptually speaking, just as we cannot understand good without bad, or light without dark, we
cannot thoroughly define or understand self-esteem without addressing or grasping its theoretical
opposite.
The evaluative bias of language. Two of the most salient functions that language serves
are to help people describe various phenomena and to evaluate those phenomena. While most
people assume that descriptions are objective and evaluations are subjective, whenever we
attempt to describe something or someone, the words we use are almost always value laden, in
that they reflect our own personal values and preferences. Therefore, our use of any particular
term serves not only to describe, but also to prescribe what is desirable or undesirable to us
(Levy, 2010). In the vast majority of cases, the distinction between objective description and
subjective evaluation is far from clear, which can be illustrated through different uses of the term
self-esteem. For example, one person might perceive another as having high self-esteem,
connoting that he or she is confident, self-assured, and assertive, while another—with a different
set of values and preferences, or from a different culture—might view that same person as pushy,
narcissistic and overly ambitious. On the other hand, one might label someone as having low
self-esteem, as being self-doubting, insecure, and anxious, while another person might label that
very same person as deferential, humble, and respectful of authority. Therefore, the very use of
the labels high self-esteem or low self-esteem are value laden, depending on one’s own set of
perspectives and beliefs.
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2. What have been some of the most salient problems with the existing research? As
summarized above, the research on self-esteem is plagued with a variety of conceptual and
methodological problems. Some of these include: imprecise definitions and operationalizations,
lack of external validity, reliance on unreliable and poorly validated self-report measures,
haphazard instrumentation variance, failure to rule out the influence of third variables,
concluding causal relationships based on research that is primarily correlational, and claiming
significant findings based on correlations that are not necessarily meaningful, substantive, or
useful. But, why, from a broader, conceptual standpoint, do we continue to make these same
mistakes? With countless studies on self-esteem being performed and published in professional
journals for over half a century, why do we continue to see some of the same problems with the
research?
Whether we are setting out to solve problems, to control our environments, or simply to
satisfy our curiosity, our need for understanding is a primary motivator in life. Unfortunately,
however, because we tend to prefer explanations that are simple and easy to understand, we often
settle for simple and uncomplicated at the cost of comprehensive and accurate (Levy, 2010).
Below is a discussion of some of the broad, overarching problems that are salient in the existing
studies that have sought to investigate and explain self-esteem.
Reactivity. As discussed in Chapter 3, given the ultimately subjective nature of selfesteem, the vast majority of research on self-esteem relies solely on self-report measures
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). While self-report may, in fact, be an efficient method of
measuring self-esteem, self-report measures are associated with a whole host of potential biasing
factors23. One of those biasing factors is reactivity, a phenomenon in which the conduct of
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For a list of biasing factors associated with self-report measures, see Appendix A.

76
research or measurement, in itself, affects the very entity that is being studied. In other words,
reactivity refers to the extent to which measuring something causes it to change (Levy, 2010).
How much are subjects’ responses to self-report measures of self-esteem altered by the biasing
factor of reactivity?
Almost without exception, the moment subjects become aware that they are being
studied, they develop expectations and hypotheses about the purpose of the study and how they
may be expected to behave (Levy, 2010). Thus, once subjects are aware of being observed, they
may be prompted to behave in ways that they believe to be socially desirable. For example, in an
individualistic, Western culture where it is desirable to present oneself as high rather than low in
self-esteem, one might be likely to—even unintentionally—respond to face-valid items
accordingly, thereby inflating self-esteem scores. Alternatively, under some circumstances,
sociocultural variables or variables such as the subject’s level of cooperativeness, trust, or
submissiveness, might affect the subject by responding to test items in a manner that deflates his
or her self-esteem score. Moreover, simply asking subjects to think about self-esteem (e.g., by
administering the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) may stimulate them to consider the topic in a
new way, or even prompt them to formulate an opinion when they previously had none.
Therefore, due to the effects of reactivity, researchers using self-report measures of self-esteem
are never really ever able to measure natural, authentic feelings or behavior, which invariably
compromises the validity of their observations.
Correlation does not prove causation. As discussed at length in the critique sections of
Chapter 3, while the links between self-esteem and a few other variables (e.g., happiness,
depression) appear strong, the methodological shortcomings of the work that has been done thus
far must be addressed prior to determining the exact nature of these relationships. With all of the
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available research being based on correlational data, we must remember that the correlation
between two variables is just that—a correlation, not necessarily causation. In other words, cause
and effect cannot be proved simply by virtue of a correlation (Levy, 2010).
For example, low self-esteem is often considered to be an associated feature of eating
disorders (e.g., anorexia and bulimia nervosa), along with negative or distorted body image. In
fact, evaluation of body appearance has been shown to be significantly correlated with global
self-esteem amongst both normal (Harter, 1999) and clinical populations (O’Brien & Epstein,
1988). However, these relationships do not prove the causal link (or links) between these two
variables. A negative evaluation of body appearance might cause low self-esteem. Conversely,
low self-esteem might cause a negative evaluation of body appearance. Further, low self-esteem
and negative evaluations of body appearance may cause each other. Or, some other variables,
such as family upbringing, environmental factors, or emotional variables (e.g., anxiety,
depression) might cause both low self-esteem and poor evaluation of body appearance. Thus,
while a high percentage of the studies discussed in Chapter 3 inappropriately imply a causal
relationship between self-esteem and other variables, simply because of the statistically
significant relationship shown between two variables, correlation does not necessarily establish a
causal relationship between two variables.
Bi-directional causation. Typically, a causal relationship is thought of as being unidirectional, while oftentimes the causal relationship between two variables is bi-directional
(Levy, 2010). Take, for example, certain popular beliefs about the relationship between selfesteem and popularity, namely that people with high-esteem are more popular than people with
low-esteem. It is certainly plausible that high self-esteem might improve interpersonal
relationships. Assuming that, perhaps, high self-esteem does cause a person to be more likeable
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or attractive insofar as people might prefer to be around confident, outgoing individuals and
avoid interacting with people who are insecure, the reverse causal relationship could also be
possible, which is illustrated by Leary’s sociometer theory of self-esteem. According to this
theory, self-esteem evolved in order to monitor social acceptance and avoid social rejection. In
other words, self-esteem is an internal measure of one’s interpersonal appeal and success and
virtually all influences on self-esteem involve factors that have real, potential or imagined
implications for the individual’s acceptability to other people (Leary, 2006; Leary & Baumeister,
2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Leary & Downs, 1995). Therefore, popularity,
according to this model, would cause self-esteem to rise, while social rejection would cause it to
decrease. It is important to remember that cause and effect are relative terms, with cause in one
instance becoming effect in another. In other words, it is not a question of whether popularity
causes self-esteem or self-esteem causes popularity because both statements are likely true.
Therefore, from this perspective, attempting to understand which phenomenon came first, in
many instances, may be irrelevant and unanswerable (Levy, 2010).
Multiple causation. Practically every behavior has multiple determinants. Any single
explanation is almost invariably an oversimplification (Levy, 2010). For example, what causes
overeating? Is it feelings of stress and tension? Or early childhood trauma? Or growing up with
critical parents? Or depression? Or a malfunctioning hypothalamus? Or low levels of serotonin?
Or loneliness? Or body dissatisfaction? Or—of course, always a favorite—low self-esteem? The
reality is that any given effect may be—and typically is—the result of not just one single cause,
but numerous causes that are functioning together. Oftentimes, the question of what’s the cause
of a particular phenomenon can be misleading in that it suggests that there is a single cause of
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that event. Rather than a matter of either-or, the question of causation is usually a matter of bothand.
Taking into account the principle of multiple causation might help to explain why the
California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility failed to
confirm their hypothesis that low self-esteem is “the [emphasis added] causally prior factor in
individuals seeking out kinds of behavior that become social problems” (Mecca et al., 1989, p.
8). Not only has research shown that self-esteem does not have a direct causal effect on almost
anything (Baumeister et al., 2003), the lack of conceptual clarity and consensus in the field on a
definition of self-esteem suggest that the findings on what causes self-esteem are about as
unclear as the findings on what self-esteem causes.
What does cause low self-esteem? Is it an unhappy childhood? Or critical parents? Or
poor academic performance? Or ongoing relationship problems? Conversely, what causes high
self-esteem? Is it the result of one’s supportive upbringing? Or loving parents? Or is it genetic
resiliency? Or is it the result of one’s life successes—academic, occupational, financial, or
interpersonal success? The existing research findings that have sought to answer these questions
are hazy at best, likely because no single cause alone produces the effects in question. Instead,
they are a result of multiple factors interacting with one another, a principle that many
researchers of self-esteem have failed to explicitly address.
3. In light of the striking lack of empirical support for self-esteem being
psychology’s Holy Grail, why does our obsession with self-esteem persist? Despite the lack
of empirical support that self-esteem plays a direct causal role in any objective outcomes, and in
spite of the weaknesses of the correlational data, countless efforts to boost self-esteem continue
to be made by teachers, parents, and therapists alike. What is more, our culture still seems to be
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characterized by this self-esteem obsession, as the quest to raise self-esteem continues to be both
an individual fixation and a national preoccupation, as evidenced by the multitude of self-help
books, the popular psychology articles, talk shows, and advertisements that continue to center
around boosting self-esteem. But why does this pervasive fascination with self-esteem continue?
The following is a discussion of various metathoughts, which might help to explain, in part, why
the fascination and obsession with self-esteem persist.
The Barnum effect. The famous circus master P. T. Barnum was reputed to have said: A
good circus should have a little something for everybody. This infamous saying led to the term
Barnum statement, which can be defined as a description or interpretation of personality about
one particular person or group that is true of practically all human beings. In other words, the
statement is vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people, and subsequently, has
a little something for everyone. The Barnum Effect can be described as one’s willingness to
accept the validity of such wide-ranging, generic interpretations (Levy, 2010). This error in
thinking is often cited as a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of such practices
such as astrological horoscopes, fortune telling, and some types of personality tests.
In his book on critical thinking, Levy (2010) provides a number of examples of Barnum
statements that are all too often used by psychotherapists and other mental health professionals,
one of which is My client’s problem is that he has self-esteem issues. (Who doesn’t?) Although
such Barnum statements might, and usually do, have prima facie validity, they are not typically
useful in describing anything distinctive about a particular individual or group. This point is
especially important to remember when it comes to clinical diagnosis and treatment planning. In
other words, part of the reason that the fascination and focus on self-esteem persists, regardless
of how widely the term is misunderstood in the field, is that statements about individuals’ self-
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esteem issues are often so generic and overly inclusive that they can be true of practically all
human beings. Thus, at first glance, they seem to be valid, resulting in people continuing to
accept them uncritically and clinicians continuing to “delude themselves into believing the
veracity of their own pseudo-incisive personality interpretations” (p. 61).
The fundamental attribution error. Nearly all significant behaviors can be attributed to
multiple determinants (see discussion of multiple causation above) that vary in the degree to
which they are responsible for causing a person’s actions (Levy, 2010). However, in arriving at
causal attributions, we have a tendency to weigh internal determinants (i.e., personality traits,
characteristics, attitudes) too heavily, and external determinants (i.e., one’s circumstances,
surroundings, environment) too lightly. This attributional bias leads us to minimize or ignore the
importance of the particular situations within which people find themselves and to explain the
behavior of others as resulting predominately from their personalities.
For instance, we attribute people’s behavior to his or her level of self-esteem while
overlooking a number of situational factors that also could account for his or her behavior.
Consider a person who goes to a job interview and comes across as lacking confidence. Due to
the fundamental attribution error, the interviewer might be likely to label the interviewee as
having low self-esteem. But the circumstance itself may have been very stressful, resulting in the
observed behavior. Conversely, a person who generally struggles with low self-esteem might be
judged as being confident and outgoing at a party while under the influence of alcohol. As
observers, we might be inclined to attribute such behavior to an inherent disposition, essentially
disregarding situational factors that could be responsible for producing these behaviors (i.e.,
social setting and inebriation). This tendency to weigh internal determinants too heavily, and
external determinants too lightly—which can be especially problematic when it leads us to
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ignore important sociocultural factors that shape behavior—is likely another reason that the selfesteem obsession persists.
The if I feel it, it must be true fallacy. Oftentimes, we rely on our subjective experiences
of emotional comfort or discomfort, which are largely based on knee-jerk reactions to somatic or
physiological sensations, as gauges for differentiating what is true from what is false. In other
words, we tend to use our feelings as the basis on which we formulate subjective judgments of
events surrounding us. But are our feelings about events valid gauges of veracity? In point of
fact, what feels good is not necessarily true or correct, and what feels bad is not necessarily
incorrect (Levy, 2010).
Might these points shed some light as to why the pervasive quest to boost self-esteem
persists in our society? The research has shown time and again that having self-esteem will not
necessarily make people perform better in school or at work, nor will it bring about better
relationships with others, nor will it end problems associated with violence and aggression, nor
will it ensure that people engage in healthier lifestyle behaviors. However, the research also
shows that high self-esteem is linked to happiness and, therefore, it feels good. So, why does the
quest to boost self-esteem persist in the field of psychology and in Western society at large?
Could it just be that self-esteem happens to feel good? Is high self-esteem such a feel-good
phenomenon that we are willing to overlook the astounding lack of support for the notion that we
should continue to boost self-esteem indiscriminately amongst our patients, our students, our
children, and our peers? More broadly, is it possible that the very existence of the construct and
just believing in self-esteem makes us feel good? As a construct, in and of itself, self-esteem is
simple, easy for nearly everyone to understand, and internally based (see discussion of
fundamental attribution error above). Thus, it is something that seems manageable and
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controllable, which holds out the hope (false or otherwise) that we can actually do something
about it.
The assimilation bias. As human beings, we have an innate tendency to classify,
organize, group, type, or otherwise structure the world around us into categories, which we
conceptualize as mental representations or schemas. While this inclination does have helpful
attributes in terms of organizing information and processing data, it can also become a problem
because we tend to overlook, misconstrue or even reject valid information when it is not
consistent with our existing schemas (Levy, 2010). With the self-esteem movement having found
its way into mainstream psychotherapeutic, educational, and occupational practices, is it possible
that we all so accustomed to viewing things through the self-esteem lens that we simply do not
question whether or not it is valid? If we are inclined to make data fit into our schemas
(assimilation) versus modifying them in order to fit new data (accommodation), this common
cognitive bias could have a lot to do with our propensity to overlook the tremendous amount of
evidence that contradicts our common assumptions about self-esteem. Moreover, because of the
remarkable pervasiveness of the term in our culture, we may have become accustomed to
viewing the world through self-esteem colored glasses, making it easier to view every problem,
irrespective of its nature or cause, as a self-esteem issue, versus modifying our existing schemas
to account for contradicting data.
The belief perseverance effect. Over the course of a lifetime, we develop a wide range of
different beliefs, the content of which ranges from the most ordinary to the most profound. One
of the most significant characteristics of our beliefs is the degree to which we become
emotionally attached or invested in them. The more personally invested we are in our beliefs, the
more likely we are to cling to them, even in the face of contrary evidence, a bias in thinking that
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is referred to as the belief perseverance effect (Levy, 2010). But what happens when our beliefs
are challenged? Particularly those beliefs we happen to like or those we have come to accept as
truths? The more emotionally attached we are to our beliefs, the more we are prone to feel
personally criticized, and even threatened, when our beliefs are being challenged. In our
Western, individualistic society, beliefs about the importance of high self-esteem are not only
widely accepted, but as research has shown, high self-esteem feels good. Therefore, it is highly
likely that our emotional investment in these beliefs about self-esteem contributes significantly to
our tendency to discount, deny, or simply ignore any information that runs counter to them.
The availability bias. In everyday life, we are consistently called upon to make rapid
judgments and draw conclusions under circumstances that may not lend themselves to
thoroughness or accuracy. Thus, while the ideal strategy to make certain judgments might
involve a complete systematic analysis of the issue at hand, we typically do not have the luxury
of conducting such analyses and must rely on the use of a variety of mental shortcuts or
heuristics. Because we are limited in our capacity to process complex information accurately, we
often draw on instances that are easily accessible or available from our memory, a specific
cognitive strategy that has been termed the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
If examples are readily available in our memories, we tend to overestimate the frequency
of those phenomena. Conversely, if we are unable to quickly recall examples of a particular
phenomenon, we are quick to assume that it is uncommon. However, there are numerous biasing
factors that affect the availability of particular events in our memories (e.g., life experience,
cultural background, level of education). When the use of the availability heuristic to make
judgments results in systematic errors, we may refer to this phenomenon as the availability bias
(Levy, 2010).
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In his book, House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth, Dawes
(1994) strongly criticizes New Age psychology for the widespread belief that all human distress
can be traced to deficient self-esteem. As part of his discussion, he mentions how the availability
bias affects psychotherapists in reaching conclusions about self-esteem. Namely, if
psychotherapists are seeing people who have psychological problems everyday and many of
those people do not feel good about themselves (a common motivation to seek therapy),
therapists might be quick to link psychological problems to poor self-esteem simply because of
the availability of such examples in their memories24. Of course many people who behave in
personally or socially destructive ways may suffer from low self-esteem, and low self-esteem can
be considered a psychological problem in and of itself. However, that does not necessarily mean
that poor behavior is necessarily traceable to low self-esteem or that good behavior is traceable
to high self-esteem. Further, the term self-esteem pervades our culture. Information and
endorsements of high self-esteem are so accessible to us at any given moment—on our news
programs, within our literature, on our television shows, in movies, in our classrooms, and within
clinical settings—the availability bias may lead us to overestimate the ubiquity and importance
of self-esteem simply because we are inundated with it.
The confirmation bias. As discussed above, we are constantly faced with a multitude of
obstacles that can obstruct our ability to reach valid and trustworthy conclusions when
attempting to explain complex phenomena. Unfortunately, because we are consistently faced
with such an overabundance of information, the manner in which we actually gather information
is far from unbiased. Specifically, we tend to selectively gather information consistent with our
24

In addition to the availability bias, this example is also an illustration of illusory correlation, a
cognitive bias that can be defined as a bias in which one’s judgments are based on the relation
one expects to see even when no such relationship exists (Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Hilbert,
2012).
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prior expectations, or evidence that will confirm our own beliefs, and we are much less likely to
seek evidence that will refute them. Our propensity to gather information in this way is called the
confirmation bias (Levy, 2010). Confirmation bias can lead us to draw distorted conclusions
regarding evidence that runs counter to our views and lead us to seek out evidence in a selffulfilling manner (Lilienfeld et al., 2009).
In a recent article on why ineffective psychotherapies appear to work, Lilienfeld et al. (2014)
assert that confirmation bias can predispose clinicians to attend to hits and forget the misses,
thereby overestimating the extent to which their interventions are associated with ensuing
improvement. Further, confirmation bias can foster a propensity toward illusory correlation,
which can be defined as the perception of a statistical association in its absence (Chapman &
Chapman, 1967). Therefore, with regard to the persistence and survival of our popular
assumptions about self-esteem, part of the reason for our continual disregard of contradictory
evidence may very well be a result of this common cognitive bias. As researchers and clinicians,
we may be unknowingly gathering data and eliciting information that affirms our common
misconceptions about self-esteem, causing us to cling to the same conclusions that have been
refuted by the evidence time and again.
4. Assuming that the construct of self-esteem is heterogeneous, where do the
distinctions lie? What constitutes self-esteem is a fundamental question that has concerned
personality and clinical psychologists for decades. The research repeatedly attests to the
heterogeneity of self-esteem, and many theorists have invoked some distinction between being
conceited, narcissistic, and defensive on the one hand, versus accepting oneself with an accurate
appreciation of one’s strengths and worth on the other. Generally speaking, high self-esteem has
been viewed as involving positive feelings of self-worth, self-liking, and acceptance, while low
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self-esteem is typically seen as reflecting negative feelings of self-worth, self-dislike, and lack of
self-acceptance. The current consensus is that self-esteem falls along a continuum, from true or
optimal to unauthentic or contingent (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kernis,
2003a).
The heterogeneity of self-esteem has been conceptualized in a number of different ways
over time. For example, Schneider and Turkat (1975) hypothesized that high self-esteem can
either be genuine or defensive and concluded that individuals with defensive high self-esteem
can be identified if they score high on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, in addition
to scoring high on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Approaching
the heterogeneity of self-esteem from a different standpoint, Kernis and Waschull (1995) provide
evidence that a full understanding of self-esteem requires consideration of both the level and
temporal stability of self-esteem. As an example of a theory that has sought to explain the
heterogeneous nature of the construct, self-determination theory distinguishes between two
different types of high self-esteem: contingent self-esteem (i.e., sense of self-worth based on the
introjection of externally defined standards) and true self-esteem (i.e., sense of self-worth
experienced as inherent or given), with the latter being considered more optimal (Deci & Ryan,
1995).
Kernis and Goldman (1999) described self-esteem in terms of fragile versus secure forms
that vary along four theoretical components: stability, contingency, congruence, and
defensiveness. In other words, secure self-esteem is characterized by positive feelings of selfworth that: (a) show minimal short-term variability (stable), (b) arise from satisfying core
psychological needs versus attaining specific outcomes (true), (c) are consistent with positive
implicit feelings of self-worth (congruent), and (d) are open to recognizing negative aspects of
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the self (genuine). On the other hand, fragile self-esteem is characterized by feelings of selfworth that: (a) exhibit significant short-term fluctuations from day-to-day (unstable); (b) depend
upon achieving specific outcomes (contingent); (c) are conflicting with implicit feelings of selfworth (incongruent); and (d) reflect an unwillingness to admit to negative feelings of self-worth
(defensive; Kernis & Goldman, 1999).
Another approach to examining the heterogeneity of self-esteem is to consider the
construct of narcissism or narcissistic personality disorder, which is associated with a highly
favorable, even grandiose sense of self-importance, need for admiration, sense of entitlement,
fantasies of personal brilliance or beauty, arrogance, and lack of empathy (see American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The heterogeneity of self-esteem is indicated by the finding that
some people who score high on measures of self-esteem are narcissistic, whereas others are not,
but the reverse is not true (i.e., narcissists typically do not score low on measures of self-esteem)
(Baumeister et al., 2003). Further, research has shown that the high self-esteem of narcissists’
tends to be unstable (Rhodewalt &, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998) and self-defensive (Paulhus,
1998).
Taken together, these lines of research imply that the category of people with high selfesteem is a mixed bag of individuals whose self-concepts and feelings of self-worth differ in
important ways (Baumesiter et al., 2003). Below is a discussion of three metathoughts that
should be considered in understanding the heterogeneous nature of the construct and determining
where the distinctions lie within this mixed bag.
The evaluative bias of language. As noted above, the words we use are almost always
value laden, in that they reflect our own personal values and preferences. Thus, our use of any
particular term serves not only to describe, but also to prescribe what is desirable or undesirable
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to us (Levy, 2010). This concept, referred to as the evaluative bias of language, should be
considered not only in terms of how we define self-esteem, but also in examining the
heterogeneity of the term. As discussed above, the research repeatedly attests to the
heterogeneity of high self-esteem, but where do the distinctions lie and how much of the
distinctions are in the eye of the perceiver? Regardless of the descriptive words one chooses,
whether it be narcissistic, arrogant, optimal, defensive, fragile, or true, it is imperative that we be
aware of our own personal values and communicate these values as openly and fairly as possible,
as opposed to presenting our value judgments as objective reflections truth.
Further, many believe that concerns about self-esteem are idiosyncratic features of
Western individualistic cultures. Therefore, the quest for high self-esteem is not a universal
human motive, according to this perspective, but differs based on socio-cultural factors. For
example, in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Japanese, South American, or some African cultures),
this motivation to have high self-esteem is virtually nonexistent (Heine, Lehman, Markus, &
Kitayama, 1999). Even within Western civilization, cultural differences exist based on a number
of socio-cultural factors (e.g., gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age). Moreover, some
research has focused on the fact that the need for high self-esteem seems to be a relatively recent
development in Western culture. For example, the Judeo-Christian tradition, which has long
reigned supreme in Western society, has historically considered excessive self-love to be suspect
because it leads to sentiments of self-importance and arrogance, as opposed to modesty and
humility, which are virtues believed to be conducive to spiritual growth. These examples are a
reflection of the fact that, regardless of intent, the descriptive words we choose—especially
regarding people—are invariably value laden. In coming to a consensus on where the distinctions
lie within the heterogeneous category of self-esteem, we must be aware of this evaluative bias.
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Differentiating dichotomous variables and continuous variables. Dichotomous
variables can be divided into two mutually exclusive or contradictory categories, whereas
continuous variables consist of a theoretically infinite number of points lying between two polar
opposites (Levy, 2010). Self-esteem is a pertinent example of a continuous variable that is often
confused as being dichotomous. How often are psychotherapists and social science researchers
guilty of referring to individuals as either having self-esteem or not having self-esteem? Most
person-related phenomena, especially psychological constructs, are frequently presumed to fit
into dichotomous categories or types, when they actually belong on a continuum (Levy, 2010).
For example, having self-esteem is not the same as being pregnant or being alive. A person is
either pregnant or not pregnant, dead or alive. Self-esteem, however, as the research has
repeatedly suggested, is a heterogeneous construct and a variable that is more appropriately
represented on a continuum as opposed to in two separate categories.
Their conceptual and methodological shortcomings notwithstanding, the most widely
used assessments of self-esteem rightfully do, in fact, depict self-esteem as a continuous variable.
For example, although the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale is a unidimensional scale of selfesteem (i.e., a measure of global self-esteem), it is scored using a four-point response format,
resulting in a scale range of 0–30, with higher scores representing higher self-esteem. The
subject’s self-esteem score subsequently lies somewhere on a continuum rather than falling
within one of two distinct categories. However, regardless of the fact that such scales are
typically used to measure self-esteem in formal research settings, it continues to be regarded as a
dichotomous variable across a number of contexts, including popular psychology and clinical
settings. In the vast majority of situations, continuous variables are more accurate and therefore
more useful representations of the phenomena we are attempting to describe and explain (Levy,
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2010). Thus, as we move towards conceptualizing self-esteem more accurately, it is important
that we remember that it is not a dichotomous (black or white) variable, but rather it is
continuous, representing countless shades of gray.
The similarity-uniqueness paradox. Determining the similarities and differences
between any set of events depends almost entirely upon the perspectives from which one chooses
to view them. In other words, all phenomena are both similar to and different from each other
depending on the variables or dimensions that have been selected to compare and contrast (Levy,
2010). For example, astronomy and astrology are similar in that they both involve the study of
celestial objects such as stars, planets, and moons. However, if we look at the two constructs
from a scientific perspective, they are also very different. Astronomy is a well-respected branch
of the natural sciences, whereas astrology has largely been rejected by scientific communities
and categorized as a pseudoscience. To look at another example, methamphetamines are similar
to caffeine in that they are both addictive, stimulant drugs. However, from a legal perspective,
they are different because meth is illegal and caffeine is not.
Keeping these principles in mind, how are self-esteem, self-efficacy, and narcissism the
same? How are they different? All three constructs are similar in that they involve some sort of
positive self-appraisal, they can all be considered parts of one’s self-concept, and, moreover,
they can all be represented on a continuum versus in dichotomous categories. However, selfesteem and self-efficacy are typically judged positively in Western society, whereas narcissism is
looked down upon. Narcissism, from a clinical standpoint, is pathological, while many people
aspire to obtain self-esteem and self-efficacy. Conceptually, self-esteem is, more often than not,
defined with a focus on affect (i.e., how one feels about himself or herself), whereas self-efficacy
is typically defined with a focus on thoughts and cognition (i.e., one’s beliefs about his or her
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ability to complete tasks or reach goals). Thus, as we attempt to determine, describe, and explain
where the distinctions lie within the heterogeneous concept of self-esteem, it is important to keep
this principle in mind: the dimensions or variables selected for the purposes of evaluation will
determine just how similar or unique the various types or categories of self-esteem turn out to be.
5. What are the clinical implications if we continue to misunderstand and misuse
self-esteem? Despite the striking lack of empirical support that self-esteem plays a direct role in
any outcomes other than feeling good, the pursuit of self-esteem continues to be a central
preoccupation of North American culture. Thousands of books offer strategies to increase selfesteem, childrearing manuals coach parents on how to raise children high in self-esteem, and
schools across the United States continue to implement programs aimed at raising self-esteem,
all in hopes of reducing an array of problematic feelings and behaviors. Even since the
publication of the widely cited review article by Baumeister et al. in 2003, which was the first
large scale study to assert that the objective benefits of high self-esteem are small and limited,
well over 8,000 journal articles on the subject of self-esteem have been published.
Some might be inclined to ask, why not continue to boost self-esteem? If it feels good and
it appears to be linked to happiness, what do we have to lose by continuing to strive for it? In
addition to the immediate emotional benefits of validating people’s self-worth, striving for the
recognition and acknowledgement that enhance self-esteem might even result in people
accomplishing great things. What could be the harm in that?
While there is some validity to these points, we must not ignore the ever-increasing
amount of recent literature that has focused on the ensuing costs of having or even pursuing high
self-esteem. A general discussion of some of these potential costs is below, followed by a
discussion of six tools of critical thinking associated with these clinical implications.
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Having high self-esteem: Potential costs25. While having high self-esteem has at least
short-term emotional benefits (e.g., positive emotions and certain self-concepts), some research
has shown that it also has both immediate and long-term costs (Crocker, 2006). For example,
some studies have shown that people with high self-esteem are more likely to persist in the face
of failure, which could be seen as a positive quality under some circumstances (Baumeister et al.,
2003). However, when failure is unavoidable, does persistence always pay? Baumeister,
Heatherton, and Tice (1993) showed that, under ego threat (i.e., any event or communication that
has unfavorable implications for the self), individuals with high self-esteem are overconfident
and take unwarranted risks, sometimes losing money as a result. Also, while having high selfesteem might have emotional benefits for the self (i.e., feeling good), it might not be as
beneficial for other people. For example, under conditions involving ego threat, individuals with
high self-esteem become less likeable, while those with low self-esteem have been shown to
become more likeable (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). Further, the
positive self-concepts of individuals with high self-esteem can lead them to become hostile,
defensive, and blaming when things go badly (Blaine & Crocker, 1993).
As discussed above, people with high self-esteem also tend to overestimate their
intelligence, likeability, and attractiveness. Therefore, they may be less realistic about their
strengths and weaknesses than people who score lower on measures of self-esteem (Taylor &
Brown, 1988). These positive illusions, which were mentioned briefly in a footnote in Chapter 3,
can be defined as overly positive self-perceptions or exaggerated perceptions of control or
mastery. Depending on circumstance, positive illusions can be helpful or unhelpful. For example,
25

In her essay on the costs and benefits of self-esteem, Crocker (2006) makes the distinction
between having self-esteem (i.e., measuring high in trait self-esteem) and pursuing self-esteem
(i.e., taking steps to boost the magnitude of self-esteem). This same useful and important
distinction is made in the current study.
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the overly positive self-views of a person with high self-esteem might be helpful when it comes
to someone asking his or her boss for a raise, but might be unhelpful and interfere with receiving
and understanding feedback about areas one needs to improve when a raise is pending. In other
words, these positive illusions (e.g., focusing on one’s strengths and minimizing one’s
weaknesses) often foster positive mood, optimism, and perseverance. However, when one’s
weaknesses are interfering with accomplishing a goal and could be addressed, the overly certain
self-views related to high self-esteem might obscure addressing the weakness and, subsequently,
impair accomplishing the goal (Crocker, 2006). Thus, perhaps the self-serving illusions that
bolster self-esteem and produce a positive mood in the short run ultimately set people up for
disappointment and failure in the long run, due to negative feedback being largely ignored when
it comes to setting goals, making decisions, and planning (see Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982;
Weinstein, 1984). Moreover, mildly depressed people and those low in self-esteem have been
shown to make more balanced and unbiased assessments about the future than normal (i.e., nondepressed) individuals (Ruehlman, West, & Pasahow, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus,
although in some cases, such patterns may reflect the pessimism, which is characteristic of
depressed people, it appears that those who are high, not low, in subjective well being have more
biased perceptions of the future (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Regarding self-esteem predicting behavioral outcomes, Baumeister and his colleagues
(e.g., Baumeister, 1993; Baumeister et al., 2003; Baumeister et al., 1996) found that behaviors
are often more variable for people high in self-esteem than for people low in self-esteem. For
example, high self-esteem is associated with both the presence and absence of aggression or
violence. On the other hand, the assumption that low self-esteem is linked to violence has not
been supported by evidence. In fact, signs of low self-esteem, such as modesty, self-deprecation,
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and self-effacing mannerisms, seem to be rare (underrepresented) among violent criminals and
aggressors (Baumeister et al., 1996).
Kernis, Grannemann, and Barclay (1989) found that people with high but unstable selfesteem score higher on measures of hostility than people with low self-esteem (whether stable or
unstable). People with high but stable self-esteem were shown to be the least hostile. Thus, with
regard to the question of possessing high self-esteem, it seems evident that secure or stable high
self-esteem is preferable to fragile or unstable self-esteem. Nonetheless, while having high selfesteem feels good to the individual, it has been shown to be associated with potential negative
outcomes as well.
Pursuing high self-esteem: Potential costs. According to much of the research that has
been discussed, many of us (at least here in the United States) seem to be stuck in a relentless
pursuit of self-esteem, regardless of whether it has been empirically shown to be useful. What
might be some of the benefits and costs of this relentless pursuit? When the quest is successful,
boosting self-esteem has been shown to have immediate emotional and motivational benefits
(Crocker, 2006). However, the pursuit of self-esteem itself may paradoxically lower self-esteem
more than it raises it. In other words, when people seek self-esteem, they often create the
opposite of what they intend to, and inflict costs on others around them as well. When some
people pursue self-esteem, success can mean not only I succeeded, but also, I am worthy.
Therefore, failure does not just mean I failed, but also, I am worthless. Thus, when people
succeed in a particular domain, one in which their self-worth is invested, they experience intense
positive emotions, but when they fail they experience intense negative emotions (Crocker &
Park, 2004).
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Outside of the inherent negative emotions that can ensue, the pursuit of high self-esteem
has been shown to interfere in several other areas of functioning, such as learning and mastery
(Covington, 1984; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Dweck, 1999). For example, when self-worth is at stake,
people typically want to avoid failure, even if doing so undermines learning. Covington (1984)
showed that students with contingent self-worth in the academic domain reported that they
would be willing to cheat if they were unable to succeed at a task, a reaction entirely focused on
maintaining or pursuing self-esteem, rather than learning from experience. When the primary
goal is self-validation, then mistakes, failures, or any negative feedback are perceived as selfthreats versus opportunities to learn and improve.
The pursuit of self-esteem has also been shown to have detrimental effects on
relationships. From an interpersonal perspective, when people pursue self-esteem, relatedness
can be hindered because they are focused more on themselves at the expense of others’ needs
and feelings. Some people pursuing self-esteem tend to want to be superior to others (Brown,
1986; Taylor & Brown, 1988). According to Crocker and Park (2004), when self-esteem is the
goal, life becomes a zero-sum game, with other people being perceived as competitors and
enemies rather than supports and resources. Responding to self-esteem threats with avoidance,
distancing, and withdrawal, or with blame, excuses, anger, antagonism, and aggression is
incompatible with relatedness (i.e., caring for or being cared for by others; Baumeister,
Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Baumeister et al., 1996; Crocker & Park, 2003; Heatherton &
Vohs, 2000; Kernis & Wachull, 1995; Tice, 1993). Studies have shown that the pursuit of selfesteem can cause people to be less attuned to the needs and feelings of others (Crocker & Park,
2003; Crocker, Lee, & Park, 2004) and that people with high self-esteem sacrifice mutually
caring relationships with others for the sake of maintaining, enhancing, and protecting self-
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esteem through achievement (Baumesiter et al., 1996; Heatherton & Vohs, 2000; Vohs &
Heatherton, 2001).
Some people pursue high self-esteem through avenues such as being accepted, included,
and liked by others, a pattern ironically considered more characteristic of people with low selfesteem. At first glance, this strategy for pursuing high self-esteem might seem congruent with
successful interpersonal relationships. However, research has shown that people who base their
self-esteem mainly on the approval and regard of others tend to have poor relationships and
behave in ways that make their relationships worse over time (e.g., excessive reassurance
seeking; Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001). Rhodewalt and Tragakis (2002) have
coined the term self-solicitation to refer to the strategic behaviors involved in seeking the social
feedback with the goals of maintaining, boosting, or protecting self-esteem. Such strategies often
accomplish the intended goal in the short-term. However, because the self-solicitor is aware, at
some level, that the feedback was solicited, it serves to sustain his or her own uncertainty,
resulting in the person being caught in an unending cycle of self-evaluation and self-esteem
regulation (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Rhodewalt, 2006; Rhodewalt & Tragakis, 2002).
Moreover, according to a review of methods for boosting self-esteem by Wood, Anthony,
and Foddis (2006), not all techniques of striving for high self-esteem are created equal. The
authors concluded that methods empirically demonstrated to raise self-esteem are scarce and it is
unclear whether they have a lasting impact. However, one feature that methods shown to be
effective in raising self-esteem (at least short-term) have in common, is that they do not
automatically instigate self-evaluation processes. Despite the popular North American belief that
people benefit from positive self-statements (e.g., self-help books encouraging the use of positive
self-affirmations), when people with low self-esteem repeat highly positive self-statements, their
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moods, their feelings about themselves, and their self-related thoughts actually become worse,
not better (Wood et al., 2006). Because methods involving self-evaluation involve focusing
attention on the self (Crocker & Park, 2004; Leary 2004), this self-focused attention often results
in intensification of one’s emotional state, disruption of social functioning, and intensification of
attention to one’s standards, all of which can actually have opposite than the desired effect (e.g.,
for an individual with low self-esteem). Therefore, with regard to the actual pursuit of high selfesteem itself, self-evaluative methods (i.e., those involving focusing attention on the self) for
boosting self-esteem can actually backfire and make a situation worse.
While further research is needed to explore the aforementioned potential costs of having
and pursuing high self-esteem, the existing research has shown enough evidence to warrant some
serious concerns when it comes to indiscriminately boosting self-esteem. The following is a
discussion of the tools of critical thinking that are most pertinent to understanding the clinical
implications associated with misunderstanding or overlooking what research has revealed about
self-esteem.
The reification error. The reification error is a common error in thinking that occurs
when conceptualizing phenomena. To reify is to invent a concept (or construct), name it, and
then treat the concept as though it objectively exists in the world. Levy (2010) used self-esteem
as a primary example of an abstract concept that is frequently regarded as if it were a concrete
thing. He wrote that it is easy to forget that self-esteem is not something that someone actually
has (although many people regard it has such). Rather, it is a concept that we have created to
help us organize and make sense out of other people’s (as well as our own) behavior.
Unfortunately, however, many persist in reifying this construct, for instance, by advising others,
“‘Your self-esteem is too low, you need to get more of it’—as if self-esteem were some kind of
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commodity that can be purchased at your local automotive supply store” (p. 9). Countless
clinicians and educators within the field of psychology are guilty of committing this common
error in thinking when it comes to discussions on self-esteem, as well as a myriad of other
popular constructs (e.g., the mind, the unconscious, personality, motivation, ego strength, etc.).
Outside of sparking an interesting semantic discussion, why is it important to clearly
distinguish between self-esteem being a concrete thing versus an abstract concept? As mentioned
above, in the pursuit of self-esteem, if success means not only I succeeded, but also, I am worthy,
and, therefore, failure does not just mean I failed, but also, I am worthless, this error in thinking
could be more costly to the individual than one might assume at first glance. In other words, if
we continue to understand and treat self-esteem as though it is a thing that objectively exists in
the world, people will continue to pursue the attainment of self-esteem to no avail. Being stuck in
a relentless pursuit of something that does not objectively exist is likely to be experienced as
failure, which paradoxically could lead to even lower levels of self-esteem. On the other hand,
understanding self-esteem for exactly what it is, a human-made construct—fragile and
imperfect—is likely more conducive to an appropriate, manageable understanding of one’s selfdirected feelings. As Levy (2010) notes, in the final analysis, the construct of self-esteem should
be evaluated not in terms of whether it is true, but rather to what extent it is useful.
The naturalistic fallacy. As mentioned above, our perceptions and, therefore, our
descriptions of the world are inescapably affected by our personal beliefs. We tend to equate our
descriptions of what is with our prescriptions of what ought to be. We typically consider what is
typical to be normal and good, while what is atypical to be abnormal and bad. The converse can
also be true: idealizing someone for being different from the crowd or condemning someone
solely for doing as most others do. This error in thinking is called the naturalistic fallacy (Levy,
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2010; see also Hume, 1978). As responsible clinicians, educators, and researchers, it is important
to be aware of this common error in thinking and to avoid presenting our value judgments as
objective reflections of truth. Examining self-esteem through a cross-cultural lens highlights the
importance of acknowledging how our perceptions are inevitably influenced by our own personal
beliefs and biases. For example, just because the quest for high self-esteem is common in North
American society does not make it good or right. The pursuit of high self-esteem is not
necessarily a universal human motive.
For example, from the perspective of European-American culture, the self is defined
primarily in terms of its internal attributes, such as personality traits, competence, and abilities.
Thus, from this cultural context, self-enhancing perceptions are positively sanctioned, reinforced,
and therefore internalized as a highly automatized response tendency. One can then assume that
individuals within this type of culture are highly motivated to confirm the positivity of their
internal attributes of the self (Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). On the other hand, Asian cultures adhere
to a very different model of the self as interdependent, in which the self is defined primarily in
terms of its relationship to others. Within this collectivistic cultural context, self-esteem, as a
positive appraisal of the self, is often antithetical to the objective of interdependence. Therefore,
in Asian interdependent cultures, an expression of the Westernized concept of high self-esteem is
typically perceived as a sign of insecurity, incompetence (Yoshida, Kojo, & Kaku, 1982), and
psychological vulnerabilities (Miller, Wang, Sandel, & Cho, 2002). Further, self-critical or selfeffacing self-perceptions—the very attributes that Western cultures might view as low selfesteem—are often encouraged, reinforced and eventually internalized as a habitual response
tendency (Kitayama, 2006).
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Therefore, as this example illustrates, the quest to obtain high self-esteem is not
universal. Nonetheless, in the United States and other Westernized societies, countless
psychotherapists, mental health providers, educators, and parents behave as if it is. From a
clinical perspective, what might be the consequences of a psychotherapist consistently
encouraging a client to strive for higher self-esteem if, in fact, that client does not share the
therapist’s Westernized belief system? How might a psychotherapist in training be affected by a
professor or supervisor who regularly instructs him or her to work towards increasing a client’s
self-esteem, or his or her own self-esteem for that matter, if that therapist in training does not
adhere to the same cultural beliefs? In other words, as clinicians, how often are we confusing
what is with what should be? By confusing what is with what should be, clinicians and educators
are not only failing to uphold a commitment to cultural awareness and sensitivity, but could also
be contributing to or even creating the clinical problems they are seeking to alleviate.
The intervention-causation fallacy. The intervention-causation fallacy refers to the
common misattribution of determining the cause of an event simply on the basis of its response
to a particular intervention. In point of fact, however, the solution to a problem does not
necessarily determine its cause (Levy, 2010). For example, suppose a psychotherapist
implements an intervention designed to boost self-esteem and it results in immediate favorable
outcomes. Does that mean that we have determined that low self-esteem was the cause of that
client’s original distress? Not necessarily.
There are numerous possible explanations for the immediate favorable outcomes in this
hypothetical scenario. The outcomes could have been a result, at least in part, to the placebo
effect, or to the fact that the intervention simply caused the person feel good momentarily, or that
the intervention happened to ameliorate another separate but related symptom (e.g., mood
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dysphoria). Regardless, a favorable response to an intervention does not necessarily determine
the original cause of the person’s original distress. Incorrectly assuming that low self-esteem is
the cause simply by virtue of one’s response to an intervention could seriously undermine the
efforts of clinicians, parents, and educators to accurately understand and treat an individual’s
issues. As discussed above, having high self-esteem, and even just the pursuit of self-esteem, are
not without potential negative implications. Therefore, to assume that an immediate favorable
response to an intervention designed to boost self-esteem means that low self-esteem is the
original cause of distress could lead not only to continuing the relentless—and potentially
costly—pursuit of self-esteem, but also to the clinician overlooking the real causal factors at
play.
Differentiating dichotomous variables and continuous variables. As discussed above,
self-esteem is an example of a continuous variable, consisting of a theoretically infinite number
of points lying between two polar opposites, but it is often confused as being a dichotomous
variable, which can be divided into two mutually exclusive categories (Levy, 2010). Why does it
matter if we continue to treat self-esteem as a dichotomous variable when it more appropriately
belongs on a continuum? For one, as Levy discusses in his book, false dichotomization can lead
to psychological distress across a number of theoretical orientations and clinical presentations.
Psychodynamic theorists refer to the ego defense mechanism of splitting, or falsely categorizing
the world into good versus bad components and treating them in an all-or-none fashion, as a
fixation at a more primitive level of psychological development (e.g., Klein, 1937; Mahler, Pine,
& Bergman, 1975). Along these lines, a common goal of cognitive therapy, is to help clients
modify their black-or-white thinking into seeing more shades of grey (see Beck, 1995; Ellis,
1984).
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Through learning to view their situations in less absolute terms, clients diagnosed with a
wide range of psychopathological disorders (from eating disorders and depression, to anxiety,
paranoia, or obsessive-compulsive personality disorder), can gain a greater sense of acceptance
and control over their situations. Just as there are potential negative effects for an individual with
an eating disorder viewing life through a dichotomous lens (e.g., perfect or imperfect, fat or thin)
or a depressed person viewing the world through a dichotomous lens (e.g., success or failure, fair
or unfair), viewing self-esteem through an all-or-nothing lens might have equally undesirable
consequences. For example, if we view self-esteem as something we either have or do not have,
what might be the effects on a person who is consistently seeking the attainment of high selfesteem to no avail? That person is much more likely to view himself or herself as unsuccessful,
imperfect, and a failure. In contrast, by learning to view self-esteem in less absolute (and
therefore more realistic) terms, an individual can gain a greater sense of acceptance, flexibility,
and control over his or her life (Levy, 2010).
The insight fallacy. One of our most widespread and enduring societal myths, especially
in the field of psychology, is that insight alone produces meaningful change. Nowhere within the
field of psychology is the insight fallacy more apparent than in the practice of psychotherapy.
Therapists and clients alike cling to the belief that understanding a psychological problem will
somehow spontaneously cause the problem to solve itself (Levy, 2010). Understanding the roots
of a problem, however, is rarely, if ever, the sole key to solving the problem.
Acknowledging this common error in thinking should not suggest that there are no
benefits to insight. There are numerous potential values to insight in psychotherapy: providing a
sense of relief or comfort by helping the client to grasp an unexplained phenomenon, acting as a
critical initial step towards the client adopting specific problem-solving strategies, and providing
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greater understanding, which could subsequently lead to therapeutic gains being generalized to
other situations or challenges (Levy, 2010). These advantages notwithstanding, the problem lies
in us failing to recognize that insight alone has significant limitations.
All too often, clinicians attribute problems to low self-esteem and stop there. Low selfesteem is regularly identified and documented as a root cause of almost every pathological
condition: depression, suicide, eating disorders, narcissism, inattention, substance abuse, selfinjurious behavior, oppositional behavior, violence, hypersexuality, anxiety, sleep disturbance,
gender dysphoria, preoccupation with perceived flaws in physical appearance, relational
problems, educational problems, acculturation problems, physically or sexually abusing others,
and even staying in an abusive relationship, to list but a few.
But what are we accomplishing by identifying low self-esteem as a cause of people’s
problems or by guiding clients to gain insight into their feelings of self-worth, or lack thereof?
For one, as this study has shown repeatedly, the research does not support a causal relationship
between self-esteem and almost anything. But let us assume that we were to continue to assist
clients in gaining insight into their feelings of self-worth simply because of the association
between high self-esteem and short-term emotional benefits (i.e., positive feelings or happiness).
We must remember that insight alone into one’s feelings about himself or herself will not
necessarily change those feelings. In fact, some critics have gone so far to argue that
emphasizing insight can be detrimental to the therapeutic process in that focusing on cognitive
insight allows both clients and therapists to avoid unpleasant emotions (see A. Freud, 1936;
Holland, 2003). To summarize, insight might be useful in some ways, but we must continually
remember to recognize its numerous limitations, and therefore seek to explore alternative
avenues of change (Levy, 2010).
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The self-fulfilling prophecy. The self-fulfilling prophecy can be described as a
phenomenon whereby a perceiver’s assumptions about another person actually lead that person
to adopt those attributes (Levy, 2010). In perhaps the most famous study of the self-fulfilling
prophecy (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968), the researchers found that by simply informing
elementary school teachers that some of their pupils would show dramatic improvement in
academic performance during the upcoming school year, the children who had been identified as
bloomers (students who were actually chosen at random) did in fact show an improvement in
their academic skills and even their IQ scores. Thus, their teachers had unknowingly created the
very behaviors they expected (Levy, 2010).
While the expectations of the teachers in this study were positive (i.e., expecting
improvement in academic performance), the self-fulfilling prophecy has been demonstrated with
a wide range of both positive and negative perceiver expectancies. To consider some clinical
examples, suppose that a therapist expects his or her new client to be fragile, resistant, seductive,
or manipulative? Similarly, what might occur if a therapist expects a new client is low in selfesteem? If we continue to view clients through the self-esteem lens, how can we be sure that our
beliefs that we hold towards them are not producing the very behaviors we expect to find?
Similar to the example of the elementary school students above, expecting that a client or a
supervisee is high in self-esteem (perhaps based on reviewing past records or recommendations)
could have potentially positive effects, if the therapist’s or supervisor’s assumptions
unknowingly create the behaviors they expect. But, what about the expectation that one is low in
self-esteem? Regardless of our intent, continuing to assume that people are suffering from a
widespread epidemic of low self-esteem might be more detrimental than we might think. Our
assumptions could actually be contributing to people adopting these expected traits.
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Summary of Critical Thinking Applications
In a detailed discussion above, the current researcher has taken a critical thinking
approach to addressing some of the fundamental questions about self-esteem. Below is a
summary of the metathought tools (denoted in italics within parentheses) of critical thinking used
to answer those questions, followed by concluding reflections and an introduction of a new
model of self-esteem:
Understanding self-esteem. Despite the fact that the term has been in existence for over
120 years, at least part of the reason for the continued lack of consensus when it comes to
defining and understanding self-esteem is our failure to think about it critically. More
specifically, despite the plethora of research dedicated to understanding self-esteem, we have
failed to realize and acknowledge that: (a) to label people as having high self-esteem or low selfesteem does not explain their behavior (the nominal fallacy and tautologous reasoning); (b) if we
are to understand what it means to have self-esteem, we will likely need to define its theoretical
opposite (consider the opposite); and (c) the very use of the labels self-esteem, high self-esteem
and low self-esteem are value laden depending on one’s own set of individual and cultural
perspectives and beliefs (the evaluative bias of language).
Problems with the existing research. In seeking to explain self-esteem, it is important
to remember that: (a) while self-report may be an efficient method of measuring self-esteem,
self-report measures are associated with a whole host of potential biasing factors, including
reactivity, which will invariably compromise the validity of researchers’ observations
(reactivity); (b) cause and effect cannot be proven simply by virtue of a statistically significant
correlation (correlation does not prove causation); (c) cause and effect are relative terms, with
cause in one instance becoming effect in another, resulting in the question of which phenomenon
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came first being potentially irrelevant and unanswerable (bi-directional causation); and (d) the
majority of effects are likely to be the result of not just one but multiple causes, which are
operating together (multiple causation).
The self-esteem obsession. Why does our fixation and obsession with self-esteem
persist? The answers to this question can be summarized at least in part by the following: (a)
statements about individuals’ self-esteem are often so generic and overly inclusive that they can
be true of practically all human beings, resulting in people continuing to accept them uncritically
(the Barnum effect); (b) we have a tendency to weigh internal determinants (e.g., self-esteem)
more heavily than external determinants (e.g., environmental or sociocultural factors) (the
fundamental attribution error); (c) self-esteem feels good, which might lead us to overlook the
lack of empirical evidence for its grave importance in shaping behavior and psychological wellbeing (the if I feel it, it must be true fallacy); (d) we are inclined to make data fit into our existing
schemas about self-esteem versus modifying them (assimilation bias); (e) we are emotionally
invested in beliefs about self-esteem, which makes us more likely to cling to them (belief
perseverance effect); (f) we tend to draw conclusions based on information that is readily
available in our memories, thereby assuming a causal connection between self-esteem and other
variables simply by virtue of relying on easily recalled, vivid examples (availability bias); and
(g) we have a propensity towards selectively gathering information consistent with our popular
beliefs about self-esteem, while ignoring evidence that refutes them (confirmation bias).
The heterogeneity of self-esteem. Research supports the heterogeneity of high selfesteem, but very little success has been achieved at determining where the distinctions lie. If we
are to attempt to delineate these distinctions, it is important to remember that: (a) regardless of
the descriptive words one chooses to describe self-esteem, it is imperative that we acknowledge
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that our words are value laden and that we not present our value judgments as objective
reflections truth (the evaluative bias of language); (b) self-esteem is often regarded as if it fits
into dichotomous categories, when it rightfully belongs on a continuum (dichotomous versus
continuous variables); and (c) all phenomena (e.g., self-esteem, self-efficacy and narcissism) are
both similar to and different from each other depending on the variables or dimensions that have
been selected to compare and contrast (the similarity-uniqueness paradox).
Clinical implications. If self-esteem has been shown to feel good and it is linked to
happiness, what do we have to lose by continuing to strive for it? What is the harm?
As discussed above, there is an ever-increasing amount of recent literature that has
focused on the ensuing costs of both having and pursuing high self-esteem. As we move towards
a more in-depth understanding of the clinical implications that go along with these resulting
costs, the following are some of the most essential and relevant critical thinking concepts: (a) if
we continue to understand and treat self-esteem as though it is a thing that objectively exists in
the world versus a fragile and imperfect human-made construct, people will continue to pursue
the attainment of self-esteem to no avail, which could paradoxically lead to even lower levels of
self-esteem (the reification error); (b) by confusing what is with what should be, clinicians and
educators are not only failing to uphold a commitment to cultural awareness and sensitivity, but
could also be contributing to or even creating the clinical problems they are seeking to alleviate
(the naturalistic fallacy); (c) incorrectly assuming that low self-esteem is the cause of an
individual’s distress simply by virtue of one’s response to an intervention intended to boost selfesteem could seriously undermine efforts to accurately understand and treat an individual’s
issues (the intervention-causation fallacy); (d) by learning to view self-esteem in less absolute
(and therefore more realistic) terms, individuals can gain a greater sense of acceptance,
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flexibility, and control over their lives (differentiating dichotomous and continuous variables);
(e) insight alone into one’s feelings about himself or herself will not necessarily change those
feelings (the insight fallacy); and (f) regardless of our intent, continuing to assume that people
are suffering from a widespread epidemic of low self-esteem might be more detrimental than we
might think because our assumptions could actually be contributing to people adopting these
expected traits (the self-fulfilling prophecy).
Reconceptualizing Self-Esteem
Despite the fact that the body of work on self-esteem has been plagued with a variety of
conceptual and methodological shortcomings, the term did not become one of the top covariates
occurring in personality and social psychology research and the subject of more than 20,000
publications without reason. Most social science researchers, clinicians, and educators would
agree that one’s feelings of self-worth, beliefs about oneself, and one’s accomplishments are
certainly fundamental factors affecting his or her psychological well-being. However, as the
current study and a multitude of other studies have suggested, self-esteem is a complex concept,
multifaceted and heterogeneous in nature. To fully understand its role in psychological
functioning, we must go beyond whether it is simply high or low. Moreover, until relatively
recently, the notion that to have high self-esteem is unmistakably a good thing has gone
unchallenged, but recent theory and evidence has suggested that this characterization is not
necessarily true. There appear to be numerous forms of high self-esteem that vary widely in
terms of how closely they mirror healthy or optimal psychological functioning (Kernis &
Paradise, 2002). Whether one’s self-esteem is considered optimal or whether it contributes to the
healthy psychological functioning depends on a consideration of not just its level, but also its
characteristics (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Kernis & Paradise, 2002).
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As discussed in Chapter 1, given the long history of the term, the self-esteem research has
given rise to a number of different definitions, all of which have yielded diverse assumptions,
theories, and findings. The lack of consensus in the field about a definition and the numerous
conceptual debates that have arisen are, therefore, not surprising. Three of the central conceptual
issues discussed in Chapter 1 are summarized here. First, existing definitions of self-esteem have
differed in terms of whether they center around affective factors (e.g., feelings of worthiness),
cognitive factors (e.g., perceived competence), or behavioral factors (e.g., one’s achievements).
Second, definitions of self-esteem have differed historically in terms of the degree to which the
construct is viewed as relatively stable or fluid. Specifically, self-esteem has been defined as a
global construct (i.e., trait self-esteem), as being based primarily on variable feelings of selfworth (i.e., state self-esteem), and as particular self-evaluations (i.e., domain specific selfesteem). Third, definitions vary in terms of whether they are unidimensional (i.e., involving a
single global domain of self-concept) or multidimensional (i.e., involving multiple, distinct
components of self-concept).
Overall, attempts to resolve the conflicting views of what exactly constitutes self-esteem
have resulted in many researchers suggesting that self-esteem is a multifaceted construct
(Baumeister et al., 2003; Kernis, 2003b; Goldman, 2006). From this standpoint, based upon the
various conceptual issues described above, what we have come to think of as self-esteem is a
highly complex, dynamic concept that cannot be summarized or confined to a simple definition
that is unidimensional and fixed, focusing on just one aspect of human experience (e.g., feelings
of worthiness). As the research has shown, oversimplification of the idea of self-esteem
contributes not only to continued confusion in the field, but also can lead to significant problems.
For example, oversimplification can lead to programs and interventions designed merely to make
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people feel good about themselves. As discussed in previous chapters, making people feel good
about themselves does not appear to be problematic inherently, but what if those feelings and
self-perceptions are not warranted? As much research has shown, feeling good about oneself
without earning it can lead to a myriad of problems, such as facilitating the development of
narcissism, risking an increase in the likelihood of violence, or tolerating undesirable academic
performance (Baumeister et al., 1996; Damon, 1995; Dawes, 1994).
Therefore, the current researcher proposes a new model for conceptualizing self-esteem,
one that captures the heterogeneous nature of the term. This model seeks to integrate the various
facets of self-esteem and account for the different dimensions on which self-esteem can vary,
taking into account the existing research findings, addressing and resolving some of the flaws in
critical thinking, and bearing in mind the fundamental conceptual issues discussed above. In
sum, the model seeks to go beyond conceptualizing self-esteem as high or low and provide an
organized system for determining various types of self-esteem, and the degree to which they
relate to optimal psychological functioning.
A new model of self-esteem: Background and rationale. In conceptualizing and
introducing a new model of self-esteem, the very use of the term itself must first be addressed.
As the current research shows, despite the appeal, ubiquity and importance of the concepts it
represents, the term and its ensuing research are plagued with confusion, discrepancies and
disagreements. Nonetheless, self-esteem is far too embedded in the literature and the concept is
far too important to discard all together. Thus, the current researcher proposes a broader
approach, involving taking a step back to examine the more fundamental concept of selfappraisal and the various forms it can take. Whether the numerous existing definitions of selfesteem are unidimensional or multidimensional; stable or fluid; focused primarily on cognitive
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factors, affective factors, behavioral factors, or some combination thereof, they all attempt to
describe a process or an aspect of self-appraisal. In other words, virtually every existing
definition of self-esteem involves some act of a person judging the value, condition, or
importance of himself or herself. Therefore, as can be seen in Figure 1, the current researcher has
chosen to use self-appraisal as the foundation and primary sorting variable from which the
various manifestations or types of self-esteem stem.
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Figure 1. A new model of self-esteem. This figure illustrates a new model for conceptualizing
self-esteem, one that captures the heterogeneous nature of the term.
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Accuracy. From this starting point, the model depicts self-appraisal as branching off into
two pathways: accurate self-appraisal and distorted self-appraisal26. Although this distinction
has been virtually absent from existing models of self-esteem, the current researcher asserts that
it is a fundamental one. In order to truly capture the heterogeneous nature of the concept—
including everything from grandiosity to self-loathing to an accurate appreciation of one’s
strengths and worth—a consideration of accurate versus distorted is essential. Without
consideration of this distinction, the differences between such terms as high self-esteem and
narcissism, for example, are largely indistinguishable. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, the
very first known definition of self-esteem by William James may have been simple, but it has
been supported by a considerable amount of research (Harter, 1999). To review, James
(1890/1983) defined self-esteem as successes divided by pretensions27, or a ratio between
achievements and aspirations. Based on this definition, by its very nature, level of self-esteem
depends, in part, on actual objective behaviors and outcomes (i.e., successes). Therefore, the
more success we have and the lower our expectations, the higher our self-esteem. Said another
way, one can raise self-esteem by either lowering expectations and/or increasing achievements.
Generally speaking, many of the definitions that followed that of James, especially those that
came out of the more recent self-esteem movement, focused primarily on the cognitive and/or
affective factors influencing self-esteem, without any consideration of behavior, successes or
objective outcomes. For example, Nathaniel Branden (1969), one of the most prominent figures

26

For the purposes of simplicity and clarity, the sorting variables in the current model are
presented as categorical in nature. However, with the aforementioned principles of critical
thinking in mind (specifically, dichotomous versus continuous variables), it should be noted that
all of the constructs included in the current model are, in fact, continuous variables.
27
Although pretension can be defined in numerous ways, James (1890/1983) used the word to
mean aspirations, as opposed to the common modern-day meaning (i.e., pretentiousness or
ostentatiousness).
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of the self-esteem movement, defined self-esteem as the result of two interrelated aspects: “It
entails a sense of personal efficacy and a sense of personal worth. It is the integrated sum of selfconfidence and self-respect. It is the conviction that one is competent to live and worthy of
living” (p. 110).
While the cognitive and affective facets of self-esteem are certainly vital to understanding
the nature of the construct, the current researcher asserts that one’s external, measurable reality is
equally important. In other words, self-esteem is shaped not only by one’s thoughts and feelings,
but also by the objective outcome of one’s behavior (e.g., actual achievements, measurable
capabilities), as well as by one’s interpersonal interactions (i.e., the level of congruence between
how one thinks he or she is perceived and how he or she is actually perceived). In this model,
accurate self-appraisal refers to one’s judgment of the value, condition, or importance of oneself
that is accurately based upon his or her measurable reality (as just described). For example, a
woman might consider herself to be highly likeable with strong social skills and, based upon
reports of individuals in her social circle, she is in fact well liked by others (accurate selfappraisal). In this instance, there is congruence between her self-appraisal and the manner in
which others appraise her. Conversely, distorted self-appraisal refers to one’s judgment of the
value, condition, or importance of oneself that is incongruent with his or her measurable reality.
For example, a man might consider himself to be highly intelligent, but based upon an objective
measure of intelligence (scores on a measure of cognitive abilities) his level of intelligence is
actually below average.
Directionality. As these examples indicate, both accurate self-appraisal and distorted selfappraisal can be skewed in opposing directions, leading to the secondary sorting variable of
directionality. Therefore, the second sequence of the model gives rise to the following
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conditions: accurate positive self-appraisal (self-appraisal that is positive and congruent with
measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of others), accurate negative selfappraisal (self-appraisal that is negative and congruent with measurable factors and/or the
interpersonal perceptions of others), distorted inflated self-appraisal (self-appraisal that is more
positive than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of others),
and distorted deflated self-appraisal (self-appraisal that is more negative than is reflected by
measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of others).
Stability. Each of these four categories (accurate positive, accurate negative, distorted
inflated, and distorted deflated) is then further divided by a third sorting variable of stability.
Considerable research supports the usefulness of distinguishing between stable versus unstable
feelings of self-worth (e.g., Kernis et al., 1993). According to Kernis and Paradise (2002), for
example, the stability of self-esteem is determined based on the extent to which the individual’s
current feelings of self-worth fluctuate across time and situations. More specifically, feelings of
self-worth that are stable are minimally affected by specific evaluative events, whereas feelings
of self-worth that are unstable are highly influenced by evaluative events, both internally
generated (e.g., reflecting on an earlier interpersonal interaction) and externally generated (e.g.,
an evaluation from a teacher). Along similar lines, other research and theory (Crocker & Wolfe,
2001; Kernis & Paradise, 2002) have shown promising support for the construct of contingent
self-esteem and its assessment. Based upon Self-Determination Theory (SDT), for example, selfesteem can either be contingent (i.e., dependent upon matching some external standards or
expectations and requiring continual validation) or non-contingent (i.e., not dependent upon
matching some external standards and not requiring continual validation; Deci & Ryan, 1995).
While these two variables, stability and contingency, have often been treated as separate
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constructs, the current researcher asserts that, by definition, if self-esteem is contingent, it is also
unstable. Conversely, if self-esteem is non-contingent, it is naturally stable. Therefore, the
current model defines stable as minimally influenced by evaluative events (both externally and
internally generated) and low need to match external standards across time and situation, and
unstable as highly influenced by evaluative events (both externally and internally generated) and
high need to match external standards or expectations across time and situation.
It should be noted that Kernis and Goldman (1999) and Kernis and Paradise (2002),
whose research has focused primarily upon distinguishing between fragile versus secure forms of
self-esteem, argue that self-esteem varies along four theoretical components: stability,
contingency, congruence, and defensiveness. Specifically, fragile high self-esteem is defined by
these researchers as positive feelings of self-worth that are unstable (i.e., fluctuates based on
contextually based feelings of self-worth), contingent (i.e., depends on the achievement of
specific outcomes), incongruent (i.e., are discrepant when compared to implicit feelings of selfworth), and defensive (i.e., exhibit an unwillingness to admit to negative feelings of self-worth).
Conversely, the authors conceptualize secure high self-esteem as positive feelings of self-worth
that are stable (i.e., vary minimally across experiences), noncontingent (i.e., result from the
satisfaction of core psychological needs versus the attainment of specific outcomes), congruent
(i.e., are in line with implicit feelings of self-worth), and genuine (i.e., open to recognizing
negative aspects of one’s self). Although the current researcher generally supports this depiction
of self-esteem as a heterogeneous and multifaceted construct, the proposed model does not
include a discussion of either the congruent versus incongruent variable, or the defensive versus
genuine variable, for the following reasons:
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First, the distinction between congruent and incongruent, which refers to the level of
congruence between explicit and implicit self-esteem, has been made by theories such as
Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein & Morling, 1995). CEST is an example of
one theory that centers around the assumption that self-esteem should be understood as an
interaction between two separate but related systems, essentially conscious (i.e., explicit) selfesteem and unconscious (i.e., implicit) self-esteem. Thus, theoretically, high explicit self- esteem
coupled with low implicit self-esteem would represent fragile self-esteem, while high explicit
self-esteem coupled with high implicit self-esteem would represent more secure self-esteem.
Explicit self-esteem has traditionally been measured by self-report measures such as the
Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, whereas implicit self-esteem, as discussed in Chapter 1, is
measured more indirectly through nonreactive measures such as projective tests, cognitive
priming tasks, and implicit association tasks. However, although nonreactive measures of
implicit self-esteem have increased in popularity during recent years (Bosson, Swann, &
Pennebaker, 2000), they have been shown to have weak and/or inconsistent psychometric
properties and the understanding of how to interpret these measures is cloudy at best (Bosson,
2006). Therefore, given the lack of empirical support for the reliability or validity of implicit
measures of self-esteem, these variables were not included in the proposed model.
Second, although the distinction between defensive and genuine high self-esteem dates
back as early as 65 years ago (Horney, 1950), it has not generated a large body of empirical
support (Kernis & Paradise, 2002). In the research that has been done, defensive has traditionally
been distinguished from genuine through measures of socially desirable responding, such as the
Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (e.g., Crowne & Marlow, 1960). In other words, if
one measures high in self-esteem and high in social desirability, he or she presumably possesses
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defensive high self-esteem due to being unwilling to admit to the undesirable qualities he or she
is likely to possess. Conversely, if one measures high in self-esteem and low on a social
desirability measure, the person is presumably less likely to conceal negative characteristics from
others and, therefore, is thought to possess genuine self-esteem. This idea notwithstanding,
however, the current researcher would argue that there are numerous ways of defining defensive,
which leads to undesirable ambiguity and confusion surrounding the term. Colloquially,
defensive is typically used to describe argumentative behavior (e.g., when one person accuses
another of being quarrelsome in response to feedback). However, in the realm of psychological
assessment, it is used to refer to a tendency to respond in a deliberately socially desirable fashion
(e.g., as measured by the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale), or to respond relatively
unintentionally in a manner reflecting social poise or reserve (e.g., as measured by the K scale on
the MMPI-2, termed subtle defensiveness). In a different context, some psychotherapists use
defensive to refer to a client’s resistance or denial in therapy. Due to this conceptual ambiguity,
defensive and genuine are not necessarily theoretical opposites: in contrast, stable versus
unstable (the third sorting variable of the current model) are. Moreover, the current researcher
would argue that a consideration of whether one’s self-appraisal is accurate or distorted, and the
direction in which it is skewed, encompasses the distinction made by Kernis and Goldman
(1999) and Kernis and Paradise (2002) when they describe the difference between one who
exhibits an unwillingness to admit to negative feelings of self-worth versus one who is open to
recognizing negative aspects of oneself. In other words, if one’s self-appraisal is defensive,
regardless of which definition is being used, it is (by its very nature) distorted. Therefore, for
these reasons, defensive versus genuine is not specifically included as a sorting variable in the
proposed model.
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A comprehensive definition of self-esteem. Based on the current research and model, the
following is a proposed comprehensive definition of self-esteem:
Self-esteem is the appraisal of one’s own personal value, including both emotional
components (self-worth) and cognitive components (self-efficacy). More specifically, selfesteem is a multifaceted and heterogeneous construct, the multiple forms of which are a function
of how accurately or closely it matches an individual’s measureable reality, comprised of the
objective outcome of one’s behavior (actual achievements, measurable capabilities) as well as
one’s interpersonal interactions (i.e., the level of congruence between how one thinks he or she is
perceived and how he or she is actually perceived). Self-esteem also varies in terms of its level of
stability, or the degree to which it is influenced by evaluative events or the need to match
external standards across time and situation. The permutations of these sorting variables yield
eight types of self-esteem: Optimal High, Fragile High, Accurate Low, Fragile Low,
Noncompensatory Narcissism, Compensatory Narcissism, Pessimal, and Disorganized. A
detailed description of each of these eight types, including examples, follows.
Optimal high self-esteem. Optimal High Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is
accurately based upon the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal
interactions and is skewed in a positive direction (accurate, positive). Further, one’s judgment of
the value, condition or importance of oneself is minimally influenced by evaluative events (both
externally and internally generated) and/or by the need to match external standards or
expectations across time and situation (stable). The self-appraisal of individuals placed within
this category is based upon their measurable reality (e.g., actual achievements, measurable
capabilities), as well as a high level of congruence between how they think they are perceived
and how they are actually perceived by others. Regardless of experiences or information that
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might threaten, contradict or challenge the individual’s overall positive self-appraisal, it remains
relatively consistent across time and situation.
For example, a woman in the Optimal High Self-Esteem category, regardless of the fact
that she is unhappy about recently gaining some weight and being passed up for a promotion at
work, maintains an overall positive and accurate self-appraisal that is not significantly influenced
by a desire to match external standards of success or physical attractiveness. She may experience
a variety of emotions and she may even take steps to better her situation, but the manner in
which she judges her own value and importance remains relatively consistent.
Fragile high self-esteem. Fragile High Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is
accurately based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal interactions
and is skewed in a positive direction (accurate, positive). However, one’s judgment of the value,
condition or importance of oneself is highly susceptible to being influenced by evaluative events
(both externally and internally generated) and/or by the need to match external standards or
expectations across time and situation (unstable). The self-appraisal of individuals placed within
this category is based upon their measurable reality (e.g., actual achievements, measurable
capabilities), as well as a high level of congruence between how they think they are perceived
and how they are actually perceived by others. Despite these individuals’ susceptibility to
adverse experiences or information, they demonstrate high resilience in their ability to recover
relatively quickly from setbacks and return to their high baseline level of functioning.
For example, a graduate student with Fragile High Self-Esteem might react to mild
criticism from her dissertation chairperson by experiencing sadness, discouragement, and selfdoubt. However, after a brief period of time, she is able to recover from her negative emotions
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and get back to rewriting her research without significant or lasting impact on her self-appraisal,
which is relatively high overall.
Accurate low self-esteem. Accurate Low Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is
accurately based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal interactions
but is skewed in a negative direction (accurate, negative). Further, one’s judgment of the value,
condition or importance of oneself is minimally influenced by evaluative events (both externally
and internally generated) and/or by the need to match external standards across time and
situation (stable). The self-appraisal of individuals placed within this category is based upon
their measurable reality (e.g., actual achievements, measurable capabilities), as well as a high
level of congruence between how they think they are perceived and how they are actually
perceived by others. Their self-appraisal remains skewed in a negative direction consistently
across time and situation and is minimally influenced by self-reflection or external feedback.
For example, a man with Accurate Low Self-Esteem who has been highly unsuccessful in
school, extracurricular activities, the workforce, and his interpersonal relationships, may receive
a call from his father telling him he is proud of him for recently obtaining a job. However, with
his overall self-appraisal being negative and accurately based upon his actual history, his selfappraisal remains unaffected by getting a job or by his father’s feedback.
Fragile low self-esteem. Fragile Low Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is
accurately based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal interactions
and is skewed in a negative direction (accurate, negative). However, one’s judgment of the
value, condition or importance of oneself is highly susceptible to being influenced by evaluative
events (both externally and internally generated) and/or the need to match external standards or
expectations across time and situation (unstable). The self-appraisal of individuals placed within
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this category is based upon their measureable realities (e.g., actual achievements, measurable
capabilities), as well as a high level of congruence between how they think they are perceived
and how they are actually perceived by others. However, due to their self-appraisal being skewed
in a negative direction, they demonstrate low resilience in their ability to recover from setbacks
and return to their low baseline level of functioning.
For example, the same graduate student described above who receives mild criticism
from her dissertation chairperson, but is instead placed within the Fragile Low Self-Esteem
category, would experience much more difficulty recovering from this setback. She is likely to
take a prolonged period of time to get back to rewriting her dissertation, taking her chairperson’s
feedback as disapproval of her global abilities and struggling to return to her level of baseline
functioning and self-appraisal.
Non-compensatory narcissism. Non-compensatory Narcissism consists of self-appraisal
that is more positive than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions
of others (distorted, inflated). Further, one’s judgment of the value, condition or importance of
oneself is minimally influenced by evaluative events (both externally and internally generated)
and/or the need to match external standards across time and situation (stable). Included within
this category are individuals who meet a clinical description of narcissism, which is
characterized by an excessive self-admiration of one’s own attributes, and includes features of
grandiosity, arrogance, entitlement, and a lack of perceived need for personal change (Pincus,
2013; Stolorow, 1975; Wrzos, 1987). In its more extreme form, individuals may meet criteria for
a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As noted in
DSM, this disorder involves a pattern that is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of
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interpersonal and social situations, and is also marked by a lack of empathy for others. Because
individuals placed in the category of Non-Compensatory Narcissism are minimally influenced by
evaluative events or the need to match external standards, this type of self-appraisal can
sometimes involve delusional thinking. The individuals’ firmly held, distorted beliefs and
feelings of superiority are stable across time and situation and, thus, are essentially immune to
criticisms, threats or contradictory evidence. The current researcher asserts that, in contrast to
Compensatory Narcissism (see below), individuals in this category do not appear to be covering
deficits in self-perceptions; they are, in fact, secure in their beliefs.
For example, an attorney with Non-compensatory Narcissism who receives harsh
criticism from a judge is likely to respond unflappably, leaving the courtroom with a smirk on
her face, thinking that the judge is incompetent and inferior. Regardless of how accurate the
judge’s criticism might be, she blithely dismisses it as being worthless and invalid. Her selfappraisal is consistently more positive than is reflected by her actual courtroom trial outcomes or
many other judges’ perceptions of her. As another example, a Non-compensatory Narcissist
whose long-time girlfriend tells him she is breaking up with him would likely be unfazed and
react arrogantly by condescendingly and smugly informing her that the loss is all hers, without
even the slightest consideration that he might need to examine his own personality or behavior.
Being negligibly influenced by his girlfriend’s feelings or opinions, his self-appraisal remains
minimally affected, if affected at all, and continues to be more positive than is reflected by his
actual behavior or the perceptions of his girlfriend.
Compensatory narcissism. Compensatory Narcissism consists of self-appraisal that is
more positive than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of
others (distorted, inflated), but is also fragile, or highly influenced by evaluative events (both
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externally and internally generated) and/or the need to match external standards or expectations
across time and situation (unstable). Included within this category are individuals who meet a
clinical description of narcissism, which is characterized by an excessive self-admiration of
one’s own attributes, and includes features of grandiosity, arrogance, entitlement, and a lack of
perceived need for personal change (Pincus, 2013; Stolorow, 1975; Wrzos, 1987). In its more
extreme form, individuals may meet criteria for a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder as
set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). As noted in DSM, this disorder involves a pattern that is
inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of interpersonal and social situations, and is also
marked by a lack of empathy for others. In contrast to Non-compensatory Narcissism, this type
of self-appraisal is further delineated as being insecure in that it is highly influenced by
evaluative events and the need to match external standards or expectations across time and
situation. Therefore, the individual is in a psychological state of insecurity, attempting to make
up for the lack of stability of his or her self-appraisal by erecting a false persona of excessive
confidence as compensation. Theoretically and historically, narcissism has frequently been
characterized by extreme emotional reactivity. For example, Kohut (1976) and Kernberg (1975)
both spoke of narcissistic rage and a more general emotional lability characteristic of narcissism.
More recent research has shown that high narcissism predicts aggression (Bushman &
Baumeister, 1998). Even though measures of self-esteem have generally failed to predict
objective behaviors when it comes to aggression, high scores on measures of narcissism have
been empirically linked to aggressive retaliation (Baumesiter et al., 2003). According to DSM
(2013), “Vulnerability in self-esteem makes individuals with narcissistic personality disorder
very sensitive to ‘injury’ from criticism or defeat…[to which] they may react with disdain, rage,
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or defiant counterattacks” (p. 671). The current researcher asserts that it is specifically
Compensatory Narcissism (as compared to Non-compensatory Narcissism) that can be
characterized by this propensity towards aggressive retaliation, due to the emotional instability
and psychological insecurity underlying the compensating narcissists’ self-appraisal.
For example, the same attorney described above who receives criticism from a judge, if
instead placed within the Compensatory Narcissism category, would likely respond with rage,
criticizing the judge and slamming the door as she storms out of the courtroom. Although her
self-appraisal is more positive than is reflected by her actual courtroom performance or the
perceptions of judges, it is insecure, fragile and highly influenced by the need to match external
standards and expectations, resulting in her aggressive, emotionally explosive tantrum. As
another example, the same man described above whose girlfriend informs him she is breaking up
with him, if he were a Compensatory Narcissist, might frantically react with a sense of utter
panic, feeling deeply wounded and devastated at the very thought that someone would reject
him. Due to his self-appraisal being insecure and highly affected by evaluative events and
external standards, he would be emotionally distraught and engage in frantic attempts to protect
and preserve his distorted, inflated self-appraisal.
Pessimal self-esteem. Pessimal Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is more
negative than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of others
(distorted, negative), and is also minimally influenced by evaluative events (both externally and
internally generated) and/or by the need to match external standards across time and situation
(stable). Pessimal Self-Esteem is the theoretical opposite of Optimal High Self-Esteem. An
individual placed within this category appraises himself or herself in a manner that is
inconsistent with measurable factors (e.g., academic success, occupational success) or the way he
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or she is actually perceived by others. The individual’s self-appraisal remains distorted and
deflated regardless of evaluative events or external standards, resulting in an overall lack of
hope.
For example, a professional athlete with Pessimal Self-Esteem may have an impressive
athletic record, a significant fan base, and close friends and family members who are proud of
him; however, he consistently maintains a negative self-appraisal regardless of his achievements
or positive feedback from others.
Disorganized low self-esteem. Disorganized Low Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal
that is more negative than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions
of others (distorted, negative) and is also fragile, or highly influenced by evaluative events (both
externally and internally generated) and/or the need to match external standards or expectations
across time and situation (unstable). Therefore, individuals placed within this category may seek
or crave opportunities to elevate their overall self-appraisal by matching various external
standards or expectations of others; however, with a baseline self-appraisal that is generally
distorted and deflated, the individual is likely to be untrusting and doubting of any evidence that
might contradict his or her negative thoughts and feelings; thus, the individual’s self-appraisal
remains in a chaotic state and generally skewed in a negative direction.
For example, a man with Disorganized Low Self-Esteem may experience some success in
his career and within his interpersonal relationships, but will still maintain self-appraisal that is
skewed in a negative direction. Being highly influenced by the need to match external standards
and expectations, he finds himself consistently trapped in a chaotic, unstable state, torn between
seeking opportunities to refute his negative self-appraisal, but being wary of any evidence that
contradicts how he feels about himself and what he believes about himself.
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Recommendations for Researchers and Clinicians
Self-esteem has not proven to be the Holy Grail that psychologists and non-psychologists
alike once believed it to be, nor has the research supported the notion that a low self-esteem
epidemic is the cause of a wide range of social problems. However, as discussed previously, the
term did not become one of the top covariates occurring in personality and social psychology
research without reason. Regardless of the fact that the research has been plagued with
confusion, discrepancies and disagreements, self-esteem—both the concept and the term itself—
is far too embedded in the research literature and mass consciousness to discard altogether.
Rather than abandoning or replacing it, the current researcher proposes a reconceptualization (as
illustrated by the new model described above), one that incorporates a critical thinking
perspective and acknowledges the heterogeneity of the construct. With these ideas in mind, and
based upon the findings of the current investigation, the following are recommendations for
future researchers and clinicians:
Reaching consensus on a definition. As discussed above, given the long history of the
term, the research on self-esteem has given rise to a number of different definitions, based on
different assumptions and theories, and yielding different findings. This lack of conceptual
clarity is one of the primary reasons—if not the primary reason—for the rampant confusion
surrounding the construct. Without a common language currency as a foundation, the research
will continue to be inundated with conceptual and methodological problems. Just as agreed upon
definitions enable physicists to communicate with one another and with the public about such
basic concepts as heat, sound, or magnetism, psychologists also must strive for the same level of
consensus with regard to self-esteem. With the plethora of definitions of self-esteem that exist
currently, we are likely comparing apples to oranges when it comes to the various self-esteem
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measures and research findings. A comprehensive definition and theoretical model have been
proposed as part of the current study. Whether or not this particular version becomes widely
adopted, it is imperative that we reach consensus about how we describe and define the term.
Moreover, further research is indicated that specifically focuses on the generalizability of the
definition and model across cultures. From a clinical perspective, reaching consensus on the
specific nature of self-esteem will assist clinicians in diagnostic clarification, treatment planning
and selecting interventions. Understanding the multidimensional nature of self-esteem and the
full spectrum of ways that one’s self-appraisal can manifest itself—as opposed to the
oversimplified view of high versus low—will assist clinicians in becoming better diagnosticians
and psychotherapists.
Developing a measure of self-esteem as a heterogeneous construct. Attempts to
resolve the conflicting views of what exactly constitutes self-esteem have resulted in many
researchers suggesting that self-esteem is a multifaceted construct. Further, the current research
shows that what we have come to think of as self-esteem is a highly complex, dynamic concept
that cannot be accurately summarized or confined to a simple definition that is unidimensional
and fixed, focusing on just one aspect of human experience (e.g., feelings of worthiness).
Therefore, an assessment measure of self-esteem that captures the heterogeneity of the term and
accounts for multiple conceptual issues is greatly needed. Methodological and conceptual
problems in the research have made valid, useful measurement of self-esteem especially difficult.
As a remedy, the following are specific areas that should be addressed in developing an
improved self-esteem measure:
•

The new measure should possess psychometric properties that exceed those of the
current measures. In particular, since self-esteem is a hypothetical construct, the
measure must demonstrate evidence of construct validity (i.e., the scale actually
measures what it purports to measure). This would best be achieved by applying the
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mutitrait-multimethod matrix paradigm (described above), wherein convergence with
similar constructs and divergence from dissimilar constructs is established.
•

Based on the proposed definition, the future measure should account for both the
affective factors (feelings of self-worth) and the cognitive factors (self-efficacy) that
comprise self-esteem.

•

The future measure should yield scores for all eight types of self-esteem that have
been identified in the proposed model. Ideally, each score should fall along a different
dimensional scale, given that the sorting variables in the model are conceptualized as
continuous, rather than categorical variables. The resulting graph of self-esteem
scores might visually resemble the personality profiles found in the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2; Hathaway & McKinley, 1989) or the
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-III; Millon, Davis, & Grossman, 2006).

•

The social desirability of high self-esteem in North American culture generally leads
subjects to respond to face-valid items accordingly, thereby inflating self-esteem
scores on self-report measures. It is therefore recommended that future measures
include a validity scale or internal check for social desirability bias. An empirically
based correction scale (similar to the K scale in the MMPI-2) might be utilized to
statistically deflate respondents’ scores to more accurately reflect their true selfesteem, were they not responding in a socially desirable manner. The inclusion of
peer or observer ratings is also recommended to counterbalance the effects of social
desirability bias.

•

Further research is needed to explore the possible cultural biases in self-esteem
assessment. Even a measure that accounts for the heterogeneous nature of self-esteem
is still subject to cultural bias, as all social labels and categorizations are inherently
value laden.

Reducing the indiscriminate boosting of self-esteem. Some may argue that arbitrarily
boosting self-esteem is harmless because it feels good, it could be linked to happiness, and it
might even motivate people to accomplish things purely because they are striving for the
recognition and acknowledgement associated with enhancing self-esteem. However, we must not
ignore the ever-increasing amount of recent literature that has focused on the ensuing potential
costs of having, or even pursuing, self-esteem. Some of these include: breeding narcissism, more
biased perceptions of the future, increased tendency towards aggression, interference with
learning and mastery, and detrimental interpersonal effects (e.g., people focusing on themselves
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at the expense of others’ needs and feelings). With these potential costs in mind, the current
researcher urges future clinicians and researchers to devote greater attention to the second
component of the proposed definition (i.e., self-efficacy) as well as to measurable behavioral
outcomes. As discussed above, self-efficacy refers to people’s cognitive beliefs regarding their
capability to accomplish a certain level of performance (see Bandura, 2001) and has been shown
to be a useful and attainable clinical goal (Riggio, 2012). Focusing on one’s self-efficacy, along
with his or her actual behavior, might promote a more realistic sense of competence that is less
susceptible to the costs associated with arbitrarily attempting to make people simply feel good
about themselves.
Disentangling the links among self-esteem, happiness, and depression. Based upon
the current literature review, the research on self-esteem, happiness, and depression emerged as
yielding the only real consistent findings by far. Thus, this area warrants further study. However,
it is important for future researchers to remember the scientific tenet that the correlation between
two variables is just that—a correlation, not necessarily causation. Although the link between
high self-esteem and happiness, and low self-esteem and depression, appear strong, future
research should address the methodological shortcomings of the work that has been done thus far
to determine the exact nature of the relationships between these variables, including pathways
and direction of causation. We must also remember that, although much of the existing research
makes claims of meaningful relationships between these variables, statistically significant
relationships are not necessarily meaningful.
Future studies should attempt to identify (and possibly rule) out potential third variable
causes. For example, research might be indicated to determine to what degree the specific items
on certain commonly used self-report measures (e.g., The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, The
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Oxford Happiness Inventory) could be measuring the same construct. For instance, determining
to what degree low self-esteem is just one of the various symptoms of depression could account
for the overlap between items on self-report measures of both constructs (e.g., The Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale and the Beck Depression Inventory).
Avoiding common errors in thinking when conceptualizing self-esteem. In Chapter 3,
the current researcher addressed the question of why self-esteem is still widely misunderstood
when it is such a prominent concern of so many people, from mental health professionals to
Westernized civilizations at large. The following are specific guidelines for researchers,
clinicians, and many others in avoiding the same common errors in thinking that have
propagated and sustained this confusion for decades:
•

Remember that self-esteem is not a thing that someone actually has. Instead, it is a
human-made construct that should be evaluated in terms of its usefulness, rather than
its veracity. Understanding self-esteem in this manner will help to guard against
people being stuck in a relentless and ultimately elusive pursuit of something that
does not objectively exist in the world.

•

Avoid the tendency to dichotomize self-esteem, which is a continuous, not
categorical, variable. By learning to view self-esteem in more relative (and therefore
more realistic) terms, an individual can gain a greater sense of acceptance, flexibility,
and control over his or her life.

•

Do not confuse a name or a label with an explanation. To label individuals as having
high self-esteem or low self-esteem does not explain their emotions, behaviors,
thoughts, or life situations.

•

Work towards increasing awareness of your own and other people’s personal values
and biases because they inherently influence the language we use (e.g., high selfesteem vs. narcissism, low self-esteem vs. humility). Try to communicate these
values as openly and fairly as possible, as opposed to presenting them as if they were
objective reflections of truth.

•

Learn to differentiate between Barnum statements (e.g., My client has self-esteem
issues) versus specific interpretations that are based on a particular individual or
group. Statements about self-esteem issues are often so generic that they can be true
of practically all human beings. To reduce the Barnum Effect, use applicable
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specifiers (e.g., stable, fragile, inflated, compensatory) or descriptive words to denote
degree (e.g., mild, moderate, severe).
•

As we attempt to identify where the distinctions lie within the heterogeneous concept
of self-esteem, remember that the dimensions or variables selected for the purposes of
evaluation (e.g., cognitive vs. affective focus) will determine just how similar or
unique the various types or categories of self-appraisal (e.g., self-efficacy vs. selfesteem) turn out to be.

•

Do not confuse subjective prescriptions with objective descriptions. In particular,
remember that the quest to obtain high self-esteem is not universal. By conflating
what is common-uncommon with what is good-bad, clinicians and educators are not
only failing to uphold a commitment to cultural awareness and sensitivity, but could
also be contributing to the clinical problems they are seeking to alleviate.

Avoiding common misattributions when attempting to understand and change selfesteem. In attempting to understand any phenomena, we typically seek explanations that are
simple and easy to understand, which frequently results in making hasty and flawed attributions.
Keeping in mind some of the most common misattributions, the following are guidelines in order
to avoid settling for simple and uncomplicated explanations regarding self-esteem at the cost of
ensuring that they are also comprehensive and accurate:
•

Remember that how people behave depends on both internal and external
determinants, and we should never underestimate the power of external determinants.
We have a tendency to weigh internal causes (e.g., self-esteem) too heavily, and
external causes (e.g., one’s social environment) too lightly, which can be especially
problematic when it leads us to minimize or even ignore important sociocultural
factors that shape behavior.

•

Do not assume that a favorable response to an intervention proves the cause of the
problem. For example, if a therapist/researcher implements an intervention designed
to boost self-esteem for people in emotional distress, and a client-subject
subsequently exhibits a positive response on a mood scale, it does not necessarily
mean that the original cause of the individual’s distress was due to low self-esteem.
This common misattribution can lead to overlooking other causal factors as play.

•

Remember that what feels good is neither necessarily good nor necessarily true.
Research has linked high self-esteem to happiness, which naturally suggests that it
feels good. However, this link alone does not justify that we should indiscriminately
boost self-esteem amongst the populations we serve and ignore the potential
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associated costs (such as fueling narcissism). Put simply, we should not rely on our
emotions as the sole gauge for distinguishing between truth and falsehood.
Circumventing common pitfalls in future efforts to investigate self-esteem. While the
majority of the current investigation has been devoted to highlighting the problems and
discrepancies plaguing the existing research, the current researcher acknowledges both the
difficulty and the importance of understanding the complexities of our self-related thoughts,
feelings and behaviors. Thus, as stated above, despite the fact that the associated body of work as
been wrought with confusion, rather than abandoning or replacing self-esteem, the current
researcher urges a reconceptualization of the term. As future researchers and clinicians continue
to investigate the subject, the following are suggestions for avoiding some of obstacles and
pitfalls that have characterized efforts of the past:
•

Do not underestimate the extent to which our prior beliefs and expectations shape our
current perceptions. Our inclination to make data fit into our schemas (assimilation)
versus modifying our schemas to fit new data (accommodation) could account for our
propensity to distort or overlook the evidence that contradicts our common
assumptions about self-esteem (such as its lack of explanatory or predictive power).

•

Keep an open mind to points of view that challenge our existing beliefs. In our
Western, individualistic society, beliefs about the importance of high self-esteem are
not only widely accepted, but as research has shown, high self-esteem feels good.
Therefore, our emotional investment in these beliefs about self-esteem likely
contributes significantly to our tendency to discount, deny or simply ignore any
information that runs counter to them.

•

Make it a point to actively seek out evidence that could disconfirm our expectations.
As researchers and clinicians, we may be unknowingly gathering data and eliciting
information that affirms our common misconceptions about self-esteem, causing us to
cling to the same conclusions that have been refuted by the evidence time and again.

•

Remember that measuring something changes it. Due to the effects of reactivity,
researchers using self-report measures of self-esteem are never really ever able to
measure natural, authentic cognitions, feelings or behavior, which invariably
compromises the validity of their observations. Even if reactivity cannot be
eliminated completely, we can reduce its impact by choosing minimally reactive
measures or, at least, acknowledging its potential effects when conveying findings.
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•

Initiate safeguards to reduce the impact of self-fulfilling expectancy effects. With or
without our intent, the assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs we hold towards others
(e.g., assuming they are suffering from low self-esteem) could actually be
contributing to people inadvertently adopting these expected traits. As such,
continuing to believe that there is a widespread epidemic of low self-esteem might be
detrimental, given the growing amount of research on the potential costs of
indiscriminately boosting self-esteem.

•

Keep in mind that understanding a problem will not necessarily solve it. As we
continue our quest to both understand and improve self-esteem, we must remember
that insight alone into our thoughts and feelings about ourselves will not necessarily
change them.
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Biasing Factors Associated With Self-Report Measures: Glossary of Terms
bias of acquiescence The tendency for survey respondents to agree with statements regardless of
their content (Lavrakas, 2008).
bias of extreme responding The tendency for survey respondents to answer categorical rating
scales in the extreme, end-most intervals, across a wide range of item content (Lavrakas, 2008).
bias to the middle The tendency for respondents to avoid extremes and choose middle responses
as a way to provide safe answers (Williams, 2014).
demand characteristics Cues provided to research participants (e.g., by the experimenter, by the
research context, etc.), often unintentionally and inadvertently, regarding the appropriate or
desirable behavior. Demand characteristics might bias the outcome of an investigation, which
seriously undermines internal and external validity (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Liao, 2004).
faking bad/malingering Feigning impairment for secondary gain (Woo & Keatinge, 2008).
faking good Attempting to intentionally manipulate psychological test results in a
nonpathological direction (Bruns & Disorbio, 2014).
random responding The tendency of a respondent to answer questions without applying much
thought or effort. The respondent is essentially providing random answers, which are not an
accurate prediction of their opinions, attitudes, or behaviors (Williams, 2014).
reactivity A phenomenon wherein the conduct of research, in itself, affects the very entity that is
being studied; the extent to which measuring something causes it to change (Levy, 2010).
response set The tendency of an assessed individual to respond in a particular way to a variety
of instruments, such as when a respondent repeatedly answers as he or she believes the
researcher desires even when such answers do not reflect the respondent’s true feelings (Gay,
Mills, & Airasian, 2009).
social desirability The tendency of some respondents to report an answer in a way they deem to
be more socially acceptable than would be their true answer (Lavrakas, 2008).
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Complete List of Measures Cited by the Studies Reviewed
Measures of Self-Esteem:
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)
The Global Self-Worth Scale from Harter’s (1982) Perceived Competence Scale for
Children (PCSC)
The Harter (1985) Self-Perception Profile for Children (SPPC)
Implicit Measures of Self-Esteem
o Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000)
o Initial-preference task (IPT; Nuttin, 1985)
Weinberger Adjustment Inventory (Weinberger & Schwartz, 1990)

Measures of Happiness and Depression:
Happiness:
-‐ Bradburn Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965)
-‐ Gurin Scale (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1960)
-‐ Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI; Argyle, Martin, & Crossland, 1989)
-‐ Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999)
Depression:
-‐ Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, & Erbaugh, 1961)
-‐ Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)
-‐ Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960)
-‐ Hopkins Symptom Checklist (Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi, 1974)
Measures of Initiative:
Aggression:
-‐ 12-item delinquent behaviors scale adapted by Elliot, Huizinga, and Ageton (1985)
-‐ Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992)
Bullying and Victimization:
-‐ Peer Relations Questionnaire (Rigby & Slee, 1995)
Externalizing Problems:
-‐ Rutter Child Scale (RCS; Rutter, Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970)
-‐ Revised Behavior Problem Checklist (RBPC; Quay & Peterson, 1987)
Gender Role Tendencies:
-‐ Bem Gender Roles Inventory (Bem, 1974)
Initiating Romantic Intimacy:
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-‐

Markers of Starting Romantic Intimacy Scale (Eryilmaz & Atak, 2009)

Interpersonal Dependency:
-‐ Interpersonal Dependency Scale (IDI; Hirschfeld, 1976)
Narcissism:
-‐ Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988)
Non-Judgmental Accepting Stance:
-‐ Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills—accept without judgment subscale (KIMS-A;
Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004)
Parental Rearing Styles:
-‐ Parental Bonding Instrument (Parker, Tupling, & Brown, 1979)
Prosocial Behavior:
-‐ Ratings of Children’s Social Behavior Scale (CSBS; Crick, 1996)
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Directions: The next questions ask about your current feelings about yourself. For each of the
following, please circle the number that corresponds with the answer that best describes how
strongly you agree or disagree with the statement about yourself now.
For the items marked with an (R), reverse the scoring (0=3, 1=2, 2=1, 3=0). For those items
without an (R) next to them, simply add the score. Add the scores. Typical scores on the
Rosenberg scale are around 22, with most people scoring between 15-25. Scores below 15
suggest low self-esteem.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

I feel that I am a person of worth, or
at least on an equal plane with others.
I feel that I have a number of good
qualities.
All in all, I’m inclined to feel that I
am a failure. (R)
I am able to do things as well as most
other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud
of. (R)
I take a positive attitude toward
myself.
On the whole, I am satisfied with
myself.
I certainly feel useless at times. (R)
I wish I could have more respect for
myself. (R)
At times, I think I am no good at all.
(R)

Note. From Rosenberg (1965).

Strongly
Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Somewhat
Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

3

2

1

0

3

2

1

0

0

1

2

3

3

2

1

0

0

1

2

3

3

2

1

0

3

2

1

0

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

0

1

2

3
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Harter’s Self-Perception Profile for Children
Instructions to the Child: We have some sentences here and, as you can see from the top of your
sheet where it says, “What I am like,” we are interested in what each of you is like, what kind of
person you are like. Thus is a survey, not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Since kids
are very different from one another, each of you will be putting down something different.
First, let me explain how these questions work. There is a sample question at the top marked (a).
I’ll read it out loud and you follow along with me. (Examiner reads the sample question). This
question talks about kinds of kids, and we want to know which kids are most like you.
(1) So, what I want you to decide first is whether you are more like the kids on the left side
who would rather play outdoors, or whether you are more like the kids on the right side
who would rather watch T.V. Don’t mark anything yet, but first decide which kinds of
kids are most like you, and go to that side of the sentence.
(2) Now the second thing I want you to think about, now that you have decided which kinds
of kids are most like you, is to decide whether that is only sort of true for you, or really
true for you. If it’s only sort of true, then put an X in the box under “Sort of True for me;”
if it’s really true for you, then put an X in that box, under “Really True for me.”
(3) For each sentence, you only check one box. Sometimes it will be on one side of the page,
another time it will be on the other side of the page, but you can only check one box for
each sentence. YOU DON’T CHECK BOTH SIDES, JUST THE ONE SIDE MOST
LIKE YOU.
(4) OK, that one was just for practice. Now we have some more sentences that I will read out
loud. For each one, just check one box- the one that goes with what is true for you, what
you are most like.
What I Am Like
Really Sort
True
of
for me True
for me
a.

1.

2.

Sort
Really
of
True
True
for me
for me
Sample: Some kids
would rather play
outdoors in their spare
time
Some kids feel that they
are very good at their
school work

Sample: Other kids
would rather watch T.V.

Other kids worry about
whether they can do the
school work assigned to
them
Some kids find it hard to Other kids find it pretty
make friends
east to make friends
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Some kids do very well
at all kinds of sports

Other kids don’t feel that
they are very good when
it comes to sports
Some kids are happy
Other kids are not happy
with the way they look
with the way they look
Some kids often do not
Other kids usually like
like the way they behave the way they behave
Some kids are unhappy
Other kids are pretty
with themselves
pleased with themselves
Some kids feel like they Other kids aren’t so sure
are just as smart as other and wonder if they are as
kids their age
smart
Some kids know how to Other kids don’t know
make classmates like
how to make classmates
them
like them
Some kids wish they
Other kids feel they are
could be a lot better at
good enough at sports
sports
Some kids are happy
Other kids wish their
with their height and
height or weight were
weight
different
Some kids usually do
Other kids often don’t do
the right thing
the right thing
Some kids don’t like the Other kids do like the
way they are leading
way they are leading
their life
their life
Some kids are pretty
Other kids can do their
slow in finishing their
school work quickly
school work
Some kids don’t have
Other kids do have the
the social skills to make social skills to make
friends
friends
Some kids think they
Other kids are afraid they
could do well at just
might not do well at
about any new sports
sports they haven’t ever
activity they haven’t
tried
trued before
Some kids wish their
Other kids like their body
body was different
the way it is
Some kids usually act
Other kids often don’t act
the way they know they the way they are
are supposed to
supposed to
Some kids are happy
Other kids are often not
with themselves as a
happy with themselves
person
Some kids often forget
Other kids can remember
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20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

what they learn
Some kids understand
how to get peers to
accept them
Some kids feel that they
are better than others
their age at sports
Some kids wish their
physical appearance
(how they look) was
different
Some kids usually get in
trouble because of
things they do
Some kids like the kind
of person they are
Some kids do very well
at their classwork
Some kids wish they
knew how to make more
friends
In game and sports some
kids usually watch
instead of play
Some kids wish
something about their
face or hair looked
different
Some kids do things
they know they
shouldn’t do
Some kids are very
happy being the way
they are
Some kids have trouble
figuring out the answers
in school
Some kids know how to
become popular
Some kids don’t do well
at outdoor games
Some kids think they are
good looking
Some kids behave
themselves very well

things easily
Other kids don’t
understand how to get
peers to accept them
Other kids don’t feel they
can play as well
Other kids like their
physical appearance the
way it is
Other kids usually do
things that get them in
trouble
Other kids often wish
they were someone else
Other kids don’t do very
well at their classwork
Other kids know how to
make as many friends as
they want
Other kids usually play
rather than watch
Other kids like their face
and hair the way they are
Other kids hardly ever do
things they know they
shouldn’t do
Other kids wish they
were different
Other kids almost always
figure out the answers
Other kids do not know
how to become popular
Other kids are good at
new games right away
Other kids think that they
are not very good looking
Other kids often find it
hard to behave
themselves
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36.

Some kids are not very
happy with the way they
do a lot of things

Susan Harter, Ph.D., University of Denver, 2012

Other kids think they
way they do things is fine

